Board of directors and top management team: a study on CEO relative power and financial return

Best corporate governance practices published in the primers of Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission and the Brazilian Corporate Governance Institute promote board independence as much as possible, as a way to increase the effectiveness of governance mechanism (Sanzovo, 2010). Therefore, this paper aims at understanding if what the managerial literature portraits as being self-evident - stricter governance, better performance - can be observed in actual evidence. The question answered is: do companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others? The method applied in this paper consists on comparing 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. From the 534 companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Sao Paulo – Bovespa – 116 were selected due to their level of corporate governance. The title “Novo Mercado” refers to the superior level of governance level within companies listed in Bovespa, as they have to follow specific criteria to assure shareholders ´protection (BM&F, 2011). Regression analyses were conducted in order to reveal the correlation level between two selected variables. The results from the regression analysis were the following: the correlation between each parameter and ROA was 10.26%; the second regression analysis conducted measured the correlation between the independence level of top management team vis-à-vis board directors – namely, CEO relative power - and ROA, leading to a multiple R of 5.45%. Understanding that the scale is a simplification of the reality, the second part of the analysis transforms all the four parameters into dummy variables, excluding what could be called as an arbitrary scale. The ultimate result from this paper led to a multiple R of 28.44%, which implies that the combination of the variables are still not enough to translate the complex reality of organizations. Nonetheless, an important finding can be taken from this paper: two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression, with p-value lower than 10% and with negative coefficients. In other words, counter affirming what the literature very often portraits as being self-evident – stricter governance leads to higher performance – this paper has provided evidences to believe that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. The section limitations and suggestions for future researches presents some reasons explaining why, although supported by strong theoretical background, this paper faced some challenging methodological assumptions, precluding categorical statements about the level of governance – measured by four selected parameters – and the financial return in terms of financial on assets.

Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions

In this note, in an independent private values auction framework, I discuss the relationship between the set of types and the distribution of types. I show that any set of types, finite dimensional or not, can be extended to a larger set of types preserving incentive compatibility constraints, expected revenue and bidder’s expected utilities. Thus for example we may convexify a set of types making our model amenable to the large body of theory in economics and mathematics that relies on convexity assumptions. An interesting application of this extension procedure is to show that although revenue equivalence is not valid in general if the set of types is not convex these mechanism have underlying distinct allocation mechanism in the extension. Thus we recover in these situations the revenue equivalence.

EVA : economic value added : resumo e aplicação da metodologia

Faz uma exposição da metodologia EVA®, demonstrando sua aplicação no gerenciamento da empresa e na avaliação de seu desempenho. Particularmente, mostra sua utilidade como no ferramenta de aferição e incentivo de seus dirigentes, bem como de seu uso em decisões de investimento e desinvestimento

Forecasting Multivariate Time Series under Present-Value-Model Short- and Long-run Co-movement Restrictions

This paper has two original contributions. First, we show that the present value model (PVM hereafter), which has a wide application in macroeconomics and fi nance, entails common cyclical feature restrictions in the dynamics of the vector error-correction representation (Vahid and Engle, 1993); something that has been already investigated in that VECM context by Johansen and Swensen (1999, 2011) but has not been discussed before with this new emphasis. We also provide the present value reduced rank constraints to be tested within the log-linear model. Our second contribution relates to forecasting time series that are subject to those long and short-run reduced rank restrictions. The reason why appropriate common cyclical feature restrictions might improve forecasting is because it finds natural exclusion restrictions preventing the estimation of useless parameters, which would otherwise contribute to the increase of forecast variance with no expected reduction in bias. We applied the techniques discussed in this paper to data known to be subject to present value restrictions, i.e. the online series maintained and up-dated by Shiller. We focus on three different data sets. The fi rst includes the levels of interest rates with long and short maturities, the second includes the level of real price and dividend for the S&P composite index, and the third includes the logarithmic transformation of prices and dividends. Our exhaustive investigation of several different multivariate models reveals that better forecasts can be achieved when restrictions are applied to them. Moreover, imposing short-run restrictions produce forecast winners 70% of the time for target variables of PVMs and 63.33% of the time when all variables in the system are considered.

Acões de crescimento e valor no Brasil : um estudo dos retornos e determinantes da convergência do múltiplo P/B

Este trabalho busca compreender melhor as fontes de retorno de ações de valor e crescimento e os determinantes da convergência do indicador preço sobre valor patrimonial (P/B). Foram criados seis carteiras durante o período de 2001 a 2013, sendo elas classificadas de acordo com o seu múltiplo (P/B) e sua capitalização de mercado. O retorno divido entre dividendos e ganhos de capital, este foi dividido em: (1) crescimento do valor patrimonial, (2) convergência do indicador preço sobre valor patrimonial (P/B), devido a reversão de rentabilidade, crescimento e retorno esperado e (3) efeito drift. Também buscou-se determinar quais os principais fatores macro que afetam a convergência do indicador P/B. Foi realizada uma regressão linear múltipla utilizando como variáveis independentes a valorização do Ibovespa, PIB, juros reais, surpresa inflacionária e dummies (small, growth e value). A carteira big growth apresentou o melhor desempenho, seguido da carteira small value. O retorno de dividendos foi mais importante para os portfólios big em relação à small e para as carteiras value em relação às growth. Ao analisar o ganho de capital, verificou-se que o crescimento do valor patrimonial é maior para empresas growth, enquanto o efeito da convergência é mais importante para empresas valor. Verificou-se que o retorno do Ibovespa, surpresa inflacionária e o baixo valor de mercado influenciam positivamente a convergência do P/B. Já o pagamento os juros reais, PIB e a dummy growth influenciam negativamente.