Valores, atitudes e intenção empreendedora: um estudo com universitários brasileiros e cabo-verdianos

A presente pesquisa apresentou como seu objetivo principal verificar as relações entre valores, atitude em relação ao empreendedorismo (AE) e intenção empreendedora (IE) em um estudo comparativo com universitários de graduação em Administração das Cinco Regiões Brasileiras e Cabo Verde. O instrumento de pesquisa foi composto por um questionário sócio demográfico, a escala de Valores Humanos – Questionário de Perfis de Valores de Schwartz(2001) e o Questionário de Intenção Empreendedora de Liñán & Chen (2009). Após o consentimento livre e informado, os alunos responderam o instrumento de pesquisa, perfazendo um total de 1561 respostas válidas. Os dados foram tabulados e analisados nos Softwares: SPSS 21 e AMOS 21 para a produção de Estatísticas Descritivas, Análises de Confiabilidade, Análises de Correlação, Análise de Variância (ANOVA), Gráficos, Análise Fatorial Confirmatória e Modelagem de Equações Estruturais (SEM). Os modelos utilizaram a Teoria de Ação Racional (FISHBEIN & AJZEN,1971) e Teoria do Comportamento Planejado(AJZEN,1991), testando o impacto dos valores nas atitudes e intenções. Os resultados indicaram que os valores de Estimulação, Poder e Hedonismo foram tiveram os maiores efeitos na IE e na AE. Diferenças significativas foram encontradas entre os gêneros, com os homens apresentando maior IE e AE. Diferenças regionais foram encontradas. Limitações, implicações práticas e teóricas, além de sugestões para pesquisas futuras são apresentadas.

The spenders-hoarders theory of capital accumulations, wealth distribution and fiscal policy

This paper proposes a simple OLG model which is consistent with the essential facts about consumer behavior, capital accumulation and wealth distribution, and yields some new and surprising conclusions about fiscal policy. By considering a society in which individuais are distinguished according to two characteristics, altruism and wealth preference, we show that those who in the long run hold the bulk of private capital are not so rnuch motivated by dynastic altruism as by preference for wealth. Two types of social segmentation can result with different wcalth distribution. To a large extcnt our results seem to fit reality better than those obtained with standard optimal growth models in which dynastic altruism ( or r ate o f impatience) is the only source of heterogeneity: overaccumulation can appear, public debt and unfunded pensions are not neutra!, estate taxation can improve the welfare of the top wealthy.

Overdetermination in a marxian theory of money

O presente artigo focaliza a genérica e abstrata análise monetária desenvolvida por Marx no inicio do Capital. Mais precisamente, pretende-se avaliar em que medida, se alguma, alguns aspectos da análise de Marx sobre o papel bastante contraditório desempenhado pela moeda no processo de circulação simples de mercadorias suportam uma interpretação sobre-determinista do método dialético por ele empregado. Baseando-se no conceito de sobre-determinação introduzido na literature Marxiana principalmente por Louis Althusser, o artigo conclui que o nexo real-monetário prevalecente na circulação simples de mercadorias pode ser concebida como um nexo sobre-determinado, ou seja, um nexo caracterizado por incorporar um regime de constitutividade.

The theory of storage and the volatility in commadity markets

Esse estudo estende a metodologia de Fama e French (1988) para testar a hipótese derivada da Teoria dos Estoques de que o convenience yield dos estoques diminui a uma taxa decrescente com o aumento de estoque. Como descrito por Samuelson (1965), a Teoria implica que as variações nos preços à vista (spot) e dos futuros (ou dos contratos a termo) serão similares quando os estoques estão altos, mas os preços futuros variarão menos que os preços à vista quando os estoques estão baixos. Isso ocorre porque os choques de oferta e demanda podem ser absorvidos por ajustes no estoque quando este está alto, afetando de maneira similar os preços à vista e futuros. Por outro lado, quando os estoques estão baixos, toda a absorção dos choques de demanda ou oferta recai sobre o preço à vista, uma vez que os agentes econômicos têm pouca condição de reagir à quantidade demandada ou ofertada no curto prazo.

Testing the optimality of aggregate consumption decisions: is there rule-of-thumb behavior?

Consumption is an important macroeconomic aggregate, being about 70% of GNP. Finding sub-optimal behavior in consumption decisions casts a serious doubt on whether optimizing behavior is applicable on an economy-wide scale, which, in turn, challenge whether it is applicable at all. This paper has several contributions to the literature on consumption optimality. First, we provide a new result on the basic rule-of-thumb regression, showing that it is observational equivalent to the one obtained in a well known optimizing real-business-cycle model. Second, for rule-of-thumb tests based on the Asset-Pricing Equation, we show that the omission of the higher-order term in the log-linear approximation yields inconsistent estimates when lagged observables are used as instruments. However, these are exactly the instruments that have been traditionally used in this literature. Third, we show that nonlinear estimation of a system of N Asset-Pricing Equations can be done efficiently even if the number of asset returns (N) is high vis-a-vis the number of time-series observations (T). We argue that efficiency can be restored by aggregating returns into a single measure that fully captures intertemporal substitution. Indeed, we show that there is no reason why return aggregation cannot be performed in the nonlinear setting of the Pricing Equation, since the latter is a linear function of individual returns. This forms the basis of a new test of rule-of-thumb behavior, which can be viewed as testing for the importance of rule-of-thumb consumers when the optimizing agent holds an equally-weighted portfolio or a weighted portfolio of traded assets. Using our setup, we find no signs of either rule-of-thumb behavior for U.S. consumers or of habit-formation in consumption decisions in econometric tests. Indeed, we show that the simple representative agent model with a CRRA utility is able to explain the time series data on consumption and aggregate returns. There, the intertemporal discount factor is significant and ranges from 0.956 to 0.969 while the relative risk-aversion coefficient is precisely estimated ranging from 0.829 to 1.126. There is no evidence of rejection in over-identifying-restriction tests.

Contributions to the Theory of Optimal Tests

This paper considers tests which maximize the weighted average power (WAP). The focus is on determining WAP tests subject to an uncountable number of equalities and/or inequalities. The unifying theory allows us to obtain tests with correct size, similar tests, and unbiased tests, among others. A WAP test may be randomized and its characterization is not always possible. We show how to approximate the power of the optimal test by sequences of nonrandomized tests. Two alternative approximations are considered. The rst approach considers a sequence of similar tests for an increasing number of boundary conditions. This discretization allows us to implement the WAP tests in practice. The second method nds a sequence of tests which approximate the WAP test uniformly. This approximation allows us to show that WAP similar tests are admissible. The theoretical framework is readily applicable to several econometric models, including the important class of the curved-exponential family. In this paper, we consider the instrumental variable model with heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors (HAC-IV) and the nearly integrated regressor model. In both models, we nd WAP similar and (locally) unbiased tests which dominate other available tests.

The role of the BNDES in the Brazilian development financing: contributions from the paper “towards a legal theory of finance” of Katharina Pistor

This paper aims to verify the main contributions and adjustments that the paper “Towards a Legal Theory of Finance” from Katharina Pistor may bring to the role of the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) in the Brazilian development financing. In order to do so, I work with two questions in this paper: (i) such theory presents elements which allow analyzing the role of the BNDES and from there, if it is required, adjustments can be made in the governance of the BNDES? and (ii) there are academics and scholars that, together with the theory, also contribute with the improvement of the BNDES role in the development of Brazil?

A theory of weekly specials

Multiproduct retailers facing similar costs and serving the same public commonly announce different weekly specials. These promotional prices also seem to evolve randomly over the weeks. Here, weekly specials are viewed as the strategic outcome of an oligopolistic price competition among multiproduct retail stores facing nonconvex costs. Existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies is proven. ldentical stores serving the same public will never charge the same price vector with probability one (cross-store price dispersion). Mixed strategies can generate random price dispersion over time in the repeated version of the mode!.

Toward a theory of international currency : a step further

We generalize the two-country, two-currency model of Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui to resolve two "shortcomings" in their approach. First, we endogenize prices and excb.ange rates. Second, we introduce monetary policy. We then use the model to address the following new questions: How does the fact that a currency circulates intemationally affect its purcb.asing power? Where does an intemational currency purcb.ase more? What are the effects on seignorage and welfare when a currency becomes intemational? How is policy affected by concems of currency substitution? How are national monetary policies connected, and what is the scope for international cooperation?

Law and economics in the civil law world: the case of Brazilian Courts

Conventional wisdom holds that economic analysis of law is either embryonic or nonexistent outside of the United States generally and in civil law jurisdictions in particular. Existing explanations for the assumed lack of interest in the application of economic reasoning to legal problems range from the different structure of legal education and academia outside of the United States to the peculiar characteristics of civilian legal systems. This paper challenges this view by documenting and explaining the growing use of economic reasoning by Brazilian courts. We argue that, given the ever-greater role of courts in the formulation of public policies, the application of legal principles and rules increasingly calls for a theory of human behavior (such as that provided by economics) to help foresee the likely aggregate consequences of different interpretations of the law. Consistent with the traditional role of civilian legal scholarship in providing guidance for the application of law by courts, the further development of law and economics in Brazil is therefore likely to be mostly driven by judicial demand.

A Theory of voter experimentation in repeated elections

Nesse artigo, eu desenvolvo e analiso um modelo de dois perí odos em que dois polí ticos competem pela preferência de um eleitor representativo, que sabe quão benevolente é um dos polí ticos mas é imperfeitamente informado sobre quão benevolente é o segundo polí tico. O polí tico conhecido é interpretado como um incumbente de longo prazo, ao passo que o polí tico desconhecido é interpretado como um desa fiante menos conhecido. É estabelecido que o mecanismo de provisão de incentivos inerente às elei cões - que surge através da possibilidade de não reeleger um incumbente - e considerações acerca de aquisi cão de informa cão por parte do eleitor se combinam de modo a determinar que em qualquer equilí brio desse jogo o eleitor escolhe o polí tico desconhecido no per íodo inicial do modelo - uma a cão à qual me refi ro como experimenta cão -, fornecendo assim uma racionaliza cão para a não reelei cão de incumbentes longevos. Especifi camente, eu mostro que a decisão do eleitor quanto a quem eleger no per odo inicial se reduz à compara cão entre os benefí cios informacionais de escolher o polí tico desconhecido e as perdas econômicas de fazê-lo. Os primeiros, que capturam as considera cões relacionadas à aquisi cão de informa cão, são mostrados serem sempre positivos, ao passo que as últimas, que capturam o incentivo à boa performance, são sempre não-negativas, implicando que é sempre ótimo para o eleitor escolher o polí tico desconhecido no per íodo inicial.