Dynamic hedging with stocastic differential utility

In this paper we study the dynamic hedging problem using three different utility specifications: stochastic differential utility, terminal wealth utility, and we propose a particular utility transformation connecting both previous approaches. In all cases, we assume Markovian prices. Stochastic differential utility, SDU, impacts the pure hedging demand ambiguously, but decreases the pure speculative demand, because risk aversion increases. We also show that consumption decision is, in some sense, independent of hedging decision. With terminal wealth utility, we derive a general and compact hedging formula, which nests as special all cases studied in Duffie and Jackson (1990). We then show how to obtain their formulas. With the third approach we find a compact formula for hedging, which makes the second-type utility framework a particular case, and show that the pure hedging demand is not impacted by this specification. In addition, with CRRA- and CARA-type utilities, the risk aversion increases and, consequently the pure speculative demand decreases. If futures price are martingales, then the transformation plays no role in determining the hedging allocation. We also derive the relevant Bellman equation for each case, using semigroup techniques.

Optimal IV estimation of systems with stochastic regressors and var disturbances with applications to dynamic systems

This paper considers the general problem of Feasible Generalized Least Squares Instrumental Variables (FG LS IV) estimation using optimal instruments. First we summarize the sufficient conditions for the FG LS IV estimator to be asymptotic ally equivalent to an optimal G LS IV estimator. Then we specialize to stationary dynamic systems with stationary VAR errors, and use the sufficient conditions to derive new moment conditions for these models. These moment conditions produce useful IVs from the lagged endogenous variables, despite the correlation between errors and endogenous variables. This use of the information contained in the lagged endogenous variables expands the class of IV estimators under consideration and there by potentially improves both asymptotic and small-sample efficiency of the optimal IV estimator in the class. Some Monte Carlo experiments compare the new methods with those of Hatanaka [1976]. For the DG P used in the Monte Carlo experiments, asymptotic efficiency is strictly improved by the new IVs, and experimental small-sample efficiency is improved as well.

Non-asymptotic confidence bounds for the optimal value of a stochastic program

We discuss a general approach to building non-asymptotic confidence bounds for stochastic optimization problems. Our principal contribution is the observation that a Sample Average Approximation of a problem supplies upper and lower bounds for the optimal value of the problem which are essentially better than the quality of the corresponding optimal solutions. At the same time, such bounds are more reliable than “standard” confidence bounds obtained through the asymptotic approach. We also discuss bounding the optimal value of MinMax Stochastic Optimization and stochastically constrained problems. We conclude with a small simulation study illustrating the numerical behavior of the proposed bounds.

Multistep stochastic mirror descent for risk-averse convex stochastic programs based on extended polyhedral risk measures

We consider risk-averse convex stochastic programs expressed in terms of extended polyhedral risk measures. We derive computable con dence intervals on the optimal value of such stochastic programs using the Robust Stochastic Approximation and the Stochastic Mirror Descent (SMD) algorithms. When the objective functions are uniformly convex, we also propose a multistep extension of the Stochastic Mirror Descent algorithm and obtain con dence intervals on both the optimal values and optimal solutions. Numerical simulations show that our con dence intervals are much less conservative and are quicker to compute than previously obtained con dence intervals for SMD and that the multistep Stochastic Mirror Descent algorithm can obtain a good approximate solution much quicker than its nonmultistep counterpart. Our con dence intervals are also more reliable than asymptotic con dence intervals when the sample size is not much larger than the problem size.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.