How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Brazil and Turkey, a comparative analysis of both countries' economic development and institutional design from the Great Depression to the early 21st century

Apos uma década de rápido crescimento econômico na primeira década do século 21, Brasil e Turquia foram considerados duas das economias emergentes mais dinâmicas e promissoras. No entanto, vários sinais de dificuldades econômicas e tensões políticas reapareceram recentemente e simultaneamente nos dois países. Acreditamos que esses sinais e a sua simultaneidade podem ser entendidos melhor com um olhar retrospectivo sobre a história econômica dos dois países, que revela ser surpreendentemente paralela. Numa primeira parte, empreendemos uma comparação abrangente da história econômica brasileira e turca para mostrar as numerosas similaridades entre os desafios de política econômica que os dois países enfrentaram, assim como entre as respostas que eles lhes deram desde a virada da Grande Depressão até a primeira década do século 21. Essas escolhas de política econômica comuns dão forma a uma trajetória de desenvolvimento notavelmente análoga, caracterizada primeiro pela adoção do modelo de industrialização por substituição das importações (ISI) no contexto da recessão mundial dos anos 1930; depois pela intensificação e crise final desse modelo nos anos 1980; e finalmente por duas décadas de estabilização e transição para um modelo econômico mais liberal. Numa segunda parte, o desenvolvimento das instituições econômicas e políticas, assim como da economia política subjacente nos dois países, são analisados comparativamente a fim de prover alguns elementos de explicação do paralelo observado na primeira parte. Sustentamos que o marco institucional estabelecido nos dois países durante esse período também têm varias características fundamentais em comum e contribui a explicar as escolhas de política econômica e as performances econômicas comparáveis, detalhadas na primeira parte. Este estudo aborda elementos do contexto histórico úteis para compreender a situação econômica e política atual nos dois países. Potencialmente também constitui uma tentativa de considerar as economias emergentes numa perspectiva histórica e comparativa mais ampla para entender melhor as suas fraquezas institucionais e adotar um olhar mais equilibrado sobre seu potencial econômico.

Watching the World Cup, one data point at a time

Retirado do blog de Marc Pickren do dia 13 jun. 2014.

Watching the World Cup, one data point at a time

Sound the vuvuzelas, the World Cup is officially here. The biggest sporting event in the world is set to break all kinds of viewing records. Sporting in the digital world is just as much about stats as it is about the game itself. Enter Brandwatch. The social media analytics company has taken it upon itself to track social media statistics for the entire run of the World Cup with their new real-time data visualization tool.

Wood : from the forest to the consumer

Illegal logging causes a number of environmental and social damages in countries where wood is sourced from native forests. Logging in protected areas is an act of irresponsibility that exacerbates the loss of biodiversity. In addition, uncontrolled deforestation and bushfires may aggravate climate change, not to mention the negative effects they impose on local populations, such as the impoverishment of rural communities whose livelihoods depend on forest products. Several studies show that Brazil ranks high in terms of irresponsible use of natural resources, including native wood from the Amazon. Even more worrisome is the fact that the state, despite being responsible for regulating logging activities, is one of the largest consumers of native wood, which subverts the goals of any government committed to sustainable environmental management. By monitoring the development and impacts of illegal timber production and consumption around the world, the Friends of the Amazon Network – an initiative by the Getulio Vargas Foundation with support from the British Government and the European Commission – identified a need to describe and evaluate, in a brief and instructive manner, the different mechanisms the state has available to reverse this predatory practice. One of the aspects discussed in this book is the role of civil servants in major efforts aimed at repressing illegal logging and timber production, as well as identifying products derived from these activities in order to prevent their consumption. This is the purpose of this publication, which uses detailed infographics and a journalistic approach, including interviews and true stories, to outline the complexity of Amazon timber’s chain of custody – from logging, processing and transportation to commercialization in the Brazilian market.

A note on financial regulation and the brazilian response to the 2008‐09 financial crisis

Brazil was frequently criticized for its interventionist and heavy financial regulation up until the 2008‐09 world financial crisis.  According to the neo‐liberal or pro‐market view that predominated in academic and financial circles during the early 2000s, economic development came together with financial deepening, which in its turn could only be achieved through financial liberalization and deregulation. The currency crises of the 1990s notwithstanding, by the mid‐2000s Brazil’s segmented financial market and its restrictive reserve and capital requirements were seen as a symbol of inefficiency and backwardness by most financial specialists.  To the luck of the Brazilian population, most of the advices of such specialists were ignored by the Brazilian authorities, so that, when the 2008 financial crisis hit the world economy, Brazil still had powerful and efficient instruments to deal with the problem.  The objective of this note is to present the mains aspects of the Brazilian financial regulation and how they helped the economy to deal with the consequences of 2008‐09 financial meltdown.