Motivação para o trabalho como fator de produtividade e criatividade em empresas de médio porte - o caso ACEPLAC

O propósito primeiro desta dissertação foi o de mostrar, por meio de um estudo de caso, o da ACEPLAC, a aplicação do conceito de motivação como fator de criatividade e incremento de produção, em empresas de médio porte, sustentado por um modelo de gestão e de projetos de recompensa. Buscou-se justificar tal modelo pela observação sistemática dos esforços de trabalho, que se mostraram capazes de manter a motivação organizacional, apesar de sua volatilidade e voluntariedade. O método visava a trazer a experiência no campo concreto para o campo do conhecimento. Para isto, dividiu-se o longo processo em passos distintos, em que a obtenção de um arcabouço teórico sobre o complexo fenômeno que representa a motivação para o trabalho revelou-se o inequívoco ponto de partida. O estudo das várias características desse fenômeno e das inúmeras contribuições apresentadas desde Elton Mayo e Mary Follet até os dias atuais permitiu a construção de instrumental seguro para a análise crítica da realidade observada. Fez-se a opção de desenvolver a análise por meio do estudo de caso selecionado, uma vez que se pretendia ligar as abordagens teóricas à prática de modelos eficazes. O objetivo foi sinalizar para executivos e gerentes de empresas de médio porte aspectos relevantes para sua constituição e operacionalização, criando, assim, um panorama sobre a temática capaz de gerar novas alternativas para a tomada de decisão relativa ao assunto. Esse modelo é significativo porque conseguiu reduzir os aspectos voláteis e maximizar a voluntariedade dos empregados. O referido caso é rico em experiências, decisões e exemplos que podem ser adaptados e levados a outras empresas do mesmo porte. A análise criteriosa de todo o material de pesquisa levantado possibilitou a confirmação da afirmativa inicial, a qual priorizava a motivação como fator de criatividade e incremento de produção nas empresas de médio porte. Essas conclusões culminaram com a implantação do referido modelo, em maio de 1994, na Acesita Placas S/A - ACEPLAC.

As mudanças nos processos de gestão do conhecimento: o caso Embratel

o aumento da competição despertou nas organizações a necessidade de reverem seus processos. Com o advento do fenômeno da globalização, associado ao desenvolvimento das telecomunicações, da tecnologia da informação e dos processos de logística, os mercados ficaram cada vez mais restritos, fazendo com que a inovação no desenvolvimento de produtos e o correto entendimento das necessidades dos clientes passassem a representar um diferencial de mercado. Para os profissionais, estas mudanças representaram novos desafios no tocante à cobrança por resultados e à manutenção da empregabilidade. No meio de todas estas mudanças, surge no cenário empresarial e acadêmico um novo processo de gestão, conhecido por gestão do conhecimento. Além disso, os efeitos deste novo cenário levou à abertura de mercados até então restritos, dentre eles o de telecomunicações, cujas empresas operadoras brasileiras foram privatizadas em 1998. Entre ela, insere-se a Empresa Brasileira de Telecomunicações (Embratel), criada em 1965 com a função de integrar o país por meio das telecomunicações. Atuando com um perfil de engenharia por 30 anos, a Embratel se viu obrigada a promover profundas mudanças em seus processos internos e no perfil de seus profissionais para se transformar em uma empresa prestadora de serviços, implantando e reformulando sistemáticas voltadas à aquisição e desenvolvimento de novas competências. Este estudo apresenta uma análise das mudanças do processo da gestão do conhecimento na EmbrateL a partir da privatização do setor de telecomunicações no Brasil. O método utilizado foi a análise de conteúdo, feita com base em dados coletados no campo, em documentos e na bibliografia existente. F oram analisados os principais processos da gestão do conhecimento ao longo da vida da EmbrateL dividindo-a em três períodos: de 1965 a 1994, período essencialmente estatal; de 1995 a 1997, período em que a empresa viveu sua transição para a privatização, e a partir de 1998, período de ambiente privado. O estudo permitiu concluir que, apesar de terem sido observadas mudanças nos indicadores de aquisição e desenvolvimento de conhecimento, a Embratel demonstra ser uma empresa na qual sempre existiu o processo de gestão do conhecimento, o que certamente contribuiu para sua história de sucesso.

REPETRO - Regime Aduaneiro Especial de Importação e Exportação de Bens Destinados à Pesquisa e Lavra de Petróleo e Gás: análise dos entraves e propostas de soluções

REPETRO, the special tax regime for importing and exporting goods for the exploration and drilling of oil and gas, aims at bringing foreign assets to Brazil enjoying a suspension or even an exemption of taxes, so that Brazilian industry may profit from about 8 billion American dollars in investments. The creation of normative devices as well as the management of the REPETRO model are under the exclusive responsibility of the Brazilian Internal Revenue Services. REPETRO was created in 1999 and is composed of the following customs treatments: importation of goods with suspension of taxes by use of the drawback special regime, suspension mode for national exporting industry; exportation with fictitious exit for the national industry; temporary admission of goods or assets used in oil exploration and production, attending to the needs of both the national and foreign market. Considering the inability of the Brazilian government in restructuring its foreign trade model so that a strong investment in technology could provide for the sector¿s needs, we must ask how we can change REPETRO to help the various companies in the oil business? The issue is very important for one of our main economic activities, though not enough studied. The energy sector has a strategic importance for the development and the economic independence of any country. The winds of globalization lead Brazil to open its economy in the last decade and the national policy for exploration and drilling (E&D) was altered. The government created a new agency dedicated to market control and energy policies, the National Agency for Oil and Biofuels (ANP). With the opening of the market, Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. - Petrobras, the Brazilian giant, lost the monopoly of the oil business. The P-50 Platform, with a capacity for 180,000 barrels per day, was imported based on REPETRO. When it began operating on April 21st, 2006, Brazil achieved self-sufficiency in oil production. The present work intends to estimate the main variables affecting the importation and exportation of goods and assets for E&D, showing how REPETRO works. We also intend to look at the results yielded by the REPETRO model for the development of the production of oil and gas in Brazil, as well as show proposals for its modernization. It has been established that even though since its implementation the REPETRO model has brought fiscal advantages through the reduction of tax costs relating to foreign commerce operations and the incentive of investments in the E&D area with the increase in the national oil production there remain the following limitations: lack of preparation and of knowledge of the model; lack of adjustement of the model to the reality of actitity of E&D of oil and gas; taxes over the pre-operational stage or investment in oil production stage; non-allowance of full access by the national industry to the supply of goods and products relating to the industrialization of goods allowed by REPETRO; other fiscal and administrative difficulties. We conclude that the REPETRO model is important for the development of the area of E&D of oil and gas, but not completely effective. It is necessary to change it or create a new model based on a new perspective of the customs treatment of the activities of exploration and production, minimizing administrative procedures relating to the operations of exportation and importation.

Day of rest - Peter Fry

[Parte 2: Filme "Day of Rest"]

Empirical essays on IPOS: the Brazilian case

The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze the main factors that determine the first-day return and the Flipping activity in Brazilian IPOs, taking into account expected results according to national and international researches. The data base encompasses IPOs that took place between May 2004 and February 2011, summing up to 129 IPOs and approximately R$ 128 billion offering. The first-day return, which means the “money left on the table”, was on average 4.6% taking into consideration the issue price, while the Flipping activity totalized R$ 7.2 billion, meaning 5.6% of the offering. The first-day return was analyzed before and after the first trade, and evidences were found supporting (a) the exogenous determination of the issue price, (b) the opening price dependence of prospectus disclosure and of other variables, observable previously to the bookbuilding process, and (c) the cascade behavior of investors in the pricing after the first trade, particularly driven by the underwriter behavior. In regards to the Flipping, it was notorious depending on how much the IPO succeeded, being concentrated in and homogeneous along the first-day, despite the intense negotiation in the first minute. As a general contribution to literature, it was concluded that Information Asymmetry Theory arguments are not sufficient to explain the first-day Underpricing and the Flipping, being necessary arguments based on Behavioral Finance adapted to an intraday perspective.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Opening ILT blackbox: Exploring recognition-based leadership perceptions with conjoint analysis

Although research on Implicit Leadership Theories (ILT) has put great effort on determining what attributes define a leader prototype, little attention has been given to understanding the relative importance of each of these attributes in the categorization process by followers. Knowing that recognition-based leadership perceptions are the result of the match between followers’ ILTs and the perceived attributes in their actual leaders, understanding how specific prototypical leader attributes impact this impression formation process is particularly relevant. In this study, we draw upon socio-cognitive theories to explore how followers cognitively process the information about a leader’s attributes. By using Conjoint Analysis (CA), a technique that allows us to measure an individual’s trade-offs when making choices about multi-attributed options, we conducted a series of 4 studies with a total of 879 participants. Our results demonstrate that attributes’ importance for individuals’ leadership perceptions formation is rather heterogeneous, and that some attributes can enhance or spoil the importance of other prototypical attributes. Finally, by manipulating the leadership domain, we show that the weighting pattern of attributes is context dependent, as suggested by the connectionist approach to leadership categorization. Our findings also demonstrate that Conjoint Analysis can be a valuable tool for ILT research.