A importância dos mecanismos comportamentais de resistência para a dinâmica populacional de abelhas Apis mellifera e o parasita Varroa destructor

Os ácaros ectoparasitas Varroa destructor, que parasitam as abelhas tornaram-se um problema global. Embora seja pouco provável que estes ácaros, por si só, provoquem a mortalidade das colmeias, eles desempenham um importante papel como vetor de muitas doenças virais. E estas doenças são identificados como algumas das mais importantes razões para a Desordem do Colapso das Colônias. Os efeitos da infestação do V.destructor são distintas em diferentes partes do mundo. Maiores mortalidades de colônias têm sido relatadas em colônias de abelhas européias (AE) em países da Europa, Ásia e América do Norte. No entanto, este ácaro está presente no Brasil já por muitos anos e não existem relatos de perdas em colônias das abelhas africanizadas (AA). Estudos realizados no México mostraram que alguns comportamentos de resistência ao ácaro Varroa - especialmente o grooming e o comportamento higiênico - são diferentes em cada uma das subespécie. Poderiam então esses mecanismos explicar por que as abelhas africanizadas são menos suscetíveis à Desordem do Colapso das Colônias? A fim de responder a esta pergunta, propomos um modelo matemático baseado em equações diferenciais, com o objetivo de analisar o papel desses mecanismos de resistência na saúde geral da colônia e na capacidade da colônia para enfrentar desafios ambientais.

Evaluation of contagion or interdependence in the financial crises of Asia and Latin America, considering the macroeconomic fundamentals

This article investigates the existence of contagion between countries on the basis of an analysis of returns for stock indices over the period 1994-2003. The economic methodology used is that of multivariate GARCH family volatility models, particularly the DCC models in the form proposed by Engle and Sheppard (2001). The returns were duly corrected for a series of country-specific fundamentals. The relevance of this procedure is highlighted in the literature by the work of Pesaran and Pick (2003). The results obtained in this paper provide evidence favourable to the hypothesis of regional contagion in both Latin America and Asia. As a rule, contagion spread from the Asian crisis to Latin America but not in the opposite direction

Strategic options development and analysis: the case of the brazilian railways

Judging by their success in Europe, Asia and North America, passenger and cargo railways are appreciated as the key to infrastructural development in Brazil. The issues are complex and steeped in uncertainty, as well as political and economic agendas, and a wide array of intersecting issues such as business and unionized interests, agricultural and industrial geographical spreads, as well as the emergence of alternative power sources. Not only are the issues systemic, but railway development itself always comes as a physical network structure. The situation under consideration, in other words, is systemic from both the soft and hard systems point of view, thus promising a rich context for systems studies. As an initial attempt in understanding the situation at hand, the research reported here applied the problem structuring approach known as Strategic Options Development and Analysis (SODA) in order to map and analyze issues facing the Brazilian railways. Strategic options for the future development of the railways were identified and analyzed, and ways forward for future research are proposed. In addition, the report serves as an initial knowledge base that can guide future systemic planning studies in the industry.

Launching a new selective skincare brand in Asia and Europe

O mercado de beleza é extremamente competitivo, tendo uma facturação de 145 biliões € em todo o mundo e registando uma taxa de 4% de crescimento anual. O mercado da beleza inclui os cuidados com o cabelo, rosto, maquilhagem, perfumes, higiene e cosmética oral. A Uniqcosmet é uma empresa que opera na indústria da beleza desde 2011. Apesar do seu foco estar relacionado com consultoria e marketing, um novo projecto nasceu: lançar uma nova marca que opere no mercado seletivo, com um posicionamento internacional no segmento de cuidados com o rosto, em particular, no mercado de produtos naturais. Nesse sentido, o objetivo do estudo é de identificar se existe espaço ou não, para uma nova marca de beleza seletiva, e posteriormente, aferir qual a melhor forma de lançar esta marca posicionando-a num mercado extremamente competitivo. Assim sendo, primeiramente, foi realizado um estudo focado nos diversos países da Europa e da Ásia. De seguida foi feita uma análise da concorrência, no sentido de perceber qual o melhor posicionamento a adotar. Para além desta análise, o comportamento do consumidor foi também alvo de pesquisa, seguido de uma análise ao potencial das azeitonas e azeite de oliva como ingrediente base. De seguida, as regiões de Portugal e Espanha como território geográfico das marcas também foram analisadas. Finalmente, dois diferentes conceitos de marca foram apresentados e apoiados por toda a fase de pesquisa. Como conclusões, descobriu-se que a Europa e Ásia Pacífico são as duas regiões mais promissoras para novas marcas de cuidados com o rosto operando no mercado seletivo. Foi também descoberto o potencial e importância das marcas conceptuais, e que as azeitonas e azeite de oliva têm enormes benefícios para a pele e uma grande aceitação por parte dos consumidores.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.