Brazil: the pressure points in labor legislation

Brazil’s experience shows that the economic and political history of a country is a critical determinant of which labor laws influence wages and employment, and which are not binding. Long periods of high inflation, illiteracy of the workforce, and biases in the design and enforcement of labor legislation bred by the country’s socioeconomic history are all important in determining the reach of labor laws. Defying conventional wisdom, these factors are shown to affect labor market outcomes even in the sector of employment regarded as unregulated. Following accepted practice in Brazil, we distinguish regulated from unregulated employment by determining whether or not the contract has been ratified by the Ministry of Labor, viz., groups of workers with and without signed work booklet. We then examine the degree of adherence to labor laws in the formal and informal sectors, and finds “pressure points” – viz., evidence of the law on minimum wage, work-hours, and payment timing being binding on outcomes – in both the formal and informal sectors of the Brazilian labor market. The findings of the paper imply that in terms of the design of legislation, informality in Brazil is mainly a fiscal, and not a legal phenomenon. But the manner in which these laws have been enforced is also critical determinant of informality in Brazil: poor record-keeping has strengthened the incentives to stay informal that are already built into the design of the main social security programs, and ambiguities in the design of labor legislation combined with slanted enforcement by labor courts have led to workers effectively being accorded the same labor rights whether or not they have ratified contracts. The incentives to stay informal are naturally higher for workers who are assured of protection under labor legislation regardless of the nature of their contract, which only alters their financial relationship with the government. The paper concludes that informality in Brazil will remain high as long as labor laws remain ambiguous and enforced with a clear pro-labor bias, and social security programs lack tight benefitcontribution linkages and strong enforcement mechanisms.

Governança de TI: o caso do m-government do estado de São Paulo

Este trabalho tem como objetivo explorar como a governança de TI tem implicações no atendimento ao cidadão por meio de serviços de governo disponibilizados em dispositivos móveis, conhecido como m-government. Foi estudada a forma como os órgãos envolvidos no desenvolvimento de aplicativos para o cidadão se organizam, tanto em termos da legislação que define suas competências quanto em termos da dinâmica deste desenvolvimento, por meio de entrevistas com atores de papel relevante neste cenário. Também foi realizada a análise da governança de m-government no Estado usando uma matriz de arranjos de governança. A conclusão foi que a governança que a legislação indica que se pretende para o Estado, como políticas emanadas de um órgão central, ainda está em estágio embrionário e que por enquanto as Secretarias e órgãos praticam m-government para atender objetivos que são específicos de suas pastas, indicando que há um longo caminho para se alcançar o objetivo de um governo único para um cidadão único