Effects of trade policy on technology adoption and investment

This paper studies the consequences of trade policy for the adoption of new technologies. It develops a dynamic international trade model with two sectors. Workers in manufacturing decide if new technologies are used, capital owners then choose investment. We analyze three different arrangements: free trade, tariffs, and quotas. In the model economy, free trade as well as tariffs guarantee that the most productive technology available will be used. In contrasL under a quota the most productive technology available will not be used at all times. Further, in the latter case investment and the capital stock are smaller than in the former one. Finally, there exists parameter values for which the computed difference in GDP is a factor of thirty.

Exchange rate misalignments and international trade policy: impacts on tariffs

The debate on “exchange wars and trade wars” is raising the attention of experts on international trade and economics. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the impacts of exchange rate misalignments on one of the most traditional trade policy instruments – tariffs, as defined by the WTO – World Trade Organization. It is divided into three sections: the first one examines the effects of exchange rate variations on tariffs and its consequences for the multilateral trade system; the second explains the methodology used to determine exchange rate misalignments and also presents its results for Brazil, US and China; and the third summarizes the methodology applied to calculate the impacts of exchange rate misalignments on the level of tariff protection through an exercise of “misalignment tariffication”

Trade policy in a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model

The Import Substitution Process in Latin Amer ica was an attempt to enhance GDP growth and productivity by rising trade barriers upon capital-intensive products. Our main goal is to analyze how an increase in import tariff on a particular type of good affects the production choices and trade pattern of an economy. We develop an extension of the dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model – a combination of a static two goods, two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin model and a two-sector growth model – allowing for import tariff. We then calibrate the closed economy model to the US. The results show that the economy will produce less of both consumption and investment goods under autarky for low and high levels of capital stock per worker. We also find that total GDP may be lower under free trade in comparison to autarky.

Monopoly power, trade protection and growth: cross industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of monopoly power on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator, concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that industries with higher monopoly power are more protected than competitive sectors. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in sectors with higher monopoly power. We thus have evidence favoring recent growth literature which stresses that interest groups with control over creasing productivity. The results here confirm the first part of this argument and show that organized groups in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce competition.

On the long run effects of barriers to trade

We study the macroeconomic effects of international trade policy by integrating a Hecksher-Ohlin trade model into an optimal-growth framework. The model predicts that a more open economy will have higher factor productivity. Furthermore, there is a "selective development trap," an additional steady state with low income, to which countries may or may not converge, depending on policy. Income at the development trap falls as trade barriers increase. Hence, cross-country differences in barriers to trade may help explain the dispersion of per-capita income observed across countries. The effects are quantified and we show that protectionism can explain a relevant fraction of TFP and long-run income differentials across countries.

On the growth effects of barriers to trade

We study the macroeconomic effects of international trade policy by integrating a Hecksher-Ohlin trade model into an optimal-growth framework. The model predicts that an open economy will have higher factor productivity and faster growth. Also, under protectionist policies there may be “development traps,” or additional steady states with low income. In the last case, higher tariffs imply lower incomes, so that the large cross-country differences in barriers to trade may explain part of the huge dispersion of per capita income observed across countries. The model simulation shows that the link between trade and macroeconomic performance may be quantitatively important.

Essays on the general equilibrium effects of barriers to trade on economic growth, foreign trade and the location of economic activity in Brazil

This work presents a fully operational interstate CGE model implemented for the Brazilian economy that tries to quantify both the role of barriers to trade on economic growth and foreign trade performance and how the distribution of the economic activity may change as the country opens up to foreign trade. Among the distinctive features embedded in the model, modeling of external scale economies, port efficiency and land-maritime transport costs provides an innovative way of dealing explicitly with theoretical issues related to integrated regional systems. In order to illustrate the role played by the quality of infrastructure and geography on the country‟s foreign and interregional trade performance, a set of simulations is presented where barriers to trade are significantly reduced. The relative importance of trade policy, port efficiency and land-maritime transport costs for the country trade relations and regional growth is then detailed and quantified, considering both short run as well as long run scenarios. A final set of simulations shed some light on the effects of liberal trade policies on regional inequality, where the manufacturing sector in the state of São Paulo, taken as the core of industrial activity in the country, is subjected to different levels of external economies of scale. Short-run core-periphery effects are then traced out suggesting the prevalence of agglomeration forces over diversion forces could rather exacerbate regional inequality as import barriers are removed up to a certain level. Further removals can reverse this balance in favor of diversion forces, implying de-concentration of economic activity. In the long run, factor mobility allows a better characterization of the balance between agglomeration and diversion forces among regions. Regional dispersion effects are then clearly traced-out, suggesting horizontal liberal trade policies to benefit both the poorest regions in the country as well as the state of São Paulo. This long run dispersion pattern, on one hand seems to unravel the fragility of simple theoretical results from recent New Economic Geography models, once they get confronted with more complex spatially heterogeneous (real) systems. On the other hand, it seems to capture the literature‟s main insight: the possible role of horizontal liberal trade policies as diversion forces leading to a more homogeneous pattern of interregional economic growth.

Monopoly power and trade protection: cross- industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of industry concentration on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator. concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that the higher the concentration of a given industry the higher its leveI of trade protection. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in more concentrated sectors. Assuming that concentration is ;1 gCl()d proX\' for mOllopoh' po\\'er as it reduces the free-rider problem in coordinating a lobby the results in this paper indicates that interest groups with control over specific markets in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce (international) competition.

Barriers to trade: barriers to growth

We study the cxtent to which differences in international trade policies contribute to the significant cross-country disparities in macroeconomic performance. In particular, wc concentrate on the effect of protectionism on generating differences in leveIs (of income and of measured total factor productivity), in growth rates (of output, productivity and inputs), in volatility and in trends (or development traps). We document that these rclationships are strong in cross country data, integrate a Hecksher-Ohlin mode! of international trade into the standard macroeconomic modcl to derive those rclationships analytically, and to quantify them. Our results suggest that a large fraction of the cros::; country variations can be attributed to trade policy.

The not so generalized effects of nonreciprocal trade agreements

This dissertation uses an empirical gravity equation approach to study the relationship between nonreciprocal trade agreements (NRTAs) and members’ trade flows. Estimations relate bilateral imports to trade policy variables using a very comprehensive dataset with over fifty years of data. Results show that meager average trade effects exist only if members are excluded from the world trading system or if they are very poor. As trade flows between NRTA members are already rising before their creation, results also suggest a strong endogeneity concerning their formation. Moreover, estimations show that uncertainty and discretion tend to critically hinder NRTA’s performance. On the other hand, reciprocal trade agreements show the opposite pattern regardless of members’ income status.Encouraging developing countries’ openness to trade through reciprocal liberalization emerges consequently as a possible policy implication.

Comércio internacional, politica comercial brasileira e a atuação da Câmara de Comércio Exterior (CAMEX) na condução das políticas para o setor

The proposal of this study is to present an assessment of the performance of the Brazilian Government Chamber of Foreign Trade (Camex), which is a board of the Council of Government responsible for the formulation, implementation and coordination of the Brazilian trade policy. The study begins with a historical approach to the international trade and the Brazilian foreign trade, mentioning its origins, features and interfaces with the economic development of the country. Based on the approach aforementioned, several interviews were made with authorities, who have remarkable knowledge about the subject, in order to obtain their views, experiences and suggestions concerning the performance of Camex since its creation in 1995. The list of interviewees includes authorities that are currently responsibles for the conduct of the policy on foreign trade, representatives of the organized society, and authorities who were in important positions in this segment of the federal public administration, regarding both the Minister of State, as Director of Cacex and the Executive Secretary of Camex. The conclusions of the study indicate that the Camex has not been succeeding in fully exercise its mandate of formulate, implement and coordinate the foreign trade policy of Brazil. A combination of factors contributes to this situation, especially its small strutcure, the fact that some ministries compete in the segment of foreign trade ¿don't understand¿ Chamber¿s real purpose, and, at last, the absence of a political mandate"(words taken from Motta Veiga) that would fortify its existing legal mandate. Finally, the study suggests some changes in the current organizational modeling of Camex, especially in its hierarchical position in the federal public administration."

Multiple equilibria and protectionism

In a nonnative approach, I analyze trade policies when the industrial sector genentes positive extemalities in production, and there are adjustments costs to changing production from one sector to the other. Protectionist trade policy can make workers intemalize the benetits from moving into the industrial sector, but it is a second best policy as it also causes consumption distortions. I show that if the govemment is able to fully commit to its tariff schedule for the future, the welfare maximizing policy is to maintain a positive tariff forever, even after all adjustment has already taken place . However, if the govemment is not able to commit at all, the only time consistent policy is zero tariff at any point in time. The time inconsistency of the full commitment policy is derived from the fact that in the model only production needs interference, and the production distortion is lagged one period with respect to the tariff wbile the consumption distortion is simultaneous to the tariff. In the intermediary case, i.e., when the government can commit for a limited period of time, the time consistent optimal tariff will be positive but lower than the "full commitment" tariff. This result indicates that some institutions that have always been considered pure sources of inefficiency, such as protectionist lobbying, may in fact be welfare improving in some cases!

The manufacturing industry in Brazil in the era of global value chains

This article presents a comprehensive and detailed overview of the international trade performance of the manufacturing industry in Brazil over the last decades, emphasizing its participation in Global Value Chains. It uses information from recent available global inputoutput tables such as WIOD (World Input-output database) and TIVA (Trade in Value Added, OECD) as well as complementary information from the GTAP 8 (Global Trade Analysis Project) database. The calculation of a broad set of value added type indicators allows a precise contextualization of the ongoing structural changes in the Brazilian industry, highlighting the relative isolation of its manufacturing sector from the most relevant international supply chains. This article also proposes a public policy discussion, presenting two case studies: the first one related to trade facilitation and the second one to preferential trade agreements. The main conclusions are twofold: first, the reduction of time delays at customs in Brazil may significantly improve the trade performance of its manufacturing industry, specially for the more capital intensive sectors which are generally the ones with greater potential to connection to global value chains; second, the extension of the concept of a “preferential trade partner” to the context of the global unbundling of production may pave the way to future trade policy in Brazil, particularly in the mapping of those partners whose bilateral trade relations with Brazil should receive greater priority by policy makers.