Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.

Board of directors and top management team: a study on CEO relative power and financial return

Best corporate governance practices published in the primers of Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission and the Brazilian Corporate Governance Institute promote board independence as much as possible, as a way to increase the effectiveness of governance mechanism (Sanzovo, 2010). Therefore, this paper aims at understanding if what the managerial literature portraits as being self-evident - stricter governance, better performance - can be observed in actual evidence. The question answered is: do companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others? The method applied in this paper consists on comparing 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. From the 534 companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Sao Paulo – Bovespa – 116 were selected due to their level of corporate governance. The title “Novo Mercado” refers to the superior level of governance level within companies listed in Bovespa, as they have to follow specific criteria to assure shareholders ´protection (BM&F, 2011). Regression analyses were conducted in order to reveal the correlation level between two selected variables. The results from the regression analysis were the following: the correlation between each parameter and ROA was 10.26%; the second regression analysis conducted measured the correlation between the independence level of top management team vis-à-vis board directors – namely, CEO relative power - and ROA, leading to a multiple R of 5.45%. Understanding that the scale is a simplification of the reality, the second part of the analysis transforms all the four parameters into dummy variables, excluding what could be called as an arbitrary scale. The ultimate result from this paper led to a multiple R of 28.44%, which implies that the combination of the variables are still not enough to translate the complex reality of organizations. Nonetheless, an important finding can be taken from this paper: two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression, with p-value lower than 10% and with negative coefficients. In other words, counter affirming what the literature very often portraits as being self-evident – stricter governance leads to higher performance – this paper has provided evidences to believe that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. The section limitations and suggestions for future researches presents some reasons explaining why, although supported by strong theoretical background, this paper faced some challenging methodological assumptions, precluding categorical statements about the level of governance – measured by four selected parameters – and the financial return in terms of financial on assets.

Wald tests for IV regression with weak instruments

This dissertation deals with the problem of making inference when there is weak identification in models of instrumental variables regression. More specifically we are interested in one-sided hypothesis testing for the coefficient of the endogenous variable when the instruments are weak. The focus is on the conditional tests based on likelihood ratio, score and Wald statistics. Theoretical and numerical work shows that the conditional t-test based on the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimator performs well even when instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous variable. The conditional approach correct uniformly its size and when the population F-statistic is as small as two, its power is near the power envelopes for similar and non-similar tests. This finding is surprising considering the bad performance of the two-sided conditional t-tests found in Andrews, Moreira and Stock (2007). Given this counter intuitive result, we propose novel two-sided t-tests which are approximately unbiased and can perform as well as the conditional likelihood ratio (CLR) test of Moreira (2003).

The performance of open-end Brazilian fixed income mutual funds for retail clients

From a financial perspective, this dissertation analyzes the Brazilian mutual fund industry performance for an average retail client. The most representative funds for the local population, that are the fixed income open-end ones, will be selected and their performance will be measured aiming to answer if clients of this industry obtained a proper return over their investments in the period between August 2010 and August 2013. A proper return will be understood as the preservation of the purchasing power of the individual´s savings, what is achieved with a positive performance of a mutual fund after discounting taxes, administrative fees and inflation. After obtaining an answer for the previous question, this dissertation will explore a possible alternative solution: Tesouro Direto, that is an example of a financial approach that could foster the disintermediation between savings and investments through electronic channels. New electronic platforms, with a broader scope, could be utilized to increase the efficiency of funding productive investments through better remunerating Brazilian savings. Tesouro Direto may point towards a new paradigm.

A moderação da concentração setorial no efeito do ambiente institucional na performance empresarial

O presente estudo avança a compreensão da performance empresarial ao propor que condições dos setores, especificamente a concentração setorial, moderam a relação entre instituições e desempenho das firmas. Já é sabido que o ambiente institucional impacta o desempenho das firmas (Makino, Isobe, & Chan, 2004) e que as reformas pró-mercado contribuem para que esse efeito seja positivo, tanto para firmas domésticas como estrangeiras (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009). A explicação desse efeito é baseada na economia dos custos de transação (Coase, 1937; Commons, 1934). Contudo, não se sabe se o efeito é o mesmo para todos os setores e se fatores moderam a relação. Esta tese contou com 230.222 observações referentes a 10.903 empresas em 64 países em um intervalo de 23 anos coletados em diferentes bancos de dados. Foi testada a interação de seis variáveis institucionais com o índice Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) para três variáveis dependentes diferentes: retorno sobre ativos (ROA), retorno sobre patrimônio líquido (ROE) e crescimento de vendas composto de três anos. Duas estratégias empíricas foram utilizadas: modelos com efeitos fixos e modelos hierárquicos (multinível). Os resultados confirmaram a hipótese de que a interação do HHI é significante e negativa com quatro variáveis institucionais: voice and accountability, efetividade do governo, qualidade regulatória e controle da corrupção. Concentração setorial modera o efeito do ambiente institucional na performance empresarial. Em contextos onde as instituições são sólidas, a força de agentes como sindicatos, associações, imprensa e consumidor assume poder de barganha, refreando o poder das empresas e o oportunismo. Regras legais, direito comum e instituições tendem a limitar o poder unilateral em relações contratuais de todos os tipos, independe da fonte do poder (Macneil, 1980). Observou-se adicionalmente que a proteção ao oportunismo se dá principalmente por meio das instituições informais, como a proteção à democracia, direitos do consumidor e controle da corrupção. Ao propiciar poder aos outros agentes que interagem com as empresas, instituições fortes garantem o enforcement de compromissos contratuais, em particular os contratos sociais (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999). Como implicações, essa tese propõe que estratégias de expansão dentro do setor, aquisição de participação de mercado e fusões e aquisições dentro do setor são mais adequadas em ambientes institucionais mais fracos que em ambientes fortes. Empresas que possuem alta participação de mercado devem reconhecer o impacto negativo que podem sofrer em seu desempenho a partir de melhorias institucionais. Finalmente, o estudo reforça a importância do reconhecimento por parte de governos de que setores e firmas se beneficiam de forma desigual das mudanças institucionais. O conhecimento prévio desses impactos pode servir de direcionamento para a formulação de políticas públicas justas e eficientes. As principais limitações estão relacionadas à base de dados, exclusivamente composta de empresas com capital aberto, a forma pela qual a classificação de algumas empresas diversificadas foi feita e o fato dessa tese não investigar diretamente o poder de barganha nem ao menos o oportunismo, mas somente o poder moderador da concentração setorial no efeito das instituições no desempenho.

Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance

We argue in this paper that executives can only impact firm outcomes if they have influence over crucial decisions. Based on this idea we develop and test a hypothesis about how CEOs’ power to influence decisions will affect firm performance: since managers’ opinions may differ, firms whose CEOs have more decision-making power should experience more variability in firm performance. Thus performance depends on the interaction between executive characteristics and organizational variables. By focusing on this interaction we are able to use firm-level characteristics to test predictions that are related to unobservable managerial characteristics. Using such firmlevel characteristics of the Executive Office we develop a proxy for the CEO’s power to influence decisions and provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis. Firm performance (measured by Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROA) is significantly more variable for firms with greater values of our proxy for CEO influence power. The results are robust across various tests designed to detect differences in variability.

A Higher order and stable method for the numerical integration of Random Differential Equations

Trabalho apresentado no Congresso Nacional de Matemática Aplicada à Indústria, 18 a 21 de novembro de 2014, Caldas Novas - Goiás