Electoral institutions,cleavage structures,and the number of parties

Theory: A classic question in political science concems ",hat deteImines the number of parties that compete in a given polity. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to answering this question, one that emphasizes the role of electorallaws in structuring coalitional incentives, another that emphasizes the importance of pre-existing social cleavages. In tbis paper, we view the number of parties as a product of the interaction between these two forces, following Powell (1982) and Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994). Hypotheses: The effective number of parties in a polity should be a multiplicative rather than an additive function ofthe peImissiveness ofthe electoral system and the heterogeneity ofthe society. Methods: Multiple regression on cross-sectional aggregate electoral statistics. Unlike previous studies, we (1) do not confine attention to developed democracies; (2) explicitly control for the influence of presidential elections, taking account of whether they are concurrent or nonconcurrent, and ofthe effective number ofpresidential candidates; and (3) also control for the presence and operation of upper tiers in legislative elections. Results: The hypothesis is confiImed, both as regards the number of legislative and the number of presidential parties .

Strategic manipulation of empirical tests

Theories can be produced by individuals seeking a good reputation of knowledge. Hence, a significant question is how to test theories anticipating that they might have been produced by (potentially uninformed) experts who prefer their theories not to be rejected. If a theory that predicts exactly like the data generating process is not rejected with high probability then the test is said to not reject the truth. On the other hand, if a false expert, with no knowledge over the data generating process, can strategically select theories that will not be rejected then the test can be ignorantly passed. These tests have limited use because they cannot feasibly dismiss completely uninformed experts. Many tests proposed in the literature (e.g., calibration tests) can be ignorantly passed. Dekel and Feinberg (2006) introduced a class of tests that seemingly have some power of dismissing uninformed experts. We show that some tests from their class can also be ignorantly passed. One of those tests, however, does not reject the truth and cannot be ignorantly passed. Thus, this empirical test can dismiss false experts.We also show that a false reputation of knowledge can be strategically sustained for an arbitrary, but given, number of periods, no matted which test is used (provided that it does not reject the truth). However, false experts can be discredited, even with bounded data sets, if the domain of permissible theories is mildly restricted.

Volatility Triggered Range Forward (VTRF): an instrument for protection against volatility fluctuations in the BRL/USD pair

Este trabalho propõe um instrumento capaz de absorver choques no par BRL/USD, garantindo ao seu detentor a possibilidade de realizar a conversão entre essas moedas a uma taxa observada recentemente. O Volatility Triggered Range Forward assemelha-se a um instrumento forward comum, cujo preço de entrega não é conhecido inicialmente, mas definido no momento em que um nível de volatilidade pré-determinado for atingido na cotação das moedas ao longo da vida do instrumento. Seu cronograma de ajustes pode ser definido para um número qualquer de períodos. Seu apreçamento e controle de riscos é baseado em uma árvore trinomial ponderada entre dois possíveis regimes de volatilidade. Esses regimes são determinados após um estudo na série BRL/USD no período entre 2003 e 2009, basedo em um modelo Switching Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (SWARCH).

Essays in heterogeneous agent macroeconomics

This thesis is comprised of three chapters. The first article studies the determinants of the labor force participation of elderly American males and investigates the factors that may account for the changes in retirement between 1950 and 2000. We develop a life-cycle general equilibrium model with endogenous retirement that embeds Social Security legislation and Medicare. Individuals are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to their preferences for leisure and face uncertainty about labor productivity, health status and out-of-pocket medical expenses. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy in 2000 and is able to reproduce very closely the retirement behavior of the American population. It reproduces the peaks in the distribution of Social Security applications at ages 62 and 65 and the observed facts that low earners and unhealthy individuals retire earlier. It also matches very closely the increase in retirement from 1950 to 2000. Changes in Social Security policy - which became much more generous - and the introduction of Medicare account for most of the expansion of retirement. In contrast, the isolated impact of the increase in longevity was a delaying of retirement. In the second article, I develop an overlapping generations model of criminal behavior, which extends prior research on crime by taking into account individuals' labor supply decisions and the stigma effect that affects convicted offenders, lowering their likelihood of employment. I use the model to guide a quantitative assessment of the determinants of crime and of a counterfactual experiment in which an income redistribution policy is thought as an alternative to greater law enforcement. The model economy considered in this paper is populated by heterogeneous agents who live for a realistic number of periods, have preferences over consumption and leisure, and differ in terms of their age, their skills as well as their employment shocks. In addition, savings may be precautionary and allow partial insurance against the labor income shocks. Because of the lack of full insurance, this model generates an endogenous distribution of wealth across consumers, enabling us to assess the welfare implications of the redistribution policy experiment. I calibrated the model using the US data for 1980 and then use the model to investigate the changes in criminality between 1980 and 1996. The main results that come out of this study are: 1) Law enforcement policy was the most important factor behind the fall in criminality in the period, while the increase in inequality was the most important single factor promoting crime; 2) Stigmatization is not a free-cost crime control policy; 3) Income redistribution can be a powerful alternative policy to fight crime. Finally, the third article studies the impact of HIV/AIDS on per capita income and education. It explores two channels from HIV/AIDS to income that have not been sufficiently stressed by the literature: the reduction of the incentives to study due to shorter expected longevity and the reduction of productivity of experienced workers. In the model individuals live for three periods, may get infected in the second period and with some probability die of Aids before reaching the third period of their life. Parents care for the welfare of the future generations so that they will maximize lifetime utility of their dynasty. The simulations predict that the most affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa will be in the future, on average, thirty percent poorer than they would be without AIDS. Schooling will decline in some cases by forty percent. These figures are dramatically reduced with widespread medical treatment, as it increases the survival probability and productivity of infected individuals.