8 resultados para Nonlinear Filtering
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principIe which we call the implementation principIe. This principIe provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect contracting mechanisms in terms of contract catalogs (or menus), and allows us to conclude that in competi tive contracting situations, firms in choosing their contracting strategies can restrict attention, without loss of generality, to contract catalogs. Second, we establish a competi tive taxation principIe. This principIe, a refinement of the implementation principIe, provides a complete characterization of all implementable nonlinear pricing schedules in terms of product-price catalogs and allows us to reduce any game played over nonlinear pricing schedules to a strategically equivalent game played over product-price catalogs. Third, using the competitive taxation principIe and a recent result due to Reny (1999) on the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games, we demonstrate the existence of a N ash equilibrium for the mixed extension of the nonlinear pricing game.
Resumo:
In this article we use factor models to describe a certain class of covariance structure for financiaI time series models. More specifical1y, we concentrate on situations where the factor variances are modeled by a multivariate stochastic volatility structure. We build on previous work by allowing the factor loadings, in the factor mo deI structure, to have a time-varying structure and to capture changes in asset weights over time motivated by applications with multi pIe time series of daily exchange rates. We explore and discuss potential extensions to the models exposed here in the prediction area. This discussion leads to open issues on real time implementation and natural model comparisons.
Resumo:
The past decade has wítenessed a series of (well accepted and defined) financial crises periods in the world economy. Most of these events aI,"e country specific and eventually spreaded out across neighbor countries, with the concept of vicinity extrapolating the geographic maps and entering the contagion maps. Unfortunately, what contagion represents and how to measure it are still unanswered questions. In this article we measure the transmission of shocks by cross-market correlation\ coefficients following Forbes and Rigobon's (2000) notion of shift-contagion,. Our main contribution relies upon the use of traditional factor model techniques combined with stochastic volatility mo deIs to study the dependence among Latin American stock price indexes and the North American indexo More specifically, we concentrate on situations where the factor variances are modeled by a multivariate stochastic volatility structure. From a theoretical perspective, we improve currently available methodology by allowing the factor loadings, in the factor model structure, to have a time-varying structure and to capture changes in the series' weights over time. By doing this, we believe that changes and interventions experienced by those five countries are well accommodated by our models which learns and adapts reasonably fast to those economic and idiosyncratic shocks. We empirically show that the time varying covariance structure can be modeled by one or two common factors and that some sort of contagion is present in most of the series' covariances during periods of economical instability, or crisis. Open issues on real time implementation and natural model comparisons are thoroughly discussed.
Resumo:
The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.
Resumo:
We show that for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection, the property of better-reply security is naturally satisfied - thus, resolving via a result due to Reny (1999) the issue of existence of Nash equilibrium for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games.
Resumo:
Wilson [16] introduced a general methodology to deal with monopolistic pricing in situations where customers have private information on their tastes (‘types’). It is based on the demand profile of customers: For each nonlinear tariff by the monopolist the demand at a given level of product (or quality) is the measure of customers’ types whose marginal utility is at least the marginal tariff (‘price’). When the customers’ marginal utility has a natural ordering (i.e., the Spence and Mirrlees Condition), such demand profile is very easy to perform. In this paper we will present a particular model with one-dimensional type where the Spence and Mirrlees condition (SMC) fails and the demand profile approach results in a suboptimal solution for the monopolist. Moreover, we will suggest a generalization of the demand profile procedure that improves the monopolist’s profit when the SMC does not hold.
Resumo:
Este trabalho avalia as previsões de três métodos não lineares — Markov Switching Autoregressive Model, Logistic Smooth Transition Autoregressive Model e Autometrics com Dummy Saturation — para a produção industrial mensal brasileira e testa se elas são mais precisas que aquelas de preditores naive, como o modelo autorregressivo de ordem p e o mecanismo de double differencing. Os resultados mostram que a saturação com dummies de degrau e o Logistic Smooth Transition Autoregressive Model podem ser superiores ao mecanismo de double differencing, mas o modelo linear autoregressivo é mais preciso que todos os outros métodos analisados.
Resumo:
This work assesses the forecasts of three nonlinear methods | Markov Switching Autoregressive Model, Logistic Smooth Transition Auto-regressive Model, and Auto-metrics with Dummy Saturation | for the Brazilian monthly industrial production and tests if they are more accurate than those of naive predictors such as the autoregressive model of order p and the double di erencing device. The results show that the step dummy saturation and the logistic smooth transition autoregressive can be superior to the double di erencing device, but the linear autoregressive model is more accurate than all the other methods analyzed.