Essays on asymmetric information problems without the single-crossing property: applications to corporate finance

The objective of this dissertation is to re-examine classical issues in corporate finance, applying a new analytical tool. The single-crossing property, also called Spence-irrlees condition, is not required in the models developed here. This property has been a standard assumption in adverse selection and signaling models developed so far. The classical papers by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) and Riley (1979) assume it. In the simplest case, for a consumer with a privately known taste, the single-crossing property states that the marginal utility of a good is monotone with respect to the taste. This assumption has an important consequence to the result of the model: the relationship between the private parameter and the quantity of the good assigned to the agent is monotone. While single crossing is a reasonable property for the utility of an ordinary consumer, this property is frequently absent in the objective function of the agents for more elaborate models. The lack of a characterization for the non-single crossing context has hindered the exploration of models that generate objective functions without this property. The first work that characterizes the optimal contract without the single-crossing property is Araújo and Moreira (2001a) and, for the competitive case, Araújo and Moreira (2001b). The main implication is that a partial separation of types may be observed. Two sets of disconnected types of agents may choose the same contract, in adverse selection problems, or signal with the same levei of signal, in signaling models.

Estrutura de propriedade e teoria da agência: um estudo de empresas brasileiras e seus diferentes tipos de controladores

A estrutura de propriedade anglo-saxônica, e o seu clássico problema de agência, com conflitos entre gestores e acionistas, caracterizados por propriedades pulverizadas, apesar de ser predominante na literatura, não constituí a regra, mas sim a exceção. O Brasil, diferentemente dos Estados Unidos e da Inglaterra, possuí uma estrutura de propriedade concentrada, onde é forte a presença de acionistas majoritários. Nesse caso, o conflito verificado não é entre gestores e acionistas (conflito agente X principal), mas sim entre acionistas majoritários e acionistas minoritários (conflito principal X principal). No mercado de capitais brasileiro, há duas classes de ações, as ordinárias (com direito a voto), e as preferências (sem direito a voto), o que viola a regra existente em muitos países, como nos Estados Unidos, de uma ação, um voto. Sendo assim, em muitos casos, ocorre uma combinação de muito poder com pouca alocação de recursos próprios na empresa. Diante disso, o presente estudo teve como objetivo estimar a magnitude dos direitos de votos, de fluxo de caixa, e do excesso de votos dos acionistas majoritários (das ações ordinárias) das empresas listadas no índice Bovespa – Ibovespa para os anos de 2009 e 2010 (carteira teórica do terceiro quadrimestre dos respectivos anos), separando-as por setor de atuação e por tipo de acionista majoritário. Para este estudo foi analisada uma amostra de 121 empresas, utilizando a metodologia quanto aos fins (descritiva e explicativa), e quanto aos meios (bibliográfica e documental). A coleta de dados foi feita no sistema Economática e nos IAN’s da CVM. Como resultados a pesquisa corroborou as hipóteses da literatura existente de que a estrutura de capital das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto é concentrada, principalmente no capital acionário (média de 51,95% e mediana de 51,20% em 2009, e 47,16% e 51,70% em 2010), e ocorrendo em vários casos uma distância considerável entre o poder de voto e o poder do fluxo de caixa dos acionistas majoritários (média de 1,10 em 2009 e mediana de 1,24, e 1,07 e 0,98 em 2010). Com isso, também se verifica que o conflito principal X principal é o predominante no Brasil.

Non-durable consumption and real-estate prices in Brazil: panel-data analysis at the state level

Housing is an important component of wealth for a typical household in many countries. The objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of real-estate price variation on welfare, trying to close a gap between the welfare literature in Brazil and that in the U.S., the U.K., and other developed countries. Our first motivation relates to the fact that real estate is probably more important here than elsewhere as a proportion of wealth, which potentially makes the impact of a price change bigger here. Our second motivation relates to the fact that real-estate prices boomed in Brazil in the last five years. Prime real estate in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo have tripled in value in that period, and a smaller but generalized increase has been observed throughout the country. Third, we have also seen a recent consumption boom in Brazil in the last five years. Indeed, the recent rise of some of the poor to middle-income status is well documented not only for Brazil but for other emerging countries as well. Regarding consumption and real-estate prices in Brazil, one cannot imply causality from correlation, but one can do causal inference with an appropriate structural model and proper inference, or with a proper inference in a reduced-form setup. Our last motivation is related to the complete absence of studies of this kind in Brazil, which makes ours a pioneering study. We assemble a panel-data set for the determinants of non-durable consumption growth by Brazilian states, merging the techniques and ideas in Campbell and Cocco (2007) and in Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005). With appropriate controls, and panel-data methods, we investigate whether house-price variation has a positive effect on non-durable consumption. The results show a non-negligible significant impact of the change in the price of real estate on welfare consumption), although smaller then what Campbell and Cocco have found. Our findings support the view that the channel through which house prices affect consumption is a financial one.

Coffee voluntary standards systems a study of the states of Minas Gerais and São Paulo

In order to adapt to new markets, the coffee supply chain has gone through numerous changes during the last years, which led to the creation of the voluntary standard systems. Adopting a Voluntary Standard System (VSS) consists of becoming a member of a certifier or verifier, in which an independent third party sets specific criteria to ensure a product complies with standards. Yet, the segment is still relatively new and raises some doubts about the economic and financial advantages of investing in sustainability-related certification. This study analyzes the perception of coffee producers about VSS – whether it brings economic benefits. The literature review covers various VSS in the coffee sector, the brief history of the commodity in Brazil, as well as the description of the supply chain. Certified and non-certified producers in the States of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais, answered questionnaires to indicate the perceived advantages of certification. The results show that, despite some added value that certification can bestow, the quality is what really matter, since it allows producers to sell the product at higher prices and to gain advantage over competitors.