What happens after the central bank of Brazil increases the target interbank rate by 1%?

I start presenting an explicit solution to Taylorís (2001) model, in order to illustrate the link between the target interest rate and the overnight interest rate prevailing in the economy. Next, I use Vector Auto Regressions to shed some light on the evolution of key macroeconomic variables after the Central Bank of Brazil increases the target interest rate by 1%. Point estimates show a four-year accumulated output loss ranging from 0:04% (whole sample, 1980 : 1-2004 : 2; quarterly data) to 0:25% (Post-Real data only) with a Örst-year peak output response between 0:04% and 1:0%; respectively. Prices decline between 2% and 4% in a 4-year horizon. The accumulated output response is found to be between 3:5 and 6 times higher after the Real Plan than when the whole sample is considered. The 95% confidence bands obtained using bias-corrected bootstrap always include the null output response when the whole sample is used, but not when the data is restricted to the Post-Real period. Innovations to interest rates explain between 4:9% (whole sample) and 9:2% (post-Real sample) of the forecast error of GDP.

What if firms adjust their debt-equity ratios toward a target range?

We estimate optimal target-ranges of capital structure controlling for a series of firmspecific characteristics and accounting for the serial correlation that arises from the dynamic component of the leverage choice. Then, we empirically examine if firms adjust their leverages toward the estimated optimal ranges. Our analysis suggests that the observed behavior of firms is consistent with the notion of range-adjustment.

What happens after the Central Bank of Brazil increases the target interbank rate by 1%?

In this paper I use Taylor's (2001) model and Vector Auto Regressions to shed some light on the evolution of some key macroeconomic variables after the Central Bank of Brazil, through the COPOM, increases the target interest rate by 1%. From a quantitative perspective, the best estimate from the empírical analysis, obtained with a 1994 : 2 - 2004 : 2 subsample of the data, is that GDP goes through an accumulated decline, over the next four years, around 0.08%. Innovations to interest rates explain around 9.2% of the forecast erro r of GDP.

Especulative (sic) attack on exchange rate target zone regime : the uncertainty case

We present a continuous time target zone model of speculative attacks. Contrary to most of the literature that considers the certainty case, i.e., agents know for sure the Central Bank behavior in the future, we build uncertainty into the madel in two different ways. First, we consider the case in whicb the leveI of reserves at which the central bank lets the regime collapse is uncertain. Alternatively, we ana1ize the case in which, with some probability, the government may cbange its policy reducing the initially positive trend in domestic credito In both cases, contrary to the case of a fixed exchange rate regime, speculators face a cost of launching a tentative attack that may not succeed. Such cost induces a delay and may even prevent its occurrence. At the time of the tentative attack, the exchange rate moves either discretely up, if the attack succeeds, or down, if it fails. The remlts are consistent with the fact that, typically, an attack involves substantial profits and losses for the speculators. In particular, if agents believed that the government will control fiscal imbalances in the future, or alternatively, if they believe the trend in domestic credit to be temporary, the attack is postponed even in the presence of a signal of an imminent collapse. Finally, we aIso show that the timing of a speculative attack increases with the width of the target zone.