A competitive growth model with endogenous fertility

This paper investigates the interaction between endogenous fertility behavior and the distribution of income and wealth arnong farnilies in a competitive market economy. We construct a growth model in which altruistic dynasties are heterogeneous in their initial stocks of physical capital. Dynasties make choices of farnily size along with decisions about consumption and intergenerational transfers. We show that if the rate of time preference is increasing in the number of children and preferences over nurnber of children satisfy a norrnality assumption, all steady states are characterized by equality of capital stocks and consumption arnong families. We also provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the steady state. In order to illustrate these results, we present an example in which preferences over number of children are logarithrnic and the technology is Cobb-Douglas. For this combination of preferences and technology, there exists a unique egalitarian steady state. Moreover, the economy converges to this steady state in only one generation .

Bank networks and firm credit: an agent based model approach

Starting from the idea that economic systems fall into complexity theory, where its many agents interact with each other without a central control and that these interactions are able to change the future behavior of the agents and the entire system, similar to a chaotic system we increase the model of Russo et al. (2014) to carry out three experiments focusing on the interaction between Banks and Firms in an artificial economy. The first experiment is relative to Relationship Banking where, according to the literature, the interaction over time between Banks and Firms are able to produce mutual benefits, mainly due to reduction of the information asymmetry between them. The following experiment is related to information heterogeneity in the credit market, where the larger the bank, the higher their visibility in the credit market, increasing the number of consult for new loans. Finally, the third experiment is about the effects on the credit market of the heterogeneity of prices that Firms faces in the goods market.

A model of competition and interbank network formation

This work aims to understand the interaction between competition and network formation in the banking market. Combining Matutes and Padilla (1994) and Matutes and Vives (2000), we build a model of imperfect bank competition for deposits in which an interbank relationship network is a key strategic decision: it affects banks’ profit and risk position. The competition level exerts influence in the banking network structure since it affects the network outcomes. As result, we have that different competition levels imply different network topologies. Specifically, greater competition imply denser networks. Finally, when we allow for the possibility of collusion, the denser network can come out in the least competitive environment.