Volatility modelling in the forex market: an empirical evaluation

We compare three frequently used volatility modelling techniques: GARCH, Markovian switching and cumulative daily volatility models. Our primary goal is to highlight a practical and systematic way to measure the relative effectiveness of these techniques. Evaluation comprises the analysis of the validity of the statistical requirements of the various models and their performance in simple options hedging strategies. The latter puts them to test in a "real life" application. Though there was not much difference between the three techniques, a tendency in favour of the cumulative daily volatility estimates, based on tick data, seems dear. As the improvement is not very big, the message for the practitioner - out of the restricted evidence of our experiment - is that he will probably not be losing much if working with the Markovian switching method. This highlights that, in terms of volatility estimation, no clear winner exists among the more sophisticated techniques.

Past and future of the bankruptcy law in Brazil and Latin America

This paper studies the Bankruptcy Law in Latin America, focusing on the Brazilian reform. We start with a review of the international literature and its evolution on this subject. Next, we examine the economic incentives associated with several aspects of bankruptcy laws and insolvency procedures in general, as well as the trade-offs involved. After this theoretical discussion, we evaluate empirically the current stage of the quality of insolvency procedures in Latin America using data from Doing Business and World Development Indicators, both from World Bank and International Financial Statistics from IMF. We find that the region is governed by an inefficient law, even when compared with regions of lower per capita income. As theoretical and econometric models predict, this inefficiency has severe consequences for credit markets and the cost of capital. Next, we focus on the recent Brazilian bankruptcy reform, analyzing its main changes and possible effects over the economic environment. The appendix describes difficulties of this process of reform in Brazil, and what other Latin American countries can possibly learn from it.

Access to knoledge in Brazil: new research on intellectual property, innovation and development

The present volume is the fruit of a research initiative on Access to Knowledge begun in 2004 by Yochai Benkler, Eddan Katz, and myself. Access to Knowledge is both a social movement and an approach to international and domestic policy. In the present era of globalization, intellectual property and information and communications technology are major determinants of wealth and power. The principle of access to knowledge argues that we best serve both human rights and economic development through policies that make knowledge, knowledge-creating tools, and nowledgeembedded goods as widely available as possible for decentralized innovation and use. Open technological standards, a balanced approach to intellectual property rights, and expansion of an open telecommunications infrastructure enable ordinary people around the world to benefit from the technological advances of the information age and allow them to generate a vibrant, participatory and democratic culture. Law plays a crucial role in securing access to knowledge, determining whether knowledge and knowledge goods are shared widely for the benefit of all, or controlled and monopolized for the benefit of a few.

Essays in macroeconomy and dynamic term-structure models

This thesis is composed of three articles with the subjects of macroeconomics and - nance. Each article corresponds to a chapter and is done in paper format. In the rst article, which was done with Axel Simonsen, we model and estimate a small open economy for the Canadian economy in a two country General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework. We show that it is important to account for the correlation between Domestic and Foreign shocks and for the Incomplete Pass-Through. In the second chapter-paper, which was done with Hedibert Freitas Lopes, we estimate a Regime-switching Macro-Finance model for the term-structure of interest rates to study the US post-World War II (WWII) joint behavior of macro-variables and the yield-curve. We show that our model tracks well the US NBER cycles, the addition of changes of regime are important to explain the Expectation Theory of the term structure, and macro-variables have increasing importance in recessions to explain the variability of the yield curve. We also present a novel sequential Monte-Carlo algorithm to learn about the parameters and the latent states of the Economy. In the third chapter, I present a Gaussian A ne Term Structure Model (ATSM) with latent jumps in order to address two questions: (1) what are the implications of incorporating jumps in an ATSM for Asian option pricing, in the particular case of the Brazilian DI Index (IDI) option, and (2) how jumps and options a ect the bond risk-premia dynamics. I show that jump risk-premia is negative in a scenario of decreasing interest rates (my sample period) and is important to explain the level of yields, and that gaussian models without jumps and with constant intensity jumps are good to price Asian options.

Assessing competition in banking industry: a multiproduct approach

This paper aims to investigate the competition aspects of banking multiproduct operation. Based on an extension of Panzar and Rosse (1987)’s test to the case of a multiproduct banking firm, we take advantage of a new dataset constructed to Brazilian banking conglomerates to infer the impact of conglomeration on market power. We find that banks offering classic (i.e., loans and credit cards) and other bank products (i.e., brokerage services, insurance and capitalization bonds) have substantially higher market power than the ones which offer only classic products. Results suggest a positive bias on the traditional estimates of competition in which the multioutput actions are not taken into account.

Citizens vs. banks: institutional drivers of financial market litigiousness in Brazil

This article analyzes the institutional drivers of Brazil’s alarmingly high levels of litigation between clients and financial institutions. Most of the policy oriented literature that explores that phenomenon discusses the impacts of a perceived debtor-friendly bias of Brazilian courts on generating feedback loops of litigation that further increases interest rates and creates adverse selection within the pool of potential debtors. This literature therefore addresses the way courts behave once disputes reach their doorstep; conversely, we take a step back to understand the underlying reasons for why such a large number of disputes end up in courts in the first place. We accordingly attribute endemic litigation in Brazilian financial markets to a framework of political, economic and legal institutions and circumstances, which this article aims to unbound and explain.

Assessing competition in the banking industry: a multi-product approach

This paper investigates the competitive aspects of multi-product banking operations. Extending Panzar and Rosse (1987)’s model to the case of a multi-product banking firm, we show that the higher the economies of scope in multi-product banking are, the lower Panzar-Rosse’s measure of competition in the banking sector is. To test this empirical implication and determine the impact of multi-production/conglomeration on market power, we use a new dataset on Brazilian banking conglomerates. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, we find that banks offering classic banking products (i.e., loans and credit cards) and other banking products (i.e., brokerage services, insurance and capitalization bonds) have substantially higher market power than banks that offer only classic products. These results suggest a positive bias in the traditional estimates of competition in which multi-output actions are not considered.

Contagion and regulation in endogenous bank networks

We develop a simple model of endogenous bank networks to study financial contagion and how leverage regulation may affect it. Banks maximize expected profit by choosing the optimal allocation of resources between three different classes of assets. An interbank network arise as result of loans between banks, creating a direct channel of contagion in the financial system. Contagion may occur when the realized return of the risky asset is sufficiently low to make a bank insolvent, subsequently triggering a cascade effect that propagates through default in interbank loans. Contrary to what would be expected, our results show that despite forcing banks to deleverage, increasing minimum capital requirements may lead to a system with higher aggregate levels of default.

Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection

Nesta dissertação, consideram-se trocas em mercados descentralizados com seleção adversa. Diferentemente da literatura até o momento, supomos que vendedores informados (e não compradores desinformados) fazem ofertas take-it-or-leave-it, de forma que sinalização através de preços é possível. Estabelecemos uma caracterização parcial do conjunto de equilíbrio, encontramos condições necessárias e suficientes para a existência de um equilíbrio e mostramos que todo equilíbrio apresenta sinalização se o problema de seleção adversa for suficientemente severo. Além disso, provamos o resultado surpreendente que o maior bem-estar atingido em equilíbrio é invariante às fricções do mercado. Também apresentamos condições necessárias e suficientes para a existência de equilíbrios separantes, que caracterizamos completamente. Mostramos que o conjunto de payoffs associados a equilíbrios separantes é invariante às fricções. Concluímos com uma caracterização completa do conjunto de equilíbrio com apenas dois tipos, e comparamos nossos resultados com os de Moreno e Wooders (2010), que analisam o caso em que compradores têm todo o poder de mercado. Nossos resultados mostram que sinalização através dos preços tem um impacto não trivial tanto nos resultados do mercado quanto no bem-estar.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

A technological innovation for capsicums production in Peru: the mechatronics arms

Peru agricultural exports have increased in recent years due to (i) free trade agreements with many countries (United States, Canada, European Union, China, Thailand, Singapore, Japan, Chile, among others), (ii) an increasing international demand for healthy products, (iii) country´s economic development and (iv) more private investments in this sector (Velazco 2012). Also, if we can compare among Peru three main regions (Coast, Andean highlands and the Jungle), It is the Coast (western region) that has a developed agricultural production due to unique weather conditions, private investments, public infrastructure, transport costs and quality of land (Gomez, 2008). This country development is also related to the production of non-traditional products for export like asparagus, artichokes, capsicums, bananas, grapes, among others; produced by agro industrial companies and small farmers and that are mainly labor intensive (Gomez, 2008 and Velazco, 2012). This very successful export diversification and self-discovery process was the result of a combination of strong natural comparative advantages (mainly excellent agro climatic conditions) and a significant innovation effort. It meant the introduction and expansion of new products and markets, the entry of new firms, and experimental research and the adoption of new techniques and process technologies developed abroad (in irrigation, crop management, post-harvesting, sanitary control, storage and packing) to produce high-quality, niche (gourmet) and higher value-added products, in line with consumer trends in sophisticated food markets. In products such as asparagus, mango, organic coffee and capsicums, Peru has become a leading world exporter (OECD). For this reason one of the government main tasks for the next years is to meet urgent agriculture producer’s needs in the areas of technological Innovation and business management (MINAG). In this context, this thesis analyzes the applicability of a new technology – the mechatronic arms – specifically to capsicums production sector in Peru. We chose Capsicums production sector (paprika, chilli pepper) because is mainly labor intensive and is the sector where my family company (DIROSE SAC) operates. This innovation consists in a 40 arms mechatronic combine, and it was first created in order to improve the efficiency on the labor intensive phase of harvest for this kind of agriculture products. It is estimated that a laborer with brief training operating the machine would be equivalent to 40 people that not only would work during daytime, but also on the night shift as well. Also, using this new technology can allow a company to make additional crops that would increase their yields and annual revenues. This thesis was developed as a business plan to make this new product available for other agriculture companies that operates in the capsicums production sector in Peru; however, this new technology has the potential to be modified in order to be available to other kind of agriculture products, in Peru and other countries.

The certification role of venture capitalists, top underwriters and big-n auditors in ipos

Esta tese avalia o impacto dos principais atores recorrentes durante o processo de IPO, em particular, o venture capitalist, o underwriter, e o auditor, sobre as condições de comercialização das ações da empresa, capturado pelo bid-ask spread, a fração de investidores institucionais que investem na empresa, a dispersão de capital, entre outros. Além disso, este estudo também analisa alguns benefícios que os fundos de Venture Capital (VCs) fornecem às empresas que eles investem. Ele investiga o papel dos VCs em dificultar o gerenciamento de resultados em IPOs e quantifica o papel desempenhado por eles no desempenho operacional das empresas após sua oferta inicial de ações. No primeiro capítulo, os resultados indicam que as empresas inflam seus resultados principalmente nos períodos pré-IPO e do IPO. Quando nós controlamos para os quatro períodos diferentes do IPO, observamos que IPOs de empresas investidas por VCs apresentam significativamente menos gerenciamento de resultados no IPO e em períodos seguintes à orfeta inicial das ações, exatamente quando as empresas tendem a inflar mais seus lucros. Este resultado é robusto a diferentes métodos estatísticos e diferentes metodologias usadas para avaliar o gerenciamento de resultados. Além disso, ao dividir a amostra entre IPOs de empresas investidas e não investidas por VCs, observa-se que ambos os grupos apresentam gerenciamento de resultados. Ambas as subamostras apresentam níveis de gerenciamento de resultados de forma mais intensa em diferentes fases ao redor do IPO. Finalmente, observamos também que top underwriters apresentam menores níveis de gerenciamento de resultados na subamostra das empresas investidas por VCs. No segundo capítulo, verificou-se que a escolha do auditor, dos VCs, e underwriter pode indicar escolhas de longo prazo da empresa. Nós apresentamos evidências que as características do underwriter, auditor, e VC têm um impacto sobre as características das empresas e seu desempenho no mercado. Além disso, estes efeitos são persistentes por quase uma década. As empresas que têm um top underwriter e um auditor big-N no momento do IPO têm características de mercado que permanecem ao longo dos próximos 8 anos. Essas características são representadas por um número maior de analistas seguindo a empresa, uma grande dispersão da propriedade através de investidores institucionais, e maior liquidez através um bid-ask spread menor. Elas também são menos propensas a saírem do mercado, bem como mais propensas à emissão de uma orferta secundária. Finalmente, empresas investidas por VCs são positivamente afetadas, quando consideramos todas as medidas de liquidez de mercado, desde a abertura de capital até quase uma década depois. Tais efeitos não são devido ao viés de sobrevivência. Estes resultados não dependem da bolha dot-com, ou seja, os nossos resultados são qualitativamente similares, uma vez que excluímos o período da bolha de 1999-2000. No último capítulo foi evidenciado que empresas investidas por VCs incorrem em um nível mais elevado de saldo em tesouraria do que as empresas não investidas. Este efeito é persistente por pelo menos 8 anos após o IPO. Mostramos também que empresas investidas por VCs estão associadas a um nível menor de alavancagem e cobertura de juros ao longo dos primeiros oito anos após o IPO. Finalmente, não temos evidências estatisticamente significantes entre VCs e a razão dividendo lucro. Estes resultados também são robustos a diversos métodos estatísticos e diferentes metodologias.

Law and economics in the civil law world: the case of Brazilian Courts

Conventional wisdom holds that economic analysis of law is either embryonic or nonexistent outside of the United States generally and in civil law jurisdictions in particular. Existing explanations for the assumed lack of interest in the application of economic reasoning to legal problems range from the different structure of legal education and academia outside of the United States to the peculiar characteristics of civilian legal systems. This paper challenges this view by documenting and explaining the growing use of economic reasoning by Brazilian courts. We argue that, given the ever-greater role of courts in the formulation of public policies, the application of legal principles and rules increasingly calls for a theory of human behavior (such as that provided by economics) to help foresee the likely aggregate consequences of different interpretations of the law. Consistent with the traditional role of civilian legal scholarship in providing guidance for the application of law by courts, the further development of law and economics in Brazil is therefore likely to be mostly driven by judicial demand.

Inference in differences-in-differences with few treated groups and heteroskedasticity

Differences-in-Differences (DID) is one of the most widely used identification strategies in applied economics. However, how to draw inferences in DID models when there are few treated groups remains an open question. We show that the usual inference methods used in DID models might not perform well when there are few treated groups and errors are heteroskedastic. In particular, we show that when there is variation in the number of observations per group, inference methods designed to work when there are few treated groups tend to (under-) over-reject the null hypothesis when the treated groups are (large) small relative to the control groups. This happens because larger groups tend to have lower variance, generating heteroskedasticity in the group x time aggregate DID model. We provide evidence from Monte Carlo simulations and from placebo DID regressions with the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS) datasets to show that this problem is relevant even in datasets with large numbers of observations per group. We then derive an alternative inference method that provides accurate hypothesis testing in situations where there are few treated groups (or even just one) and many control groups in the presence of heteroskedasticity. Our method assumes that we can model the heteroskedasticity of a linear combination of the errors. We show that this assumption can be satisfied without imposing strong assumptions on the errors in common DID applications. With many pre-treatment periods, we show that this assumption can be relaxed. Instead, we provide an alternative inference method that relies on strict stationarity and ergodicity of the time series. Finally, we consider two recent alternatives to DID when there are many pre-treatment periods. We extend our inference methods to linear factor models when there are few treated groups. We also derive conditions under which a permutation test for the synthetic control estimator proposed by Abadie et al. (2010) is robust to heteroskedasticity and propose a modification on the test statistic that provided a better heteroskedasticity correction in our simulations.