A economia como ciência. Dos clássicos a Keynes

Este ensaio se propõe confrontar a abordagem neoclássica da economia como ciência positiva, com a modelo keynesiano e a visão da economia dinâmica de Kalecki, onde a economia é tratada desde a perspectiva de uma ciência moral e normativa. Para tanto analisaremos as bases teóricas de cada modelo, seus pressupostos, leis fundamentais e principais conclusões. Dado o propósito didático do texto nos preocupamos em tentar explicar os antecedentes, axiomas, leis e relações funcionais de cada modelo, dando especial ênfase às que surgem da crítica de postulados anteriores, pois admitimos que cada modelo incorpora valores, pressupostos e metodologia própria, cuja crítica é essencial para o avanço da ciência. A economia neoclássica supõe agentes racionais, informação completa e ações e resultados imediatos. Seu método de análise é a otimização com restrições. O principio ordenador, necessário e suficiente da atividade econômica, consiste no comportamento racional dos agentes. Este modelo tem sua concepção política e ética das relações econômicas, consistente com seus pressupostos, o que fica patente, por exemplo, a propósito de sua teoria da distribuição da renda. Com a introdução de conceitos como: o tempo histórico; o caracter monetário da produção; a preferência pela liquidez; o comportamento subjetivo dos agentes; o predomínio da procura sobre a oferta; as expectativas e a incerteza em relação ao futuro, etc., a macroeconomia de Keynes consegue romper o paradigma anterior, do ajuste automático dos mercados de acordo com um feedeback contínuo e estável, capaz de garantir o equilíbrio de pleno emprego. Embora a análise keynesiana tivesse permitido a abordagem precisa de questões tão importantes como: a natureza e as causas do desemprego; o papel da moeda e do crédito; a determinação dos juros; os condicionantes do investimento, etc., faltava ainda uma teoria dos preços, da distribuição e do ciclo econômico, no que o trabalho de M. Kalecki, certamente parece ter avançado. Este autor parte de um contexto cultural e ideológico que lhe permite abordar sem entraves a natureza do capitalismo. Seu enfoque micro e macroeconômico é integrado e está apoiado no pressuposto da concorrência imperfeita. No universo keynesiano os mercados podem estar em equilíbrio, mas não no de pleno emprego, já segundo Kalecki o ciclo econômico é inevitável. Em ambos os casos os mercados não são perfeitos e não tendem naturalmente para o equilíbrio, o que justifica a ação reguladora do Estado, de acordo sua opção política e um código de valores preestabelecido. É de se imaginar que cada modelo de análise esteja condicionado pelo conjunto de valores dominantes do momento, o que não invalida o caracter de ciência social da economia. Por exemplo, desde a perspectiva individualista da troca mercantil, a economia se apresenta com a metodologia de ciência pura, porém, levando em conta as relações de classe social, é uma ciência moral.

Distortions in the investment goods sector and productivity decline

We study the impact of distortions in the investment goods sector on aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). We develop a two-sector neo-classical growth model in which TFP in the capital goods sector relative to TFP in the consumption sector is inversely related to the price of investment relative to consumption, so that we use relative prices to measure TFP in the investment goods sector. The model is calibrated to Brazil and we nd that distortions in the investment goods sector may explain most of the decline in Brazilian TFP relative to the United States since the mid-1970s.

Paixão empreendedora: neoliberalismo, capital humano e processos seletivos de trainees

O neoliberalismo, do ponto de vista econômico e social, pode ser entendido como a instauração, na sociedade, de relações estritamente mercantis, fazendo com que a lógica da maximização do ganho e do rendimento seja estendida a todos os campos, promovendo a racionalidade econômica como forma de racionalidade em geral. A forma de governamentalidade neoliberal norte-americana, com sua pretensão de transmutar os indivíduos em sujeitos-microempresas e as relações humanas em relações de tipo concorrencial, faz com que os indivíduos passem a ser vistos como “capital humano”. Originalmente, o termo “capital humano” remete a uma teoria que, desenvolvida sob influência do paradigma econômico neoclássico e liderança de Theodore Schultz, foi responsável por assimilar e transferir princípios econômicos para uma realidade anteriormente isenta de significados dessa natureza, fazendo emergir um discurso que associa o humano ao capital, transportando-o, dessa forma, para uma lógica onde ele deve gerir a si mesmo, tal como uma empresa. A empresa é, assim, promovida a modelo de subjetivação, sendo cada indivíduo um capital a ser gerenciado e valorizado conforme as demandas do mercado. É por isso que o modelo de conduta empreendedora, advindo do discurso do capital humano de inspiração neoliberal e de teorias clássicas propostas por Werner Sombart e Joseph A. Schumpeter, acomete os profissionais das organizações sediadas nos países capitalistas. Esse fato é bastante expressivo entre os jovens que procuram inserir-se no mercado de trabalho, principalmente em posições estratégicas valorizadas dentro das organizações, como as de trainee. No Brasil, os programas de trainee são considerados uma estratégia de busca de atração de jovens com perfil diferenciado, sendo uma resposta encontrada por muitas organizações desde 1970 para ganhar vantagem em um cenário econômico altamente competitivo. Esses profissionais são vistos como os “talentos” da organização, sendo treinados para ocuparem cargos estratégicos em um curto espaço tempo. A fim de esclarecer de que maneira o modelo de conduta empreendedora está presente nos processos seletivos de trainee, foi realizada uma análise dos textos que descrevem as competências exigidas na seleção desses jovens, a partir da Análise Crítica do Discurso (ACD) de Fairclough (2001, 2003), a partir das categorias analíticas “modalidade” e “avaliação”, e reflexões acerca da ideologia neoliberal. Chegou-se à conclusão de que o modelo de conduta empreendedora que está presente nos processos seletivos de trainee é marcada pela expressão de um comportamento apaixonado, que, no campo do management, é entendido a partir do conceito de “paixão empreendedora”. A pesquisa desenvolvida é relevante para o campo da Administração, tanto para o campo acadêmico (uma vez que há poucos estudos que têm como objeto de pesquisa a seleção de trainees e que procuram entendê-lo a partir de um viés crítico utilizando-se da análise do discurso do capital humano), como para quem está inserido nas organizações e convive com as dificuldades e desafios de selecionar jovens para programas de trainees, já que levanta questões importantes sobre os impactos dessas iniciativas tanto para os jovens, como para as organizações que os contratam.

A ética em Smith nos neo-clássicos e suas implicações na ética em negócios

Esta pesquisa procurará discutir as relações entre ética em economia e administração. O enfoque adotado demonstrará que a ética da economia clássica representada pelo pensamento de Adam Smith é completamente diferente daquela encontrada nos pensadores neoclássicos representados por Hayek, Von Mises e Friedman. Decorre daí que apesar do mundo dos negócios adotar algumas perspectivas econômicas de Smith, os critérios de avaliação de desempenho empresarial decorrem da economia neoclássica e de forma subjacente incorpora seus valores éticos. Ao se ignorar este relacionamento entre economia e negócios, a discussão sobre ética nos negócios é conduzida por um caminho que impede qualquer consenso ou aplicação prática.

The revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of intelligent regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.

Why has productivity growth stagnated in most Latin American countries since the neo-liberal reforms?

Latin America’s economic performance since the beginning of neo-liberal reforms has been poor; this not only contrasts with its own performance pre-1980, but also with what has happened in Asia since 1980. I shall argue that the weakness of the region’s new paradigm is rooted as much in its intrinsic flaws as in the particular way it has been implemented. Latin America’s economic reforms were undertaken primarily as a result of the perceived economic weaknesses of the region — i.e., there was an attitude of ‘throwing in the towel’ vis-à-vis the previous state-led import substituting industrialisation strategy, because most politicians and economists interpreted the 1982 debt crisis as conclusive evidence that it had led the region into a cul-de-sac. As Hirschman has argued, policymaking has a strong component of ‘path-dependency’; as a result, people often stick with policies after they have achieved their aims, and those policies have become counterproductive. This leads to such frustration and disappointment with existing policies and institutions that is not uncommon to experience a ‘rebound effect’. An extreme example of this phenomenon is post-1982 Latin America, where the core of the discourse of the economic reforms that followed ended up simply emphasising the need to reverse as many aspects of the previous development (and political) strategies as possible. This helps to explain the peculiar set of priorities, the rigidity and the messianic attitude with which the reforms were implemented in Latin America, as well as their poor outcome. Something very different happened in Asia, where economic reforms were often intended (rightly or wrongly) as a more targeted and pragmatic mechanism to overcome specific economic and financial constraints. Instead of implementing reforms as a mechanism to reverse existing industrialisation strategies, in Asia they were put into practice in order to continue and strengthen ambitious processes of industrialisation.

Development, technological change and innovation, Schumpeter and neo-Schumpeterians

This review essay is devoted to a discussion of some central aspects of the Schumpeterian and neo-Schumpeterian approaches to the dynamic processes of development, technological change and innovation. This essay is organised in two parts. In the first, Schumpeter's insightful distinction between circular flow and development is discussed. In the second, some central elements of the neo-Schumpeterian interpretation and extension of Schumpeter's views are critically outlined, special emphasis being placed on some recent attempts to formalize several of his insights on the cyclical dynamics of the processes of technological change and innovation. I should stress that due to space constraints I will focus primarily upon macrotheoretic issues, thus paying only secondary attention to the neo-Schumpeterian literature on the microeconomics of technological change and to the burgeoning empirical developments along those lines.

Os keynesianos neo-ricardianos e os pós-keynesianos: comentários a Amadeu e Dutt

O objetivo deste "paper" é tecer alguns comentários à leitura que Amadeo e Dutt apresentam em artigo publicado na Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, sobre duas vertentes do keynesianismo: a ner-ricardiana e a pós-keynesiana.

Pensamento neo-schumpeteriano: fronteiras : natureza, incentivos e condições para a ocorrência de mudanças tecnológicas

A inovação, que não se pode determinar como resultado de uma mera intervenção racional, pode apresentar-se sob diversas formas; das mais óbvias e tradicionalmente consideradas e estudadas (novos processos e novos produtos), às novas soluções organizativas, ao uso de novos sistemas informativos e de apoio a decisões e às novas formas de distribuição comercial. O conceito de inovação estende-se também à adoção diferenciada de novos métodos na logística da relação técnico-comercial entre fornecedor e empresa, e à adoção de programas e processos como planejamento estratégico, reengenharia, qualidade total e novas técnicas de treinamento, avaliação de desempenho, e administração participativa. A inovação se realiza com diferentes tipos de tecnologia, tem caráter multidimensional, e não está ligada somente a tecnologia da produção industrial, no seu sentido tradicional, mas a qualquer tipo de atividade que se desenvolva em uma empresa produtora ou utilizadora de bens ou de serviços

Essays on the credit channel of monetary policy: a case study for Brazil

The onset of the financial crisis in 2008 and the European sovereign crisis in 2010 renewed the interest of macroeconomists on the role played by credit in business cycle fluctuations. The purpose of the present work is to present empirical evidence on the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Brazil with a special eye on the role played by the credit channel, using different econometric techniques. It is comprised by three articles. The first one presents a review of the literature of financial frictions, with a focus on the overlaps between credit activity and the monetary policy. It highlights how the sharp disruptions in the financial markets spurred central banks in developed and emerging nations to deploy of a broad set of non conventional tools to overcome the damage on financial intermediation. A chapter is dedicated to the challenge face by the policymaking in emerging markets and Brazil in particular in the highly integrated global capital market. This second article investigates the implications of the credit channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the case of Brazil, using a structural FAVAR (SFAVAR) approach. The term “structural” comes from the estimation strategy, which generates factors that have a clear economic interpretation. The results show that unexpected shocks in the proxies for the external finance premium and the credit volume produce large and persistent fluctuations in inflation and economic activity – accounting for more than 30% of the error forecast variance of the latter in a three-year horizon. Counterfactual simulations demonstrate that the credit channel amplified the economic contraction in Brazil during the acute phase of the global financial crisis in the last quarter of 2008, thus gave an important impulse to the recovery period that followed. In the third articles, I make use of Bayesian estimation of a classical neo-Keynesian DSGE model, incorporating the financial accelerator channel developed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). The results present evidences in line to those already seen in the previous article: disturbances on the external finance premium – represented here by credit spreads – trigger significant responses on the aggregate demand and inflation and monetary policy shocks are amplified by the financial accelerator mechanism. Keywords: Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy, Credit Channel, Financial Accelerator, FAVAR, DSGE, Bayesian Econometrics

Growth and distribution: a revised classical model

This paper discusses distribution and the historical phases of capitalism. It assumes that technical progress and growth are taking place, and, given that, its question is on the functional distribution of income between labor and capital, having as reference classical theory of distribution and Marx’s falling tendency of the rate of profit. Based on the historical experience, it, first, inverts the model, making the rate of profit as the constant variable in the long run and the wage rate, as the residuum; second, it distinguishes three types of technical progress (capital-saving, neutral and capital-using) and applies it to the history of capitalism, having the UK and France as reference. Given these three types of technical progress, it distinguishes four phases of capitalist growth, where only the second is consistent with Marx prediction. The last phase, after World War II, should be, in principle, capital-saving, consistent with growth of wages above productivity. Instead, since the 1970s wages were kept stagnant in rich countries because of, first, the fact that the Information and Communication Technology Revolution proved to be highly capital using, opening room for a new wage of substitution of capital for labor; second, the new competition coming from developing countries; third, the emergence of the technobureaucratic or professional class; and, fourth, the new power of the neoliberal class coalition associating rentier capitalists and financiers

Reflecting on new developmentalism and classical developmentalism

This paper, first, distinguishes new developmentalism, a new theoretical system that is being created, from really existing developmentalism – a form of organizing capitalism. Second, it distinguishes new developmentalism from its antecedents, Development Economics or classical developmentalism and Keynesian Macroeconomics. Third, it discusses the false opposition that some economists have adopted between new developmentalism and social-developmentalism, which the author understands as a form of really existing developmentalism; as theory, it is just a version of classical developmentalism with a bias toward immediate consumption. Finally, it makes a summary of new developmentalism – of its main political economy, economic theory and economic policy claims

International civil society actors in Genetically Modificied Organisms as a field of struggle: a neo-gramscian study in Brazil and the United Kingdom

Since the international financial and food crisis that started in 2008, strong emphasis has been made on the importance of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) (or “transgenics”) under the claim that they could contribute to increase food productivity at a global level, as the world population is predicted to reach 9.1 billion in the year 2050 and food demand is predicted to increase by as much as 50% by 2030. GMOs are now at the forefront of the debates and struggles of different actors. Within civil society actors, it is possible to observe multiple, and sometime, conflicting roles. The role of international social movements and international NGOs in the GMO field of struggle is increasingly relevant. However, while many of these international civil society actors oppose this type of technological developments (alleging, for instance, environmental, health and even social harms), others have been reportedly cooperating with multinational corporations, retailers, and the biotechnology industry to promote GMOs. In this thesis research, I focus on analysing the role of “international civil society” in the GMO field of struggle by asking: “what are the organizing strategies of international civil society actors, such as NGOs and social movements, in GMO governance as a field of struggle?” To do so, I adopt a neo-Gramscian discourse approach based on the studies of Laclau and Mouffe. This theoretical approach affirms that in a particular hegemonic regime there are contingent alliances and forces that overpass the spheres of the state and the economy, while civil society actors can be seen as a “glue” to the way hegemony functions. Civil society is then the site where hegemony is consented, reproduced, sustained, channelled, but also where counter-hegemonic and emancipatory forces can emerge. Considering the importance of civil society actors in the construction of hegemony, I also discuss some important theories around them. The research combines, on the one hand, 36 in-depth interviews with a range of key civil society actors and scientists representing the GMO field of struggle in Brazil (19) and the UK (17), and, on the other hand, direct observations of two events: Rio+20 in Rio de Janeiro in 2012, and the first March Against Monsanto in London in 2013. A brief overview of the GMO field of struggle, from its beginning and especially focusing in the 1990s when the process of hegemonic formation became clearer, serves as the basis to map who are the main actors in this field, how resource mobilization works, how political opportunities (“historical contingencies”) are discovered and exploited, which are the main discourses (“science” and “sustainability” - articulated by “biodiversity preservation”, “food security” and “ecological agriculture”) articulated among the actors to construct a collective identity in order to attract new potential allies around “GMOs” (“nodal point”), and which are the institutions and international regulations within these processes that enable hegemony to emerge in meaningful and durable hegemonic links. This mapping indicates that that the main strategies applied by the international civil society actors are influenced by two central historical contingencies in the GMO field of struggle: 1) First Multi-stakeholder Historical Contingency; and 2) “Supposed” Hegemony Stability. These two types of historical contingency in the GMO field of struggle encompass deeper hegemonic articulations and, because of that, they induce international civil society actors to rethink the way they articulate and position themselves within the field. Therefore, depending on one of those moments, they will apply one specific strategy of discourse articulation, such as: introducing a new discourse in hegemony articulation to capture the attention of the public and of institutions; endorsing new plural demands; increasing collective visibility; facilitating material articulations; sharing a common enemy identity; or spreading new ideological elements among the actors in the field of struggle.

Homogeneous middles vs. heterogeneous tails, and the end of the ‘Inverted-U’: the share of the rich is what it’s all about

This paper examines the current global scene of distributional disparities within-nations. There are six main conclusions. First, about 80 per cent of the world’s population now live in regions whose median country has a Gini not far from 40. Second, as outliers are now only located among middle-income and rich countries, the ‘upwards’ side of the ‘Inverted-U’ between inequality and income per capita has evaporated (and with it the statistical support there was for the hypothesis that posits that, for whatever reason, ‘things have to get worse before they can get better’). Third, among middle-income countries Latin America and mineral-rich Southern Africa are uniquely unequal, while Eastern Europe follows a distributional path similar to the Nordic countries. Fourth, among rich countries there is a large (and growing) distributional diversity. Fifth, within a global trend of rising inequality, there are two opposite forces at work. One is ‘centrifugal’, and leads to an increased diversity in the shares appropriated by the top 10 and bottom 40 per cent. The other is ‘centripetal’, and leads to a growing uniformity in the income-share appropriated by deciles 5 to 9. Therefore, half of the world’s population (the middle and upper-middle classes) have acquired strong ‘property rights’ over half of their respective national incomes; the other half, however, is increasingly up for grabs between the very rich and the poor. And sixth, Globalisation is thus creating a distributional scenario in which what really matters is the income-share of the rich — because the rest ‘follows’ (middle classes able to defend their shares, and workers with ever more precarious jobs in ever more ‘flexible’ labour markets). Therefore, anybody attempting to understand the within-nations disparity of inequality should always be reminded of this basic distributional fact following the example of Clinton’s campaign strategist: by sticking a note on their notice-boards saying “It’s the share of the rich, stupid”.