Cartel deterrence and settlements: the Brazilian experience

Settlements are an important part of a program of cartel deterrence, particularly when the likelihood of conviction and the litigation costs are higher. This type of negotiated procedure to reach finality is in essence complementary to the fully adversarial procedures associated to the trial by the administrative or judicial courts, and to other investigative instruments, such as the leniency agreement. The Brazilian experience provides some insights about the different models of direct settlement in cartel cases and the complex interaction among settlements, leniency agreements, and trial outcome. First, there is leeway for the complementary models of settlements, the first oriented mainly to increasing the likelihood of detection, and the second oriented to saving social costs of litigation. Second, the concern with the preservation of the demand for leniency agreements led the competition authority to restrict the use of settlements, which are effectively designed for the defendants that are likely guilty and give higher value to finality. The recent experience illustrates that the current settlement policy has not caused any adverse effect on leniency agreements, while reducing litigation costs and granting finality in some cases.

Acordos preferenciais de comércio e a OMC: um estudo sobre seus mecanismos de solução de controvérsias

Este trabalho analisa os Acordos Preferenciais de Comércio (APCs) com ênfase em seus Mecanismos de Solução de Controvérsias (MSC). A partir da seleção de alguns APCs bilaterais celebrados por Estados Unidos e União Europeia com outros parceiros comerciais, o trabalho objetiva (i) explicar como funcionam os MSC previstos pelos APCs para, em seguida, (ii) testar a hipótese de que a forma como os MSC são negociados nos APCs possibilita, em alguma medida, sua coexistência com o Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC) da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC). This paper analyzes Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) focusing in its Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (DRM). Bilateral agreements signed by the United States and the European Union with other countries were selected with the aim to (i) explain how the DRMs stablished by PTAs work and, aftwards, (ii) test the hypothesis that the way the DRMs are negotiated in the PTAs enables its coexistence with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization.

WTO-plus commitments on the elimination of export duties: evidence of a two-tier membership?

This descriptive paper examines the prevalence of ‘WTO-plus’ commitments in accession protocols of newly acceded Members, with a focus on commitments on the elimination of export duties. It presents preliminary results of a mapping exercise carried out with respect to these commitments and seeks to answer two questions. First, can any general conclusions be drawn as to the prevalence of these commitments or are they, per definition, country-specific. Second, has the political nature of the WTO accession process allowed for the creation of a two-tier membership. The first question is answered by relying on data gathered as part of the ongoing PhD-research project conducted by the author. The project aims to construct a typology of WTO-plus commitments to allow for a more detailed analysis of the relationship between these commitments and the baseline obligations in the covered agreements. The accession of China to the WTO is commonly considered as the prime example of the inclusion of WTO-plus obligations in accession protocols. The paper tries to answer the question whether this particular accession was truly unique in nature, or whether the inclusion of “Plus” obligations is less exceptional than often assumed. Additionally, the accession protocols of other recently acceded-Members are examined to establish whether the hypothesis holds. In the PhD-research project this comparative methodology will also be applied to map WTO-plus commitments in other areas, such as anti-dumping and transparency. The second question will be answered in two stages. In a preliminary stage, international institutional law will be used to by analyzing the way in which the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body has dealt with this type of WTO-plus commitment in its jurisprudence. The second stage deals with the question of hierarchy: Accession Protocols are negotiated with the WTO Membership, by each country willing to accede to the WTO. This poses questions as to their exact position in the system of WTO law. To establish whether evidence of a two-tier membership is present, one first has to turn back to the question whether Accession Protocols are a separate (or independent) legal instrument or an “integral part” of the WTO system of covered agreements. If newly acceded Members do not benefit from the general exceptions in order to balance their more stringent, WTO-plus, obligations, this may support the conclusion that the membership of the World Trade Organization is becoming, in fact, two-tiered.

Energy subsidies and WTO dispute settlement: why only renewable energy subsidies are challenged?

Over the past few years, renewable energy subsidies have become one of the main sources of trade disputes in the WTO. A total of six cases have been initiated against renewable energy subsidy programs since the first of such disputes was brought by Japan against Canada’s Feed in Tariff (FIT) program in 2010. Yet not even a single case has so far been initiated against the much larger and environmentally harmful fossil fuel subsidies. The main objective of this paper is to examine what makes renewable energy subsidies vulnerable to WTO dispute, as compared fossil fuel subsidies.