Financiamento para o subdesenvolvimento, o Brasil e o segundo consenso de Washington

While in the social and in the ethical realms the Cardoso administration was successful, its economic outcomes were frustrating. In this administration’s eight years the investment rate did not increase and income per capita growth lagged, while the public debt and the foreign debt increased substantially. This poor economic performance may be explained by three chained causes: a mistake in agenda setting, the adoption of the Second Washington Consensus, and the alienation of elites. The decision of setting high inflation as the major problem to be tackled instead of achieving equilibrium in foreign accounts represented a major macroeconomic mistake, which can be explained by the Second Washington Consensus. This consensus proposed in the 1990s that highly indebted countries should grow counting on foreign savings, although this is not the experience among OECD countries. The outcome was to evaluate the real, to increase artificially wages and consumption, so that instead of growth what we have been increased indebtedness. Why this flopped strategy was adopted? Rich countries’ interests are not difficult to guess. On the part of Brazil, the only explanation is Brazilian elites’ alienation in relation to the country’s national interest. As a final outcome, the Cardoso administration ends with another balance of payments crisis, which was empowered by the coming presidential elections. Yet, the solvency situation of the Brazilian economy have been improving since the 1999 successful floatation of the real, so that I believe that, adopted a policy that deepens fiscal adjustment, while lowers the interest rate, and avoids new evaluation of the real, the country will eventually be able to avoid default.

A implementação da estratégia nacional de defesa, 2008-2013

O debate sobre defesa no Brasil ainda fica aquém de sua importância estratégica para o país. Entretanto, nos anos recentes, a questão passou a ganhar maior relevância e assuntos relacionados ao tema começam a ganhar mais destaque, inclusive na mídia (compra dos caças Gripen, por exemplo). A institucionalização da Defesa no Brasil teve importantes marcos desde a criação do Ministério da Defesa (MD) em 1999, passando pela elaboração da Política Nacional de Defesa (PND) em 2005, da Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (END) em 2008 e, finalmente, do Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional (LBDN) em 2012. As relações civis militares são pautadas por visões muitas vezes distintas sobre a Defesa, é preciso que haja uma maior convergência nesse entendimento. Entretanto, ainda há um longo caminho a ser percorrido para que a sociedade compreenda e tenha um maior envolvimento com tema tão relevante de interesse nacional. O presente estudo objetiva analisar o grau de implementação das diretrizes da Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (END) e avaliar os motivos que impactaram nas ações propostas para sua efetivação.

Capitalismo de estado e inovação: facetas da relação entre estado e iniciativa privada no desenvolvimento nacional

While countries managed to rapidly rise and recover economically, Brazilian social indicators have advanced at short pace in the last decades. Although millions of Brazilians have recently left poverty, Brazil still has a long way to go regarding its socioeconomic development. Circa one fifth of the population is still considered functionally illiterate, basic education has one of the poorest performances in the world, the country has no top-level universities nor produces technology or patents at relevant levels. This paper, at first, analyses how the interaction between government and private agents influenced Brazil’s industrial and economic development, identifying the existence of bonds based on the exchange of private interests that at great extension kept public policies from reaching goals of national interest – the so called crony capitalism. Secondly, the paper verifies how development policies based on the promotion of innovative companies and segments of the industry may positively impact broad socioeconomic development. The paper delves specifically into the cooperation between universities and industry as a development tool. Enterprises and universities, guided by their endogenous interests, may be combined for the structuring of a national innovation system. While universities are fundamentally interested in promoting knowledge accumulation, enterprises are willing to invest financial capital in universities in exchange for the economic exploitation of products developed within the academic environment and direct access to its human capital. Lastly, the paper identifies the legal and cultural barriers and advances of this mechanism in Brazil. It verifies that, notwithstanding the institutional advance promoted by the Law of Innovation to the university-enterprise cooperation in Brazil, the law wasn’t entirely capable of eliminating the legal uncertainty of this relationship and capturing in an efficient way the interests of the agents involved. Recently, federal law n. 12.863/2013 officially offered universities the option of bypassing problems related to public law by regulating support foundations, which conceives greater certainty and simplicity to the cooperation. There are, however, remaining uncertainties regarding the norms to be edited by the executive power, as well as conflicts of interest linked to the property rights over patents resulting from this kind of cooperation. The paper verifies, moreover, the existence of ideological resistance to this tool within universities, in such a way that it is unlikely that those relationships develop in a systematic way throughout the country without further engagement from the government and its executive and legislative bodies.

Evaluating the existence of structural change in the brazilian term structure of interest: evidence based on cointegration models with structural break

This paper investigates whether there is evidence of structural change in the Brazilian term structure of interest rates. Multivariate cointegration techniques are used to verify this evidence. Two econometrics models are estimated. The rst one is a Vector Autoregressive Model with Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) with smooth transition in the deterministic coe¢ cients (Ripatti and Saikkonen [25]). The second one is a VECM with abrupt structural change formulated by Hansen [13]. Two datasets were analysed. The rst one contains a nominal interest rate with maturity up to three years. The second data set focuses on maturity up to one year. The rst data set focuses on a sample period from 1995 to 2010 and the second from 1998 to 2010. The frequency is monthly. The estimated models suggest the existence of structural change in the Brazilian term structure. It was possible to document the existence of multiple regimes using both techniques for both databases. The risk premium for di¤erent spreads varied considerably during the earliest period of both samples and seemed to converge to stable and lower values at the end of the sample period. Long-term risk premiums seemed to converge to inter-national standards, although the Brazilian term structure is still subject to liquidity problems for longer maturities.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.