Estratégias de internacionalização: investimentos diretos externos de multinacionais brasileiras

With the improvement of the international trade on the last decades, the Brazilian firms are searching to operate beyond the national borders in order to guarantee its presence on the key markets. The dissertation aimed to analyze the motivations and the strategies of internationalization implemented by the firms: Petrobras, Vale, Embraer, Gerdau and Marcopolo as well as determine the existence of a dominant strategy. In order to do that, Dunning¿s eclectic paradigm and the strategies of internationalization supported by him were revised along with the main literature from Brazilian authors on the internationalization process of the selected firms. The comparative analysis between the strategies of internationalization selected and the industrial sector, origin of capital and the preferred mode of entrance on the markets were done through an exploratory research, with a qualitative character and collection of secondary data from the internationalization process of the firms. At the end of this research, it was possible to identify that each firm had adopted a predominant strategy however it was also possible to observe that new strategies were aggregated in complementation of the previous one. Besides that, no evidence was found between the predominant strategy of internationalization and the origin of the capital neither with the preferred mode of entrance.

Trust-based trade

There is substantially more trade within national borders than across borders. An important explanation for this fact is the weak enforcement of international contracts. We develop a model in which agents build reputations to overcome this institutional failure. The model describes the interplay between institutional quality, reputations and the dynamics of international trade. It also rationalizes several empirical regularities. We find that history matters for trade volumes, but that its effects vary with the institutional setting of the country. The same is true for the efticacy of trade liberalization programs. Moreover, while stricter enforcement of contracts enhances trade in the short run, it makes it harder for individual traders to develop good reputations. We show that this indirect negative effect may produce an "institutional trap": for sufliciently low initial levels of contract enforcement, a small tightening in enforcement reduces future trade fiows. We find also that search frictions aggravate the problems created by weak enforceability of contracts, even if they impose no direct cost on agents. The model allows extensions in several directions. We outline two of them, indicating how one could study transnational networks and the effects of firm heterogeneity within our structure.