Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.

Avanços e desafios na gestão municipal do SUS: um retrato das contratações de pessoas e serviços no Estado de São Paulo

O papel dos municípios na garantia da provisão de serviços de saúde no âmbito do Sistema Único de Saúde é crescente, sendo cada vez mais necessário repensar novas formas de financiamento e apoio para fortalecer uma gestão mais eficiente e racional. Esse trabalho vem no sentido de identificar como os municípios estão garantindo essa provisão, dentro de um cenário de restrição orçamentária imposto pelos limites com despesas de pessoal. A metodologia conta com uma primeira abordagem exploratória dos gastos municipais, que revelaram impactos, sendo o principal o aumento das despesas com terceiros após a aprovação da Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal. A partir dessa análise foi elaborada uma amostra representativa dos municípios do Estado de São Paulo, para detectar como eles conduzem a execução da política de saúde, por meio de entrevistas e de levantamento de informações sobre as formas de contratação de pessoas e serviços no âmbito municipal, ambas recolhidas junto a gestores municipais. Os resultados reforçam a necessidade de investimentos que contemplem as desigualdades intermunicipais e o questionamento no estabelecimento de limites iguais em realidades totalmente desiguais.

On the impossibility of prisoner's dilemmas in adversarial preference games

Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PDís are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or jealousy may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results ñ including the possibility of conflict inducing growth.

Global stabilizing feedback law for a problem of biological control of mosquito-borne diseases

The control of the spread of dengue fever by introduction of the intracellular parasitic bacterium Wolbachia in populations of the vector Aedes aegypti, is presently one of the most promising tools for eliminating dengue, in the absence of an efficient vaccine. The success of this operation requires locally careful planning to determine the adequate number of mosquitoes carrying the Wolbachia parasite that need to be introduced into the natural population. The latter are expected to eventually replace the Wolbachia-free population and guarantee permanent protection against the transmission of dengue to human. In this paper, we propose and analyze a model describing the fundamental aspects of the competition between mosquitoes carrying Wolbachia and mosquitoes free of the parasite. We then introduce a simple feedback control law to synthesize an introduction protocol, and prove that the population is guaranteed to converge to a stable equilibrium where the totality of mosquitoes carry Wolbachia. The techniques are based on the theory of monotone control systems, as developed after Angeli and Sontag. Due to bistability, the considered input-output system has multivalued static characteristics, but the existing results are unable to prove almost-global stabilization, and ad hoc analysis has to be conducted.