Contingent Edis: a new contractual framework for minimizing the risk of incentive failures

Granting economic development incentives (or “EDIs”) has become commonplace throughout the United States, but the efficiency of these mechanisms is generally unwarranted. Both the politicians granting, and the companies seeking, EDIs have incentives to overestimate the EDIs benefits. For politicians, ribbon–cutting ceremonies can be the highly desirable opportunity to please political allies and financiers, and the same time that they demonstrate to the population that they are successful in promoting economic growth – even when the population would be better off otherwise. In turn, businesses are naturally prone to seek governmental aid. This explains in part why EDIs often “fail” (i.e. don’t pay–off). To increase transparency and mitigate the risk of EDI failure, local and state governments across the country have created a number of accountability mechanisms. The general trait of these accountability mechanisms is that they apply controls to some of the sub–risks that underlie the risk of EDI failure. These sub–risks include the companies receiving EDIs not generating the expected number of jobs, not investing enough in their local facilities, not attracting the expected additional businesses investments to the jurisdiction, etc. The problem with such schemes is that they tackle the problem of EDI failure very loosely. They are too narrow and leave multiplier effects uncontrolled. I propose novel contractual framework for implementing accountability mechanisms. My suggestion is to establish controls on the risk of EDI failure itself, leaving its underlying sub–risks uncontrolled. I call this mechanism “Contingent EDIs”, because the EDIs are made contingent on the government achieving a preset target that benchmarks the risk of EDI failure. If the target is met, the EDIs will ex post kick in; if not, then the EDIs never kick in.

Transição cultural : divergências diante da formação de uma nova identidade : estudo de caso da Companhia Siderúrgica de Tubarão - CST

The employees' partlclpation in the cultural transltIon process occurred in Companhia Siderúrgica de Tubarão (CST) was helpful in the identification of the group of measures that started to be managed in order to be established in the run of the control assumption. The company, in order to acquire proper features, had to change prior values, behaviors and identities through strategies shared by ali the organization members, thus, creating a new culture. The CST was seen as a company controlling and coordinating a group of people. It counted on vertical hierarchical leveis, departments and authority relations. It was neve r taken into account that the company could have its own personality, like each person that worked there. Before getting through this cultural transition process, that extremely changed its values, the company had a dominating culture, with a centralized administration. This way, it influenced the conduct of ali its members, in a controlling environment. When the company realized the necessity of investments in cultural changing programs, in order to eliminate the pathologies and disfunctions that were hitting its business structure, causing damage to productivity and to the quality of the results, it condensed energies in one direction implementing the participation of ali its leaderships as implementing and multiplier elements to orientate and facilitate the achievement of its goals. Trying to understand better the influences suffered by the changes brought by globalization and privatization, some theorical and operational concepts of culture and identity were developed in this study, mainly in the first chapters. In the research extension, several aspects of this complex anthropological and sociological concept of culture were managed, such as affectiveness, cognitive process, valuation process and everything that could be related to or that give elligibility to this concept and to the phenomenon this concept will consist in.

A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.

A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.

Fiscal multipliers in an incomplete markets economy

This paper studies the behavior of fiscal multipliers in two different economic environments: complete markets and incomplete markets. Based on steady state analysis, output multipliers are found within a range between 0.49 and 0.66, when the markets are complete. Under incomplete markets, output multiplier was found in an interval between 0.75 and 0.94. These results indicates that the market structure, which reflects the degree of risk sharing and the intensity of the precautionary motive faced by individuals, plays a key role in determining the fiscal multipliers. In the second part of the paper, was performed an exercise to analyze the dynamic response of macroeconomic aggregates to an exogenous and unexpected rise in government spending financed by lump-sum taxes. In this case, impact output multipliers varies in a range between 0.64 and 0.68, under complete markets, and within 1.05 and 1.20 when markets are incomplete. The results found under incomplete markets are very close to that found on related literature which usually uses an econometric approach or calibrated/estimated New Keynesian models. These results shows that taking into account the deficiencies in the insurance mechanisms can be an interesting way to reconcile theoretical models with the results found on related current literature, without the need of ad-hoc assumptions relative to price stickness.

Tree-structured smooth transition models

The goal of this paper is to introduce a class of tree-structured models that combines aspects of regression trees and smooth transition regression models. The model is called the Smooth Transition Regression Tree (STR-Tree). The main idea relies on specifying a multiple-regime parametric model through a tree-growing procedure with smooth transitions among different regimes. Decisions about splits are entirely based on a sequence of Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests of hypotheses.

Os efeitos macroeconômicos das transferências sociais: uma abordagem de matriz de contabilidade social

Government transfers to individuals and families play a central role in the Brazilian social protection system, accounting for almost 14 per cent of GDP in 2009. While their fiscal and redistributive impacts have been widely studied, the macroeconomic effects of transfers are harder to ascertain. We constructed a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 2009 and estimated short-term multipliers for seven different government monetary transfers . The SAM is a double-entry square matrix depicting all income flows in the economy. The data were compiled from the 2009 Brazilian National Accounts and the 2008/2009 POF, a household budget survey. Our SAM was disaggregated into 56 sectors, 110 commodities, 200 household groups and seven factors of production (capital plus six types of labor, according to schooling). Finally, we ran a set of regressions to separate household consumption into ‘autonomous’ (or ‘exogenous’) and ‘endogenous’ components. More specifically, we are interested in the effects of an exogenous injection into each of the seven government transfers outlined above. All the other accounts are thus endogenous. The so-called demand ‘leaks’ are income flows from the endogenous to exogenous accounts. Leaks—such as savings, taxes and imports—are crucial to determine the multiplier effect of an exogenous injection, as they allow the system to go back to equilibrium. The model assumes that supply is perfectly elastic to demand shocks. It assumes that the families’ propensity to save and consumption profile are fixed—that is, rising incomes do not provoke changes in behaviour. The multiplier effects of the on GDP corresponds to the growth in GDP resulting from each additional dollar injected into each transfer seven government transfers. If the government increased Bolsa Família expenditures by 1 per cent of GDP, overall economic activity would grow by 1.78 per cent, the highest effect. The Continuous Cash Benefit, comes second. Only three transfers— the private-sector and public servants’ pensions and FGTS withdrawals—had multipliers lower than unity. The multipliers for other relevant macroeconomic aggregates—household and total consumption, disposable income etc. —reveal a similar pattern. Thus, under the stringent assumptions of our model, we cannot reject the hypothesis that government transfers targeting poor households, such as the Bolsa Família, help foster economic expansion. Naturally, it should be stressed that the multipliers relate marginal injections into government transfers to short-term economic performance either real growth, or inflation if there is no idle capacity which is also useful to analyze. In the long term, there is no doubt that what truly matters is the growth of the country’s productive capacity.