A robust poverty profile for Brazil using multiple data sources

This paper presents a poverty profile for Brazil, based on three different sources of household data for 1996. We use PPV consumption data to estimate poverty and indigence lines. “Contagem” data is used to allow for an unprecedented refinement of the country’s poverty map. Poverty measures and shares are also presented for a wide range of population subgroups, based on the PNAD 1996, with new adjustments for imputed rents and spatial differences in cost of living. Robustness of the profile is verified with respect to different poverty lines, spatial price deflators, and equivalence scales. Overall poverty incidence ranges from 23% with respect to an indigence line to 45% with respect to a more generous poverty line. More importantly, however, poverty is found to vary significantly across regions and city sizes, with rural areas, small and medium towns and the metropolitan peripheries of the North and Northeast regions being poorest.

Unemployment insurance an analysis of optimal mechanisms under aggregate shocks

The purpose of this work is to provide a brief overview of the literature on the optimal design of unemployment insurance systems by analyzing some of the most influential articles published over the last three decades on the subject and extend the main results to a multiple aggregate shocks environment. The properties of optimal contracts are discussed in light of the key assumptions commonly made in theoretical publications on the area. Moreover, the implications of relaxing each of these hypothesis is reckoned as well. The analysis of models of only one unemployment spell starts from the seminal work of Shavell and Weiss (1979). In a simple and common setting, unemployment benefits policies, wage taxes and search effort assignments are covered. Further, the idea that the UI distortion of the relative price of leisure and consumption is the only explanation for the marginal incentives to search for a job is discussed, putting into question the reduction in labor supply caused by social insurance, usually interpreted as solely an evidence of a dynamic moral hazard caused by a substitution effect. In addition, the paper presents one characterization of optimal unemployment insurance contracts in environments in which workers experience multiple unemployment spells. Finally, an extension to multiple aggregate shocks environment is considered. The paper ends with a numerical analysis of the implications of i.i.d. shocks to the optimal unemployment insurance mechanism.