7 resultados para Multi-objective functions
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
The objective of this dissertation is to re-examine classical issues in corporate finance, applying a new analytical tool. The single-crossing property, also called Spence-irrlees condition, is not required in the models developed here. This property has been a standard assumption in adverse selection and signaling models developed so far. The classical papers by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) and Riley (1979) assume it. In the simplest case, for a consumer with a privately known taste, the single-crossing property states that the marginal utility of a good is monotone with respect to the taste. This assumption has an important consequence to the result of the model: the relationship between the private parameter and the quantity of the good assigned to the agent is monotone. While single crossing is a reasonable property for the utility of an ordinary consumer, this property is frequently absent in the objective function of the agents for more elaborate models. The lack of a characterization for the non-single crossing context has hindered the exploration of models that generate objective functions without this property. The first work that characterizes the optimal contract without the single-crossing property is Araújo and Moreira (2001a) and, for the competitive case, Araújo and Moreira (2001b). The main implication is that a partial separation of types may be observed. Two sets of disconnected types of agents may choose the same contract, in adverse selection problems, or signal with the same levei of signal, in signaling models.
Resumo:
The paper analysis a general equilibrium model with two periods, several households and a government that has to finance some expenditures in the first period. Households may have some private information either about their type (adverse selection) or about some action levei chosen in the first period that affects the probability of certain states of nature in the second period (moral hazard). Trade of financiai assets are intermediated by a finite collection of banks. Banks objective functions are determined in equilibrium by shareholders. Due to private information it may be optimal for the banks to introduce constraints in the set of available portfolios for each household as wellas household specific asset prices. In particular, households may face distinct interest rates for holding the risk-free asset. The government finances its expenditures either by taxing households in the first period or by issuing bonds in the first period and taxing households in the second period. Taxes may be state-dependent. Suppose government policies are neutml: i) government policies do not affect the distribution of wealth across households; and ii) if the government decides to tax a household in the second period there is a portfolio available for the banks that generates the Mme payoff in each state of nature as the household taxes. Tben, Ricardian equivalence holds if and only if an appropriate boundary condition is satisfied. Moreover, at every free-entry equilibrium the boundary condition is satisfied and thus Ricardian equivalence holds. These results do not require any particular assumption on the banks' objective function. In particular, we do not assume banks to be risk neutral.
Resumo:
This paper empirically examines the alternative posed by Richardson (1993) to the traditional view that trade integration may exacerbate inefficiencies through trade diversion. Richardson’s hypothesis boldly predicts that trade diversion may actually cause tariffs to decline! The hypothesis is fundamentally attributable to the presence of a political component in the governments’ objective functions. A cross-sectionally rich data-set on trade and tariffs from the Mercosur-pact countries, primarily Argentina, is used. The evidence yields surprising conclusions about the validity of the political economy construct in models of trade integration.
Resumo:
We consider risk-averse convex stochastic programs expressed in terms of extended polyhedral risk measures. We derive computable con dence intervals on the optimal value of such stochastic programs using the Robust Stochastic Approximation and the Stochastic Mirror Descent (SMD) algorithms. When the objective functions are uniformly convex, we also propose a multistep extension of the Stochastic Mirror Descent algorithm and obtain con dence intervals on both the optimal values and optimal solutions. Numerical simulations show that our con dence intervals are much less conservative and are quicker to compute than previously obtained con dence intervals for SMD and that the multistep Stochastic Mirror Descent algorithm can obtain a good approximate solution much quicker than its nonmultistep counterpart. Our con dence intervals are also more reliable than asymptotic con dence intervals when the sample size is not much larger than the problem size.
Resumo:
Optimal tax theory in the Mirrlees’ (1971) tradition implicitly relies on the assumption that all agents are single or that couples may be treated as individuals, despite accumulating evidence against this view of household behavior. We consider an economy where agents may either be single or married, in which case choices result from Nash bargaining between spouses. In such an environment, tax schedules must play the double role of: i) defining households’ objective functions through their impact on threat points, and; ii) inducing the desired allocations as optimal choices for households given these objectives. We find that the taxation principle, which asserts that there is no loss in relying on tax schedules is not valid here: there are constrained efficient allocations which cannot be implemented via taxes. More sophisticated mechanisms expand the set of implementable allocations by: i) aligning the households’ and planner’s objectives; ii) manipulating taxable income elasticities, and; iii) freeing the design of singles’ tax schedules from its consequences on households’ objectives.
Resumo:
The estimation of labor supply elasticities has been an important issue m the economic literature. Yet all works have estimated conditional mean labor supply functions only. The objective of this paper is to obtain more information on labor supply, by estimating the conditional quantile labor supply function. vI/e use a sample of prime age urban males employees in Brazil. Two stage estimators are used as the net wage and virtual income are found to be endogenous to the model. Contrary to previous works using conditional mean estimators, it is found that labor supply elasticities vary significantly and asymmetrically across hours of work. vVhile the income and wage elasticities at the standard work week are zero, for those working longer hours the elasticities are negative.
Resumo:
Neste trabalho, o objetivo é identificar, a partir da análise de um estudo de caso, quais são as principais divergências encontradas quando se compara o que a teoria preconiza como o escopo e a abordagem dos Project Management Offices - PMOs e o que acontece na prática, no que diz respeito à real atuação destas estruturas. O tema pode ser considerado relevante devido ao fato de fornecer uma melhor compreensão sobre como as estruturas de PMO realmente atuam, principalmente no que diz respeito ao escopo, isto é, se o PMO é um Programa-Projeto, um PMO Departamental ou um PMO Corporativo e relativamente a sua amplitude, ou seja, se sua atuação é operacional, tática ou estratégica. Para este estudo foi utilizada a metodologia qualitativa, por meio da abordagem de estudo de caso. Foi selecionada uma empresa de grande porte do setor de manufatura não estruturada por projeto para avaliação. A empresa do estudo de caso possui uma estrutura organizacional complexa que possibilita um estudo abrangente. A atuação dos PMOs do estudo de caso foi discutida à luz da revisão de literatura e levando-se em conta, também, as informações colhidas a partir da observação participante. Os resultados deste trabalho permitem concluir que o pressuposto defendido, que é a existência de divergências entre o que a teoria preconiza como escopo e abordagem do PMO e a real atuação dos PMOs, foi confirmado através do estudo de caso; além disso, não existe relação de causalidade clara entre o escopo de atuação dos PMOs e sua posição hierárquica dentro da empresa; e não existe uma atuação padrão destas estruturas, quando comparadas às funções que elas exercem. Por fim, são apresentadas recomendações relativas ao estudo de caso realizado, ou seja, é importante realizar um estudo multicasos entre ao menos uma empresa não estruturada por projeto e outra estruturada por projeto e comparar a atuação dos seus PMOs para melhor compreensão do tema, incluir mais stakeholders no grupo de entrevistados dentro do estudo de caso, realizar um survey com várias empresas de vários segmentos dentro do território nacional e um possível estudo onde seja verificado se tipologias diferentes de estruturas organizacionais podem afetar a atuação práticas dos PMOs.