Controle social exercido através da denúncia no âmbito do TCE-RJ

The crisis that affected the capitalist states during the last decade of the 20th century, put an end to the period of greatest expansion of the state, demanding alterations that brought, especially in economic terms, the ideals of the liberal state. The main goal of these changes was to optimize the administration of the public service by introducing into it more efficiency, transparency, and morality because the state had shown to be incapable of attending the demands of the society and its way of doing was inefficient and did not reach out to the public interest. In Brazil, like in other part of the world, recent scandals of corruption and misuse of public funds put in doubt the efficiency of the financial control system. Like any other political system Brazil has a complex set of external and internal control, institutions that work to prevent misuse of public funds and identify responsibilities if bad use occurred. All these elements highlight the mechanisms of control of the public administration, which came to be seen as essential instruments for the improvement of the management of the public resources, targeting the collective interest. Therefore, along with the traditional mechanisms of power suppression, such as the system of checks and balances, social control arises. This, when used together with the monitoring exercised by public inspection agencies, is defined as horizontal accountability activated by civil society, in which citizens and institutions gather efforts in order to promote a more effective charge of responsibility from public agents and politicians in case of misconducts. This study aimed to identify the opportunities and limitations of social control exercised by the complaint under the TCE-RJ. The results point to the need to develop measures to guarantee the anonymity of denouncers, to simplify the forms of access the TCE-RJ and to improve information spread to the citizen.

O Instituto das Súmulas Vinculantes e sua cogente alteração legislativa: a análise do verbete nº 13

O Supremo Tribunal Federal entregou ao ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, em 21 de agosto de 2008, a súmula vinculante nº 13. O referido verbete trata da vedação a nomeações de cônjuge, companheiro ou parente em linha reta, colateral ou por afinidade até o terceiro grau, no âmbito da administração pública direta e indireta, em todas as esferas. Antes da vigência da súmula vinculante nº 13, o nepotismo era praticado de forma nebulosa, tendo em vista a ausência de uma fiscalização eficaz e eficiente. Os Estados e Municípios, através de legislação própria, buscaram o combate a essa prática em momento anterior à edição do verbete, o país carecia de uma regra geral. A partir do início da vigência da súmula vinculante nº 13, o que se verificou, no âmbito da administração pública brasileira, como será demonstrado adiante, foram diversas exonerações de servidores por simples suposição de que determinada situação jurídica configuraria nepotismo, cenário totalmente contrário àquele então proposto.. O STF manifesta-se face aos casos concretos apenas em sede de reclamação. Têm-se, atualmente, uma situação de grave insegurança jurídica, onde servidores públicos não sabem se podem ou não ser nomeados ou se podem continuar exercendo suas funções. O presente exame, pautado no direito comparado e em estudo de casos, analisou algumas situações hipotéticas que, supostamente, configurariam nepotismo, e outras já decididas pela Suprema Corte e propõe uma alteração de natureza legislativa ao instituto das súmulas vinculantes: a criação de incisos a incluídos no corpo do enunciado após cada decisão em sede de reclamação, cujos efeitos não possuem efeito vinculante. Dessa forma, a administração pública direta e indireta poderá aplicar a súmula vinculante nº 13 de forma eficaz, sem interpretações equivocadas, de modo a permitir uma sintonia entre a segurança jurídica e a moralidade.

Compliance to law and effectiveness of the rule of law in Brazil

The goal of this paper is to debate the degree of effectiveness of the rule of law in Brazil, through a survey measuring perceptions, attitudes and habits of Brazilians in regard to compliance to law. The survey conducted in Brazil is based on the study conducted by Tom R. Tyler in the United States, entitled Why People Obey the Law? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). The main argument of Tyler´s study is that people obey the law when they believe it’s legitimate, and not because they fear punishment. We test the same argument in Brazil, relying on five indicators: (i) behavior, which depicts the frequency with which respondents declared to have engaged in conducts in disobedience to the law; (ii) instrumentality, measuring perception of losses associated with the violation of the law, specially fear of punishment; (iii) morality, measuring perception of how much is right or wrong to engage in certain conducts in violation of the law; (iv) social control, which measures perception of social disapproval of certain types of behavior in violation of the law, and (v) legitimacy, which measures the perception of respect to the law and to some authorities. Results indicate that fear of sanctions is not the strongest drive in compliance to law, but more than legitimacy, indicators of morality and social control are the strongest in explaining why people obey the law in Brazil.