On choice of technique in the Robinson-Solow-Srinivasan model

We report results on the optimal \choice of technique" in a model originally formulated by Robinson, Solow and Srinivasan (henceforth, the RSS model) and further discussed by Okishio and Stiglitz. By viewing this vintage-capital model without discounting as a speci c instance of the general theory of intertemporal resource allocation associated with Brock, Gale and McKenzie, we resolve longstanding conjectures in the form of theorems on the existence and price support of optimal paths, and of conditions suÆcient for the optimality of a policy rst identi ed by Stiglitz. We dispose of the necessity of these conditions in surprisingly simple examples of economies in which (i) an optimal path is periodic, (ii) a path following Stiglitz' policy is bad, and (iii) there is optimal investment in di erent vintages at di erent times. (129 words)

Practice location of physicians: a discrete choice model approach

Economists and policymakers have long been concerned with increasing the supply of health professionals in rural and remote areas. This work seeks to understand which factors influence physicians’ choice of practice location right after completing residency. Differently from previous papers, we analyse the Brazilian missalocation and assess the particularities of developing countries. We use a discrete choice model approach with a multinomial logit specification. Two rich databases are employed containing the location and wage of formally employed physicians as well as details from their post-graduation. Our main findings are that amenities matter, physicians have a strong tendency to remain in the region they completed residency and salaries are significant in the choice of urban, but not rural, communities. We conjecture this is due to attachments built during training and infrastructure concerns.

Redistribution with ex-ante unobserved choice

Introducing dynamics to Mirrlees' (1971) optimal taxation model creates a whole new set of issues that are only starting to be investigated in the literature. When choices are made before one's realizing her productivity incentive constraints ought to be defined as a function of more complex strategies than in the static case. 80 far, all work has assumed that these choices are observable and can be contracted upon by the government. Here we investigate choices that : i) are not observed, andj ii) affect preferences conditional Oil the realization of types. In the simplest possible model where a non-trivial filtration is incorporated we show how these two characteristics make it necessary for IC constraints to be defined in terms of strategies rather than pure announcements. Tax prescriptions are derived, and it is shown that they bear some resemblance to classic optimal taxation results. We are able to show that in the most 'natural' cases return on capital ought to be taxed . However, we also show that the uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz fails to hold, in general.

From commitment to non-commitment: allowing type dynamic in Laffont and Tirole's regulation model

This paper investigates the introduction of type dynamic in the La ont and Tirole's regulation model. The regulator and the rm are engaged in a two period relationship governed by short-term contracts, where, the regulator observes cost but cannot distinguish how much of the cost is due to e ort on cost reduction or e ciency of rm's technology, named type. There is asymmetric information about the rm's type. Our model is developed in a framework in which the regulator learns with rm's choice in the rst period and uses that information to design the best second period incentive scheme. The regulator is aware of the possibility of changes in types and takes that into account. We show how type dynamic builds a bridge between com- mitment and non-commitment situations. In particular, the possibility of changing types mitigates the \ratchet e ect". We show that for small degree of type dynamic the equilibrium shows separation and the welfare achived is close to his upper bound (given by the commitment allocation).

Competition and cooperation between international courts: a critical approach to the new paradigms of cross-border dispute resolution model

This article examines the arising cross-border dispute resolution models (Cooperation and Competition among national Courts) from a critical perspective. Although they have been conceived to surpass the ordinary solution of a Modern paradigm (exclusive jurisdiction, choice of court, lis pendens, forum non conveniens, among others), they are insufficient to deal with problems raised with present globalization, as they do not abandon aspects of that paradigm, namely, (i) statebased Law; and (ii) standardization of cultural issues.

Moral hazard and nonlinear pricing in a general equilibrium model

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.

General equilibrium model with restricted participation in financial markets

The paper analyses a general equilibrium model with financiaI markets in which households may face restrictions in trading financiaI assets such as borrowing constraints and collateral (restricted participation model). However, markets are not assumed to be incomplete. We consider a standard general equilibrium model with H > 1 households, 2 periods and S states of nature in the second period. We show that generically the set of equilibrium allocations ia indeterminate, provided the existence of at least one nominal asset and one household for who some restriction is binding. Suppose there are C > 1 commodities in each state of nature and assets pays in units of some commodity. In this case for each household with binding restrictions it is possible to reduce the set of feasible assets trading and obtain a new equilibrium that utility improve alI those households. There is however an upper bound on the number of households to be improved related to the number of states of nature and the number of commodities. In particular, if the number of households ia smaller than the number of states of nature it is possible to Pareto improve any equilibrium by reducing the feasible choice set for each household.

Life expectancy, educational attainment, and fertility choice

This paper explores the role of mortality as a determinant of educational attainment and fertility, both during the demographic transition and after its completion. Two main points distinguish our analysis from the previous ones. Together with the investments of parents in the human capital of children, traditional in the fertility literature, we introduce investments of adult individuals (parents) in their own education, which ultimately determines productivity in both the goods and household sectors. Second, we let adult longevity affect the way parents value each individual child. Increases in adult longevity or reductions in child mortality eventually raise the investments in adult education. Together with the higher utility derived from each child, this tilts the quality-quantity trade off towards less and better educated children, and increases the growth rate of the economy. This setup can explain both the demographic transition and the recent behavior of fertility in “post-transition” countries. Evidence from historical experiences of demographic transition, and from the recent behavior of fertility, education, and growth generally supports the predictions of the model.

Portfolio choice with a correlated background risk : theory and evidence

We extend the static portfolio choice problem with a small background risk to the case of small partially correlated background risks. We show that respecting the theories under which risk substitution appears, except for the independence of background risk, it is perfectly rational for the individual to increase his optimal exposure to portfolio risk when risks are partially negatively correlated. Then, we test empirically the hypothesis of risk substitutability using INSEE data on French households. We find that households respond by increasing their stockholdings in response to the increase in future earnings uncertainty. This conclusion is in contradiction with results obtained in other countries. So, in light of these results, our model provides an explanation to account for the lack of empirical consensus on cross-country tests of risk substitution theory that encompasses and criticises all of them.

Entry mode choice and market selection of born globals in developing countries: a multiple-case study of the ecuadorian software sector

O fenômeno "Born global" refere-se a empresas que consideram o mercado global como seu contexto natural e que iniciam seu processo de internacionalização muito cedo após sua criação. As teorias tradicionais como o modelo de Uppsala não conseguem explicar este processo. Portanto, outras teorias têm surgido, como a perspectiva de redes. Existem alguns estudos relacionados a esta área, principalmente realizados em países desenvolvidos com pequenos mercados e economias abertas. No entanto, poucos estudos têm sido feitos em economias em desenvolvimento. Além disso, o número de pesquisas quanto à escolha do modo de entrada e seleção de mercados das empresas “born global” é bastante limitado. Consequentemente, este estudo pretende descrever os principais fatores que influenciam a escolha do modo de entrada e seleção de mercados das empresas, de economias em desenvolvimento, nascidas globais. O foco da pesquisa é a indústria de software e um estudo de casos múltiplo foi realizado com três empresas no Equador. A metodologia incluiu entrevistas com fundadores, bem como a coleta de dados secundários. Com base na evidência empírica, verificou-se que os principais fatores que influenciam a escolha do modo de entrada são as restrições financeiras, as receitas esperadas, a velocidade de internacionalização, mercados nicho e a experiência empresarial anterior dos fundadores. Por outro lado, a seleção de mercado é influenciada por semelhanças de língua e cultura, mercados nicho e relações em rede.