A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignaling an the GED

We develop a job-market signaling model where signals may convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study the GED exam and countersignaling (signals non-monotonic in ability). A result of the model is that countersignaling is more expected to occur in jobs that require a combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals both high cognitive and low non-cognitive skills and (ii) it does not affect wages. Additionally, it suggests modifications that would make the GED a more signal.

Gains from trade and measured total factor productivity

We develop and calibrate a model where diferences in factor en-dowments lead countries to trade di¤erent goods, so that the existence of international trade changes the sectorial composition of output from one country to another. Gains from trade re ect in total factor productivity. We perform a development decomposition, to assess the impact of trade and barriers to trade on measured TFP. In our sample, the median size of that e¤ect is about 6.5% of output, with a median of 17% and a maximum of 89%. Also, the model predicts that changes in the terms of trade cause a change of productivity, and that efect has an average elasticity of 0.71.