Health and development with imperfect capital markets

This paper investigates the interaction between investment in education and in life-expanding investments, in a simple two-period model in which individuaIs are liquidity constrained in the first period. We show that under low leveIs of health and capital, investments in human capital and in health are complement: since the probability of survival is small, there is littIe incentive to invest in human capital; therefore the return on health investment is also low. This reinforcing effect does not hold for higher leveIs of health or capital, and the two investments become substitute. This property has many consequences. First, subsidizing health care may have dramatically different effects on private investment in human capital, depending on the initial leveI of health and capital. Second, the assumption that mortality is endogenous induces an increase in inequality of income: since health investment is a normal good, the return on education is also lower for poor individuaIs. Third,in a non-overlapping generation madel with non-altruistic agents, the hea1th leveI of the population has strong consequences on growth. For a very low leveI of hea1th, mortality is too high for the investment on education to be profitable. For a higher, but still low, levei of hea1th the economy grows on1y if the initial stock of capital is high enough; bad health and low capital create a poverty trapo Fourth, we compare redistributive income policies versus public hea1th measures. Redistributing income reduces both static and dynamic inequality, but slows growth. In contrast, a paternalistic health policy that forces the poor to invest in hea1th reduces dynamic inequality and may foster growth.

Social entrepreneurship, microcredit and development challenges: a case study analysis of Banco Pérola

The term “social entrepreneurship” has been attracting growing interest from different sectors in the past years, driven by the possibility of employing business techniques to tackle recurrent social and environmental issues. At the forefront of this global phenomenon is microcredit, seen by many as an effective anti-poverty tool and having the Grameen Bank as its flagship program. While the prospects of social entrepreneurship seem promising, the newness of the concept and its somewhat confusing definition make conditions difficult to analyze this contemporary phenomenon. Therefore, the objective of this study was to discuss the challenges faced by social entrepreneurs and alternatives of development for social businesses through a case study on a Brazilian microcredit institution and inclusive business, Banco Pérola. The case addresses a growing need for case studies designed for teaching in the field of social entrepreneurship. It was focused mainly on understanding the development challenges within Banco Pérola, and built based on interviews carried out with top management, credit officer and clients of the institution, as well as on secondary data collected. An analysis of the case study was performed under a Teaching Notes. As illustrated by the Banco Pérola case, the main difficulties encountered by social entrepreneurs relate to the systematization of processes and creation of operational routines, including for performance evaluation (impact assessment tools); to the capture and management of both financial and human capital; to scaling up the business model and to the need of forging closer and more personal relationships with customers as against in traditional banking practices. In spite of certain limitations, such as the fact that the case might soon become outdated due to the fast-changing environment surrounding Banco Pérola, or the fact that not all relevant stakeholders (e.g. partners) were selected for interviews, the research objective has been achieved and the study can be seen as a contribution to spreading the concept of social entrepreneurship.

Barriers to entry and development

This paper analyzes the effect of an accountability system in the Brazilian college market. For each discipline, colleges were assigned a grade that depended on the scores of their students on the ENC, an annual mandatory exam. Those grades were then disclosed to the public, giving applicants information about college quality. The system also established rewards and penalties based on the colleges’ grades. I find that the ENC had a substantial effect on different measures of college quality, such as faculty education and the proportion of full-time faculty. The detailed information from this unique dataset and the fact that the ENC started being required for different disciplines in different years allow me to control for time-specific effects, thus minimizing the bias caused by policy endogeneity. Indeed, I find strong evidence on the importance of controlling for time-specific effects: estimates of the impact of the ENC on college quality more than double when I do not take those effects into account. The ENC also affects positively the ratio between applicants and vacancies, and it decreases the faculty and the entering class sizes. The results suggest that its introduction fostered competition and favored colleges entering the market.