Fiscal multipliers in an incomplete markets economy

This paper studies the behavior of fiscal multipliers in two different economic environments: complete markets and incomplete markets. Based on steady state analysis, output multipliers are found within a range between 0.49 and 0.66, when the markets are complete. Under incomplete markets, output multiplier was found in an interval between 0.75 and 0.94. These results indicates that the market structure, which reflects the degree of risk sharing and the intensity of the precautionary motive faced by individuals, plays a key role in determining the fiscal multipliers. In the second part of the paper, was performed an exercise to analyze the dynamic response of macroeconomic aggregates to an exogenous and unexpected rise in government spending financed by lump-sum taxes. In this case, impact output multipliers varies in a range between 0.64 and 0.68, under complete markets, and within 1.05 and 1.20 when markets are incomplete. The results found under incomplete markets are very close to that found on related literature which usually uses an econometric approach or calibrated/estimated New Keynesian models. These results shows that taking into account the deficiencies in the insurance mechanisms can be an interesting way to reconcile theoretical models with the results found on related current literature, without the need of ad-hoc assumptions relative to price stickness.

A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.

A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.

On the efficiency of equal sacrifice income tax schedules

In an economy which primitives are exactly those in Mirrlees (1971), we investigate the efficiency of labor income tax schedules derived under the equal sacrifice principle. Starting from a given government revenue level, we use Werning’s (2007b) approach to assess whether there is an alternative tax schedule to the one derived under the equal sacrifice principle that raises more revenue while delivering less utility to no one. For our preferred parametrizations of the problem we find that inefficiency only arises at very high levels of income. We also show how the multipliers of the Pareto problem may be extracted from the data and used to find the implicit marginal social weights associated with each level of income.

Estímulos fiscais em um modelo estrutural para o Brasil

A atual crise econômica internacional mostrou que o combate a hiatos do produto utilizando apenas a política monetária pode não ser suficiente. Neste contexto, questões sobre a eficácia de estímulos fiscais temporários como política anticíclica foram levantadas, e adicionalmente quais estímulos fiscais seriam mais benéficos às economias. Este trabalho desenvolveu um modelo estrutural DSGE com características e calibrações para a economia brasileira. O objetivo era realizar um exercício com choques fiscais expansionistas, de modo a analisar seus multiplicadores fiscais. Os resultados sugerem que o impacto de gastos correntes do governo obteve melhor multiplicador fiscal, tanto no curto quanto no longo prazo, porém teve efeitos acumulativos decrescentes. Por outro lado, o choque de diminuição da alíquota dos impostos sobre consumo obteve baixos multiplicadores fiscais a curto prazo, porém com efeitos crescentes a longo prazo, alcançando multiplicadores de longo prazo similares aos dos gastos do governo.

Os efeitos macroeconômicos das transferências sociais: uma abordagem de matriz de contabilidade social

Government transfers to individuals and families play a central role in the Brazilian social protection system, accounting for almost 14 per cent of GDP in 2009. While their fiscal and redistributive impacts have been widely studied, the macroeconomic effects of transfers are harder to ascertain. We constructed a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 2009 and estimated short-term multipliers for seven different government monetary transfers . The SAM is a double-entry square matrix depicting all income flows in the economy. The data were compiled from the 2009 Brazilian National Accounts and the 2008/2009 POF, a household budget survey. Our SAM was disaggregated into 56 sectors, 110 commodities, 200 household groups and seven factors of production (capital plus six types of labor, according to schooling). Finally, we ran a set of regressions to separate household consumption into ‘autonomous’ (or ‘exogenous’) and ‘endogenous’ components. More specifically, we are interested in the effects of an exogenous injection into each of the seven government transfers outlined above. All the other accounts are thus endogenous. The so-called demand ‘leaks’ are income flows from the endogenous to exogenous accounts. Leaks—such as savings, taxes and imports—are crucial to determine the multiplier effect of an exogenous injection, as they allow the system to go back to equilibrium. The model assumes that supply is perfectly elastic to demand shocks. It assumes that the families’ propensity to save and consumption profile are fixed—that is, rising incomes do not provoke changes in behaviour. The multiplier effects of the on GDP corresponds to the growth in GDP resulting from each additional dollar injected into each transfer seven government transfers. If the government increased Bolsa Família expenditures by 1 per cent of GDP, overall economic activity would grow by 1.78 per cent, the highest effect. The Continuous Cash Benefit, comes second. Only three transfers— the private-sector and public servants’ pensions and FGTS withdrawals—had multipliers lower than unity. The multipliers for other relevant macroeconomic aggregates—household and total consumption, disposable income etc. —reveal a similar pattern. Thus, under the stringent assumptions of our model, we cannot reject the hypothesis that government transfers targeting poor households, such as the Bolsa Família, help foster economic expansion. Naturally, it should be stressed that the multipliers relate marginal injections into government transfers to short-term economic performance either real growth, or inflation if there is no idle capacity which is also useful to analyze. In the long term, there is no doubt that what truly matters is the growth of the country’s productive capacity.