Banks, liquidity crises and economic growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages of economic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. Finally, the model replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

Balance of payment crises and capital flows : the role of liquidity

A model of externaI CrISIS is deveIoped focusing on the interaction between Iiquidity creation by financiaI intermediaries and foreign exchange collapses. The intermediaries' role of transforming maturities is shown to result in larger movements of capital and a higher probability of crisis. This resembles the observed cycle in capital fiows: large infiows, crisis and abrupt outfiows. The mo deI highlights how adverse productivity and international interest rate shocks can be magnified by the behavior of individual foreign investors linked together through their deposits in the intermediaries. An eventual collapse of the exchange rate can link investors' behavior even further. The basic model is then extended, quite naturally, to study the effects of capital fiow contagion between countries.

Do shocks permanently change output? : Local persistency in economic time series

While it is recognized that output fuctuations are highly persistent over certain range, less persistent results are also found around very long horizons (Conchrane, 1988), indicating the existence of local or temporary persistency. In this paper, we study time series with local persistency. A test for stationarity against locally persistent alternative is proposed. Asymptotic distributions of the test statistic are provided under both the null and the alternative hypothesis of local persistency. Monte Carlo experiment is conducted to study the power and size of the test. An empirical application reveals that many US real economic variables may exhibit local persistency.

The private memory of aggregate shocks

Em economias caracterizadas por choques agregados e privados, mostramos que a alocação ótima restrita pode depender de forma não-trivial dos choques agregados. Usando versões dos modelos de Atkeson e Lucas (1992) e Mirrlees (1971) de dois períodos, é mostrado que a alocação ótima apresenta memória com relação aos choques agregados mesmo eles sendo i.i.d. e independentes dos choques individuais, quando esses últimos choques não são totalmente persistentes. O fato de os choques terem efeitos persistentes na alocação mesmo sendo informação pública, foi primeiramente apresentado em Phelan (1994). Nossas simulações numéricas indicam que esse não é um resultado pontual: existe uma relação contínua entre persistência de tipos privados e memória do choque agregado.

Aftermarket short covering in ipos and long-term stock liquidity

This study investigates the effect of the aftermarket short covering (ASC) carried out by the underwriter during the price stabilization period on stock long-term liquidity. Because the ASC increases liquidity during the stabilization period and liquidity is a persistent characteristic of stocks, the ASC can increase long-term liquidity. In fact, we show that the ASC has a positive effect on liquidity over the 6 months subsequent to the stabilization period. This positive relation holds true even after controlling for many variables found important to explain liquidity by previous authors and the instrumentalization of the ASC.

The Aiyagari model with liquidity shoch

Neste trabalho é desenvolvida uma versão do modelo de Aiyagari (1994) com choque de liquidez. Este modelo tem Huggett (1993) e Aiyagari (1994) como casos particulares, mas esta generalização permite dois ativos distintos na economia, um líquido e outro ilíquido. Usar dois ativos diferentes implica em dois retornos afetando o "market clearing", logo, a estratégia computacional usada por Aiyagari e Hugget não funciona. Consequentemente, a triangulação de Scarf substitui o algoritmo. Este experimento computacional mostra que o retorno em equilíbrio do ativo líquido é menor do que o retorno do ilíquido. Além disso, pessoas pobres carregam relativamente mais o ativo líquido, e essa desigualdade não aparece no modelo de Aiyagari.

The private memory of aggregate shocks

We study constrained efficient aggregate risk sharing and its consequence for the behavior of macro-aggregates in a dynamic Mirrlees’s (1971) setting. Privately observed idiosyncratic productivity shocks are assumed to be independent of i.i.d. publicly observed aggregate shocks. Yet, private allocations display memory with respect to past aggregate shocks, when idosyncratic shocks are also i.i.d.. Under a mild restriction on the nature of optimal allocations the result extends to more persistent idiosyncratic shocks, for all but the limit at which idiosyncratic risk disappears, and the model collapses to a pure heterogeneity repeated Mirrlees economy identical to Werning [2007]. When preferences are iso-elastic we show that an allocation is memoryless only if it displays a strong form of separability with respect to aggregate shocks. Separability characterizes the pure heterogeneity limit as well as the general case with log preferences. With less than full persistence and risk aversion different from unity both memory and non-separability characterize optimal allocations. Exploiting the fact that non-separability is associated with state-varying labor wedges, we apply a business cycle accounting procedure (e.g. Chari et al. [2007]) to the aggregate data generated by the model. We show that, whenever risk aversion is great than one our model produces efficient counter-cyclical labor wedges.

Microeconomic instability and children's human capital accumulation: the effects of idiosyncratic shocks to father's income on child labor, school drop-outs and repetition rates in Brazil

This paper evaluates the long-run effects of economic instability. In particular, we study the impact of idiosyncratic shocks to father’s income on children’s human capital accumulation variables such as school drop-outs, repetition rates and domestic and non-domestic labor. Although, the problem of child labor in Brazil has declined greatly during the last decade, the number of children working is still substantial. The low levels of educational attainment in Brazil are also a main cause for concern. The large rotating panel data set used allows for the estimation of the impacts of changes in occupational and income status of fathers on changes in his child’s time allocation circumstances. The empirical analysis is restricted to families with fathers, mothers and at least one child between 10 and 15 years of age in the main Brazilian metropolitan areas during the 1982-1999 period. We perform logistic regressions controlling for child characteristics (gender, age, if he/she is behind in school for age), parents characteristics (grade attainment and income) and time and location variables. The main variables analyzed are dynamic proxies of impulses and responses, namely: shocks to household head’s income and unemployment status, on the one hand and child’s probability of dropping out of school, of repeating a grade and of start working, on the other. The findings suggest that father’s income has a significant positive correlation with child’s dropping out of school and of repeating a grade. The findings do not suggest a significant relationship between a father’s becoming unemployed and a child entering the non-domestic labor market. However, the results demonstrate a significant positive relationship between a father becoming unemployed and a child beginning to work in domestic labor. There was also a positive correlation between father becoming unemployed and a child dropping out and repeating a grade. Both gender and age were highly significant with boys and older children being more likely to work, drop-out and repeat grades.

Unemployment insurance an analysis of optimal mechanisms under aggregate shocks

The purpose of this work is to provide a brief overview of the literature on the optimal design of unemployment insurance systems by analyzing some of the most influential articles published over the last three decades on the subject and extend the main results to a multiple aggregate shocks environment. The properties of optimal contracts are discussed in light of the key assumptions commonly made in theoretical publications on the area. Moreover, the implications of relaxing each of these hypothesis is reckoned as well. The analysis of models of only one unemployment spell starts from the seminal work of Shavell and Weiss (1979). In a simple and common setting, unemployment benefits policies, wage taxes and search effort assignments are covered. Further, the idea that the UI distortion of the relative price of leisure and consumption is the only explanation for the marginal incentives to search for a job is discussed, putting into question the reduction in labor supply caused by social insurance, usually interpreted as solely an evidence of a dynamic moral hazard caused by a substitution effect. In addition, the paper presents one characterization of optimal unemployment insurance contracts in environments in which workers experience multiple unemployment spells. Finally, an extension to multiple aggregate shocks environment is considered. The paper ends with a numerical analysis of the implications of i.i.d. shocks to the optimal unemployment insurance mechanism.

Um estudo sobre a inter-relação dos mercados de ações e títulos públicos sob a ótica da liquidez e volatilidade

Na última década, a economia brasileira apresentou-se estável adquirindo maior credibilidade mundial. Dentre as opções de investimento, estão os mercados de ações e de títulos públicos. O portfolio de investimento dos agentes é determinado de acordo com os retornos dos ativos e/ou aversão ao risco, e a diversificação é importante para mitigar risco. Dessa forma, o objetivo principal do presente trabalho é estudar a inter-relação entre os mercados de títulos públicos e ações, avaliando aspectos de liquidez e quais variáveis representariam melhor esta relação, verificando também como respondem a um choque (surpresa econômica), pois a percepção de alteração do cenário econômico, ou variações de fluxo financeiro, pode alterar/inverter as relações entre esses mercados. Para isso, estimou-se modelos de vetores auto-regressivos - VAR, com variáveis de retorno, volatilidade e volume negociado para cada um dos mercados em combinações diferentes das variáveis representativas, visando encontrar o(s) modelo(s) mais descritivo(s) das inter-relações entre os mercados, dado a amostra utilizada, para aplicar a dummy de surpresa econômica. Em estudo semelhante Chordia, Sarkar e Subrahmanyam (2005) concluiram que choques de liquidez e volatilidade são positivamente correlacionado nos mercados de ações e títulos públicos em horizontes diários, indicando que os choques de liquidez e volatilidade são muitas vezes de natureza sistêmica. O mesmo não foi observado para a proxy de liquidez utilizada na amostra brasileira. Um resultado interessante a ser ressaltado deve-se as séries SMLL11 (índice Small Caps) e IDkAs (índice de duração constante ANBIMA) não possuírem relação de causalidade de Granger com as demais séries, mas os retornos dos IDkAs Granger causam os retornos do índice SMLL11. Por fim, o choque de surpresa econômica não se mostra explicativo sobre qualquer alteração nas inter-relações entre os mercados de títulos públicos e ações.

The long-run properties of a dynamic Mirrlees' model with aggregate shocks

Nós abordamos a existência de distribuições estacionárias de promessas de utilidade em um modelo Mirrlees dinâmico quando o governo tem record keeping imperfeito e a economia é sujeita a choques agregados. Quando esses choques são iid, provamos a existência de um estado estacionário não degenerado e caracterizamos parcialmente as alocações estacionárias. Mostramos que a proporção do consumo agregado é invariante ao estado agregado. Quando os choques agregados apresentam persistência, porém, alocações eficientes apresentam dependência da história de choques e, em geral, uma distribuição invariante não existe.

Central bank balance sheet concerns and credible optimal escape from the Liquidity trap

I show that when a central bank is financially independent from the treasury and has balance sheet concerns, an increase in the size or a change in the composition of the central bank's balance sheet (quantitative easing) can serve as a commitment device in a liquidity trap scenario. In particular, when the short-term interest rate is up against the zero lower bound, an open market operation by the central bank that involves purchases of long-term bonds can help mitigate the deation and a large negative output gap under a discretionary equilibrium. This is because such an open market operation provides an incentive to the central bank to keep interest rates low in future in order to avoid losses in its balance sheet.