A composição da dívida pública mobiliária federal interna e os fundos de investimento no Brasil: análise dos fatores de influência

This work intends to study the relationship between Brazilian Internal Public Debt mix and Mutual Funds. In the theoretical framework, the discussion about liquidity preference theories implies considering risk averse investors. Portfolio selection is also discussed, particularly Markowitz efficient frontier. Historical data from November of 1999 to December of 2004 of Brazilian Internal Public Debt mix and Mutual Funds portfolio are analyzed. Official goals concerning Public Debt's mix and its actual composition are presented, as well as Mutual Fund preferences as buyers of public debt securities. Time series of three securities (LFT, LTN and NTN-C) in Public Debt mix and Mutual Funds portfolio are compared and a similar behavior is identified. Relevant facts of the macroeconomic context which may have affected Public Debt or Mutual Funds are discussed. Some indications of a possible influence of Mutual Funds upon Public Debt Mix are obtained and hypothesis to be tested in future studies are proposed.

Aftermarket short covering in ipos and long-term stock liquidity

This study investigates the effect of the aftermarket short covering (ASC) carried out by the underwriter during the price stabilization period on stock long-term liquidity. Because the ASC increases liquidity during the stabilization period and liquidity is a persistent characteristic of stocks, the ASC can increase long-term liquidity. In fact, we show that the ASC has a positive effect on liquidity over the 6 months subsequent to the stabilization period. This positive relation holds true even after controlling for many variables found important to explain liquidity by previous authors and the instrumentalization of the ASC.

The Aiyagari model with liquidity shoch

Neste trabalho é desenvolvida uma versão do modelo de Aiyagari (1994) com choque de liquidez. Este modelo tem Huggett (1993) e Aiyagari (1994) como casos particulares, mas esta generalização permite dois ativos distintos na economia, um líquido e outro ilíquido. Usar dois ativos diferentes implica em dois retornos afetando o "market clearing", logo, a estratégia computacional usada por Aiyagari e Hugget não funciona. Consequentemente, a triangulação de Scarf substitui o algoritmo. Este experimento computacional mostra que o retorno em equilíbrio do ativo líquido é menor do que o retorno do ilíquido. Além disso, pessoas pobres carregam relativamente mais o ativo líquido, e essa desigualdade não aparece no modelo de Aiyagari.

Inflation and overbanking

This paper argues that monetary models can and usually present the phenomenon of over-banking; that is, the market solution of the model presents a size of the banking sector which is higher than the social optima. Applying a two sector monetary model of capital accumulation in presence of a banking sector, which supplies liquidity services, it is shown that the rise of a tax that disincentives the acquisition of the banking service presents the following impacts on welfare. If the technology is the same among the sectors, the tax increases welfare; otherwise, steady-state utility increase if the banking sector is labor-intensive compared to the real sector. Additionally, it is proved that the elevation of inflation has the following impact on the economy's equilibrium: the share on the product of the banking sector increases; the product and the stock of capital increases or reduces whether the banking sector is capital-intensive or laborintensive; and, the steady-state utility reduces. The results were derived under a quite general set up - standard hypothesis regarding concavity of preference, convexity of technology, and normality of goods - were required.

Central bank balance sheet concerns and credible optimal escape from the Liquidity trap

I show that when a central bank is financially independent from the treasury and has balance sheet concerns, an increase in the size or a change in the composition of the central bank's balance sheet (quantitative easing) can serve as a commitment device in a liquidity trap scenario. In particular, when the short-term interest rate is up against the zero lower bound, an open market operation by the central bank that involves purchases of long-term bonds can help mitigate the deation and a large negative output gap under a discretionary equilibrium. This is because such an open market operation provides an incentive to the central bank to keep interest rates low in future in order to avoid losses in its balance sheet.

Insider trading, investment, and liquidity: a welfare analysis

We compare competitive equilibrium outcomes with and without trading by a privately infonned "monopolistic" insider, in a model with real investment portfolio choices ex ante, and noise trading generated by aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare implications of insider trading for the ex ante expected utilities of outsiders are analyzed. The role of interim infonnation revelation due to insider trading, in improving the risk-sharing among outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, is examined in detaiL

Balance of payment crises and capital flows : the role of liquidity

A model of externaI CrISIS is deveIoped focusing on the interaction between Iiquidity creation by financiaI intermediaries and foreign exchange collapses. The intermediaries' role of transforming maturities is shown to result in larger movements of capital and a higher probability of crisis. This resembles the observed cycle in capital fiows: large infiows, crisis and abrupt outfiows. The mo deI highlights how adverse productivity and international interest rate shocks can be magnified by the behavior of individual foreign investors linked together through their deposits in the intermediaries. An eventual collapse of the exchange rate can link investors' behavior even further. The basic model is then extended, quite naturally, to study the effects of capital fiow contagion between countries.

Trend following performance with size and liquidity: evidence from US, Brazil and Portugal

Neste trabalho, eu analiso a eficiência de se aplicar estratégias que identificam tendências em mercados de capitais, em três países diferentes, usando um conjunto de variáveis macroeconómicas. Em cada país, a estratégia é testada contra os índices de grande capitalização, pequena capitalização e o índice principal. Eu concluo que, ao combinar os sinais diários obtidos pela estratégia, é possível alcançar retornos ajustados ao risco superiores e reduzir as perdas possíveis do portfólio. No geral, enfatizo os benefícios de usar estratégias que exploram tendências para investidores avessos ao risco, obtendo retornos característicos de capitais próprios com a volatilidade característica de obrigações.

Does liquidity constraints matter for Ricardian equivalence?

The paper analysis a general equilibrium model with two periods, several households and a government that has to finance some expenditures in the first period. Households may have some private information either about their type (adverse selection) or about some action levei chosen in the first period that affects the probability of certain states of nature in the second period (moral hazard). Trade of financiai assets are intermediated by a finite collection of banks. Banks objective functions are determined in equilibrium by shareholders. Due to private information it may be optimal for the banks to introduce constraints in the set of available portfolios for each household as wellas household specific asset prices. In particular, households may face distinct interest rates for holding the risk-free asset. The government finances its expenditures either by taxing households in the first period or by issuing bonds in the first period and taxing households in the second period. Taxes may be state-dependent. Suppose government policies are neutml: i) government policies do not affect the distribution of wealth across households; and ii) if the government decides to tax a household in the second period there is a portfolio available for the banks that generates the Mme payoff in each state of nature as the household taxes. Tben, Ricardian equivalence holds if and only if an appropriate boundary condition is satisfied. Moreover, at every free-entry equilibrium the boundary condition is satisfied and thus Ricardian equivalence holds. These results do not require any particular assumption on the banks' objective function. In particular, we do not assume banks to be risk neutral.

On the impossibility of prisoner's dilemmas in adversarial preference games

Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PDís are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or jealousy may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results ñ including the possibility of conflict inducing growth.

Banks, liquidity crises and economic growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages of economic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. Finally, the model replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies.

Liquidity proxies in the Brazilian debenture market

Este estudo analisa as variáveis de liquidez no mercado corporativo brasileiro de debêntures e testa a variável Eurobond para compreender quais características ajudam a prever a liquidez de debêntures. Embora os mercados de capitais brasileiros tenham melhorado drasticamente nos últimos anos, as grandes empresas brasileiras têm muitas opções na hora de tomar a decisão de aumentar capital (emissão de Eurobônus é um deles). Este estudo busca preencher uma lacuna na literatura acadêmica vendo se existe uma relação de liquidez entre os dois mercados. O proxy Eurobond foi encontrado significativo ao nível de 5% e o nível de 1%. Os outras proxies que foram significativos (valor de emissão, data de vencimento inicial, Avaliação) coincidem com os resultados de estudos anteriores.