On the limits of cheap talk for public good provision

This article studies a model where, as a consequence of private information, agents do not have incentive to invest in a desired joint project, or a public good, when they are unable to have prior discussion with their partners. As a result, the joint project is never undertaken and inefficiency is observed. Agastya, Menezes and Sengupta (2007) prove that with a prior stage of communication, with a binary message space, it is possible to have some efficiency gain since "all ex-ante and interim efficient equilibria exhibit a simple structure". We show that any finite message space does not provide efficiency gain on the simple structure discussed in that article. We use laboratory experiments to test these results. We find that people do contribute, even without communication, and that any kind of communication increases the probability of project implementation. We also observed that communication reduces the unproductive contribution, and that a large message space cannot provide efficiency gain relative to the binary one.

Public debt and the limits of fiscal policy to increase economic growth

Research that seeks to estimate the effects of fiscal policies on economic growth has ignored the role of public debt in this relationship. This study proposes a theoretical model of endogenous growth, which demonstrates that the level of the public debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio should negatively impact the effect of fiscal policy on growth. This occurs because government indebtedness extracts part of the savings of the young to pay interest on the debts of the older generation, who are no longer saving. Therefore, the payment of debt interest assumes an allocation exchange role between generations that is similar to a pay-as-you-go pension system, which results in changes in the savings rate of the economy. The major conclusions of the theoretical model were tested using an econometric model to provide evidence for the validity of this conclusion. Our empirical analysis controls for timeinvariant, country-specific heterogeneity in the growth rates. We also address endogeneity issues and allow for heterogeneity across countries in the model parameters and for cross-sectional dependence.

The Limits of political compromise: debt ceilings and political competition

We study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political competition in an economy where political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same. In contrast to the received literature, we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political-economy distortions by rendering a political compromise unsustainable. This tends to happen when political competition is limited. Conversely, a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome when political competition is vigorous, saving the economy from immiseration. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt.

Responsabilidade social das empresas e valores humanos: um estudo sobre a atitude dos gestores brasileiros

In the last decades of the 21st century, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has become one of the most widely debated issues in business management, concerning researchers, politicians, managers and society at large. With multilateral implications in economic and social life, CSR refers, essentially, to the discussion about the boundaries of business intervention in society and the ethical limits that should regulate that intervention. It questions the impact of business practices in social well-being, the role left for corporations and for the State in attending to community needs, and which are, at last, the responsibilities that tie enterprises to society. In this research, CSR is approached from the perspective of its ethical foundations, based on the moral reasoning of the business manager, as a key organizational leader with relevant decision power. Specifically, the research aims to understand how the personal human value system and the ethical orientation of managers influence their attitude towards CSR, considering this attitude as an indicator of managerial behavior that translates into corporate performance. Theoretically, CSR concept is discussed and presented as a set of social commitments, based on a strict interpretation of its meaning. As to human values, its philosophical roots are briefly analyzed and Schwartz modern motivational theory is addressed as main reference for studying the personal value system of managers in this research. Concerning ethics, based on classical theory from moral philosophy, references are seek in John Stuart Mill¿s utilitarianism, Immanuel Kant¿s deontological absolutism, John Rawls¿s theory of justice and the ethics of virtue inspired by Aristotle¿s moral thoughts. Based on an extended literature review, research hypothesis are proposed as part of a theoretical model of analysis named Individual Attitude Towards Social Responsibility Model. In order to test the theory¿s empirical validity, it was conducted a field study with 252 Brazilian managers, mainly from the metropolitan areas of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Results show that managerial attitude aligned with CSR principles is favored by conservative personal values, protectors of stability and centered on collective will, and by an ethical orientation based on egalitarianism as postulated by distributive justice principles. However, results also show that the influence of values and personal ethics on managerial attitude towards CSR only occur in managers younger than 30 years old. Findings and their meanings are discussed, as well as summarized in the Axiological and Ethical Determinants of Managers¿ Social Commitment Model. Finally, methodological limitations are evaluated and clues for further research are suggested.