Mitigating high ‘equity capital’ risk exposure to ‘small cap’ sector in India: analysing ‘key factors of success’ for ‘Institutional Investors’ whilst Investing in small cap sector in India

This paper deals with the subject of mitigating high ‘Equity Capital’ Risk Exposure to ‘Small Cap’ Sector in India. Institutional investors in India are prone to be risk averse when it comes to investing in the small cap sector in India as they find the companies risky and volatile. This paper will help analyse ‘Key Factors of success’ for ‘Institutional Investors’ whilst investing in Small Cap sector in India as some of these Indian small cap stocks offer handsome returns despite economic downturn. This paper has been harnessed carefully under the influence of expert investors, which includes Benjamin Graham (Security Analysis); Warren Buffet; Philip Fisher (Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits); and Aswath Damodaran.

Valuing emerging markets companies : new approaches to determine the effective exposure to country risk

The aim of this paper is to propose new methods to measure the effective exposure to country risk of emerging-market companies. Starting from Damodaran (2003), we propose seven new approaches and a revised CAPM for emerging markets companies. The “Prospective Lambda” represents the effective exposure according to analysts’ estimates of growth. The “Relative Lambda” relies on the firm value estimated through a relative valuation. The “Retrospective Lambda” represents the ex-post effective exposure to country risk. The “Company Effective Risk Premium” is a generalization of the Retrospective Lambda, and expresses the premium effectively requested by investors to invest in that specific company in the past year. “The Actual Lambda” and the “Company Actual Risk Premium” represent, respectively, the actual exposure to country risk of a company and the actual premium requested by investors to invest in that specific company. The “Industry Lambda” reflects the median exposure to country risk of the industry in which the company belongs. We tested our new measures of exposure to country risk on the Latin American emerging markets companies according to the classification of the MSCI Emerging Markets Latin America Index. The results confirm that the new approaches can be effectively applied by financial analysts to stable-growth companies that operate in emerging markets and to mature markets companies that operate in emerging markets, providing with a more reliable estimate of both the premium effectively requested by investors in the past and the actual premium. Applying the new approaches, the cost of equity reflects the effective exposure of a company to country risk without being over- or underestimated, as is the case with other existing approaches.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.