On Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) showed that, without imposing any debt constraint, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with limited commitment when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2009) presented two examples in which they argued that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. Moreover, they claimed that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is restored. This paper questions the validity of the claims made in Páscoa and Seghir (2009). First, we show that it is not true that harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes in the examples they have proposed. A competitive equilibrium with no trade can be supported due to unduly pessimistic expectations on asset deliveries. We subsequently refine the equilibrium concept in the spirit of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) in order to rule out spurious inactivity on asset markets due to irrational expectations. Our second contribution is to provide a specific example of an economy with moderate default penalties in which Ponzi schemes reappear when overpessimistic beliefs on asset deliveries are ruled out. Our finding shows that, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009), moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme.

Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.

Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts

This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.

Limited memory and the essentiality of money

This paper investigates the relationship between memory and the essentiality of money. We consider a random matching economy with a large finite population in which commitment is not possible and memory is limited in the sense that only a fraction m E(0; 1) of the population has publicly observable histories. We show that no matter how limited memory is, there exists a social norm that achieves the first best regardless of the population size. In other words, money can fail to be essential irrespective of the amount of memory in the economy. This suggests that the emphasis on limited memory as a fundamental friction for money to be essential deserves a deeper examination.

Agricultura orgânica : fatores relevantes para sustentabilidade

This work analyzes how the cluster of organic production is developed in Petrópolis city, in the Rio de Janeiro state. It describes how agriculture is organized, innovation processes and commercial activities are developed. Cooperation, collective actions, dissemination of knowledge and information are also treated in this work as well as the fundamental actors in production and development as a whole. This study tries to enumerate some policies and strategies that can foment and give more efficiency to the existing processes. For this research i used the case estudy methodology. We observed that organic agriculture can help a better development to the farmers and also a better local development. The low level of education of farmers and the underdevelopment of all variables in social capital are limitant factors. Another aspect raised during the research was the dificulty and the lack of commitment in getting financial support from managers of public banks turning the improvements in organic agriculture limited and underdeveloped. The technical knowlegde production isn¿t the basic problem and, at the moment, the management ability is really the main limitation.

Learning-by-employing: the value of commitment

We analyze a dynamic principal–agent model where an infinitely-lived principal faces a sequence of finitely-lived agents who differ in their ability to produce output. The ability of an agent is initially unknown to both him and the principal. An agent’s effort affects the information on ability that is conveyed by performance. We characterize the equilibrium contracts and show that they display short–term commitment to employment when the impact of effort on output is persistent but delayed. By providing insurance against early termination, commitment encourages agents to exert effort, and thus improves on the principal’s ability to identify their talent. We argue that this helps explain the use of probationary appointments in environments in which there exists uncertainty about individual ability.

From commitment to non-commitment: allowing type dynamic in Laffont and Tirole's regulation model

This paper investigates the introduction of type dynamic in the La ont and Tirole's regulation model. The regulator and the rm are engaged in a two period relationship governed by short-term contracts, where, the regulator observes cost but cannot distinguish how much of the cost is due to e ort on cost reduction or e ciency of rm's technology, named type. There is asymmetric information about the rm's type. Our model is developed in a framework in which the regulator learns with rm's choice in the rst period and uses that information to design the best second period incentive scheme. The regulator is aware of the possibility of changes in types and takes that into account. We show how type dynamic builds a bridge between com- mitment and non-commitment situations. In particular, the possibility of changing types mitigates the \ratchet e ect". We show that for small degree of type dynamic the equilibrium shows separation and the welfare achived is close to his upper bound (given by the commitment allocation).

Creating buyer-supplier commitment in food supply chains at the base of the pyramid

Esta pesquisa analisa o papel dos aspectos relacionais tais como confiança, comprometimento, interdependência e uso de poder âmbito das estratégias de negócios inclusivos que envolvem pequenos agricultores nas cadeias de valor de multinacionais dos agronegócios no Brasil. Os negócios inclusivos de abastecimento direto por empresas com pequenos agricultores em países em desenvolvimento têm sido reconhecidos como uma abordagem economicamente viavél e promissora para criar impacto social e melhorar as condições de vida de produtores rurais da "base da pirâmide", ao mesmo tempo permitindo que as empresas reforçar as suas posições nos mercados locais e adquirir matérias primas de qualidade a custos mais baixos. Estudos sobre este tema focam amplamente sobre as vantagens comerciais e competitivas que as empresas derivam do abastecimento direito com pequenos fornecedores, apresentando modelos de cadeia de valor customizados e ajustados estratégias globais de negócios, no entanto ainda há pouco conhecimento teoricamente fundamentado sobre os desafios organizacionais e relacionais da relação entre o comprador multinacional e o fornecedor de baixa renda. Além disso, pouco foco tem-se prestado sobre como assimetrias entre multinacionais e produtores de baixa renda, em questão de poder, dependência e de valores pode afetar a evolução dessas relações de negócios. O objetivo do estudo foi descrever os fatores que permitem a esses parceiros assimétricos de construir relacionamentos comerciais de longo prazo e mutuamente benéficos. A metodologia da teoria fundamentada foi usada e foi particularmente adequada para examinar as relações entre comprador e fornecedor e para recolher experiências de campo em três setores principais dominados pela agricultura familiar no Brasil, ou seja laticínios, avi-suinocultura e produção hortícola. Os principais conceitos teóricos da área de Relationship Marketing foram usados para apoiar os resultados da pesquisa de campo. A principal conclusão desta pesquisa é a importância de ir além da construção de confiança na estratégia de gestão do relacionamento entre comprador e fornecedor e de criar parcerias diádicas baseadas na interdependência mútua, a fim de reduzir as assimetrias e melhorar o comprometimento entre a empresa e o pequeno agricultor.

As conferências nacionais de política para as mulheres e os sentidos atribuídos á deliberação

Esta dissertação tem como problema de pesquisa analisar o perfil normativo das Conferências Nacionais de Política para Mulheres a partir dos sentidos atribuídos à deliberação pelas representantes governamentais e não governamentais que organizaram e/ou participaram desses processos de Conferências, entrevistadas para esta pesquisa. A relevância do problema se dá pelo diagnóstico de que o perfil dessas Conferências, marcado por discursos históricos que buscam firmar o compromisso político do governo federal com a Política para as mulheres, não está claro, por um lado. Mas também se justifica pelos debates em torno de propostas de Sistemas de Participação que buscam trabalhar com a complementaridade de modelos de democracia, por outro. No arcabouço teórico está a noção de “momentos deliberativos” presente na literatura brasileira sobre efetividade da participação e as noções jurídicas de ato administrativo discricionário e vinculativo presentes no ramo do Direito Administrativo, como tentativas de compreender o perfil a partir das categorias analíticas consultiva e deliberativa presentes na literatura brasileira sobre participação. As categorias, contudo, se mostram limitadas para se compreender os diversos sentidos da deliberação que indicariam seu perfil.

Asset pricing when risk sharing is limited by default: a theoretical framework

We study the asset pricing implications of an endowment economy when agents can default on contracts that would leave them otherwise worse off. We specialize and extend the environment studied by Kocherlakota (1995) and Kehoe and Levine (1993) to make it comparable to standard studies of asset pricillg. We completely charactize efficient allocations for several special cases. We illtroduce a competitive equilibrium with complete markets alld with elldogellous solvency constraints. These solvellcy constraints are such as to prevent default -at the cost of reduced risk sharing. We show a version of the classical welfare theorems for this equilibrium definition. We characterize the pricing kernel, alld compare it with the one for economies without participation constraints : interest rates are lower and risk premia can be bigger depending on the covariance of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Quantitative examples show that for reasonable parameter values the relevant marginal rates of substitution fali within the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds.

Multiple equilibria and protectionism

In a nonnative approach, I analyze trade policies when the industrial sector genentes positive extemalities in production, and there are adjustments costs to changing production from one sector to the other. Protectionist trade policy can make workers intemalize the benetits from moving into the industrial sector, but it is a second best policy as it also causes consumption distortions. I show that if the govemment is able to fully commit to its tariff schedule for the future, the welfare maximizing policy is to maintain a positive tariff forever, even after all adjustment has already taken place . However, if the govemment is not able to commit at all, the only time consistent policy is zero tariff at any point in time. The time inconsistency of the full commitment policy is derived from the fact that in the model only production needs interference, and the production distortion is lagged one period with respect to the tariff wbile the consumption distortion is simultaneous to the tariff. In the intermediary case, i.e., when the government can commit for a limited period of time, the time consistent optimal tariff will be positive but lower than the "full commitment" tariff. This result indicates that some institutions that have always been considered pure sources of inefficiency, such as protectionist lobbying, may in fact be welfare improving in some cases!

Inglorious revolution : sovereign debt, tropical credibility, and financial underdevelopment in imperial Brazil

In 1824 the creation of institutions that constrained the monarch’s ability to unilaterally tax, spend, and debase the currency put Brazil on a path toward a revolution in public finance, roughly analogous to the financial consequences of England’s Glorious Revolution. This credible commitment to honor sovereign debt resulted in successful long-term funded borrowing at home and abroad from the 1820s through the 1880s that was unrivalled in Latin America. Some domestic bonds, denominated in the home currency and bearing exchange clauses, eventually circulated in European financial markets. The share of total debt accounted for by long-term funded issues grew, and domestic debt came to dominate foreign debt. Sovereign debt yields fell over time in London and Rio de Janeiro, and the cost of new borrowing declined on average. The market’s assessment of the probability of default tended to decrease. Imperial Brazil enjoyed favorable conditions for borrowing, and escaped the strong form of “original sin” stressed by recent work on sovereign debt. The development of vibrant private financial markets did not, however, follow from the enhanced credibility of government debt. Private finance in Imperial Brazil suffered from politicized market interventions that undermined the development of domestic capital markets. Private interest rates remained high, entry into commercial banking was heavily restricted, and limited-liability joint-stock companies were tightly controlled. The Brazilian case provides a powerful counterexample to the general proposition of North and Weingast that institutional changes that credibly commit the government to honor its obligations necessarily promote the development of private finance. The very institutions that enhanced the credibility of sovereign debt permitted the systematic repression of private financial development. In terms of its consequences for domestic capital markets, the liberal Constitution of 1824 represented an “inglorious” revolution.

Limited attention and investor disagreement: a nowcasting approach

When disagreement in economic models occurs due to different interpretations of public signals, the level of ``marketwide disagreement'' not necessarily decreases upon the arrival of a public signal. We propose an empirical assessment of this phenomenon. By using a measure of attention based on Google Trends, we show that an increase in the attention allocated by the market to a company is associated to a significant increase in disagreement about it.

The corporate financial effects of corporate social responsibility, as executed by, and impacted upon, Prime Bank Limited, Bangladesh

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is being implemented in the corporate world at an ever increasing rate, benefitting societies around the world. Several theories have been proposed that contend that the corporations who are implementing CSR programs also benefit financially, making the relationship a symbiotic one. This paper analyzes the financial health of Prime Bank Limited, Bangladesh, (PBL) over a period of a decade in order to determine if PBL has indeed benefited financially from implementing its CSR program. The analysis focuses on examining PBL’s internal and external financial indicators over an extended period of time to determine what the net effect, if any, that the CSR program has had on them. This analysis concludes that the evidence does not support the claim of a causal relationship between CSR spending and positive effects upon PBL, as measured by PBL’s financial indicators.

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.