Financial guarantees in Brazilian life insurance and pension plans

Recently regulated Brazilian life and pension products offer a benefit structure composed of minimum guaranteed annual rate, in°ation adjustment according to a price index and participation on an investment fund performance. We present a valuation model for these products. We establish a fair condition relationship between minimum guarantees and participation rates, and explore its behavior over a space of maturities, interest rates, and also fund and price index volatilities and correlation. Besides consistency to reference models, we found that the effect of the fund volatility is conditioned to the price index volatility level and the correlation between them.

Garantias financeiras em seguros vida e previdência: um modelo de avaliação

Recentemente, o mercado brasileiro regulamentou produtos de seguro de vida e previdência com garantia de uma remuneração mínima, a ser corrigida por um índice de preços e acrescida da participação em retorno de fundo específico de investimento. Esta tese vem dar sua contribuição no âmbito da crescente demanda pela avaliação econômico financeira destes produtos. Esta demanda é motivada não apenas pelas exigências regulatórias internacionais mas também pelas necessidades de real percepção dos riscos fincnaceiros envolvidos. Assim, é aqui proposto um modelo de precificação cuja finalidade é permitir a calibragem, dentro de uma condição definida de equilíbrio, dos parâmetros de garantias de um contrato - taxa mínima e participação. Estes são assim determinados em função não só da maturidade estabelecida, como também das expectativas relativas às variáveis de mercado, como taxas de juros, volatilidade dos ativos e índice de preços. O modelo proposto mostrou comportamento similar ao constatado num conjunto referencial de modelos. Por esta razão, sugere-se que ele é adequado, dentro das limitações colocadas, ao processo de precificação dos produtos em questão.

Concentração nos mercados brasileiros de seguros, previdência e capitalização

Os mercados de seguros regulados pela SUSEP apresentaram queda no número de empresas e elevação no índice de concentração de Herfindahl Hirschman. O que parece um quadro preocupante no âmbito da regulação é atenuado pela diminuição do índice de Gini e outros testes de poder de mercado que não indicam que esta queda no número de empresas tenha tido impacto sobre o nível de preços. Assim como esperado a partir da evidência internacional, a concentração é maior nos mercados de seguros de vida do que nos não-vida. Este fato tem reflexo nos preços, que apresentam patamares mais altos nos seguros de vida, indicando diferença mais substancial entre mercados.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Essays in heterogeneous agent macroeconomics

This thesis is comprised of three chapters. The first article studies the determinants of the labor force participation of elderly American males and investigates the factors that may account for the changes in retirement between 1950 and 2000. We develop a life-cycle general equilibrium model with endogenous retirement that embeds Social Security legislation and Medicare. Individuals are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to their preferences for leisure and face uncertainty about labor productivity, health status and out-of-pocket medical expenses. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy in 2000 and is able to reproduce very closely the retirement behavior of the American population. It reproduces the peaks in the distribution of Social Security applications at ages 62 and 65 and the observed facts that low earners and unhealthy individuals retire earlier. It also matches very closely the increase in retirement from 1950 to 2000. Changes in Social Security policy - which became much more generous - and the introduction of Medicare account for most of the expansion of retirement. In contrast, the isolated impact of the increase in longevity was a delaying of retirement. In the second article, I develop an overlapping generations model of criminal behavior, which extends prior research on crime by taking into account individuals' labor supply decisions and the stigma effect that affects convicted offenders, lowering their likelihood of employment. I use the model to guide a quantitative assessment of the determinants of crime and of a counterfactual experiment in which an income redistribution policy is thought as an alternative to greater law enforcement. The model economy considered in this paper is populated by heterogeneous agents who live for a realistic number of periods, have preferences over consumption and leisure, and differ in terms of their age, their skills as well as their employment shocks. In addition, savings may be precautionary and allow partial insurance against the labor income shocks. Because of the lack of full insurance, this model generates an endogenous distribution of wealth across consumers, enabling us to assess the welfare implications of the redistribution policy experiment. I calibrated the model using the US data for 1980 and then use the model to investigate the changes in criminality between 1980 and 1996. The main results that come out of this study are: 1) Law enforcement policy was the most important factor behind the fall in criminality in the period, while the increase in inequality was the most important single factor promoting crime; 2) Stigmatization is not a free-cost crime control policy; 3) Income redistribution can be a powerful alternative policy to fight crime. Finally, the third article studies the impact of HIV/AIDS on per capita income and education. It explores two channels from HIV/AIDS to income that have not been sufficiently stressed by the literature: the reduction of the incentives to study due to shorter expected longevity and the reduction of productivity of experienced workers. In the model individuals live for three periods, may get infected in the second period and with some probability die of Aids before reaching the third period of their life. Parents care for the welfare of the future generations so that they will maximize lifetime utility of their dynasty. The simulations predict that the most affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa will be in the future, on average, thirty percent poorer than they would be without AIDS. Schooling will decline in some cases by forty percent. These figures are dramatically reduced with widespread medical treatment, as it increases the survival probability and productivity of infected individuals.

The life-cycle effects of social security in a model with housing and endogenous benefits

This article develops a life-cycle general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents who make choices of nondurables consumption, investment in homeowned housing and labour supply. Agents retire from an specific age and receive Social Security benefits which are dependant on average past earnings. The model is calibrated, numerically solved and is able to match stylized U.S. aggregate statistics and to generate average life-cycle profiles of its decision variables consistent with data and literature. We also conduct an exercise of complete elimination of the Social Security system and compare its results with the benchmark economy. The results enable us to emphasize the importance of endogenous labour supply and benefits for agents' consumption-smoothing behaviour.

On the cost of sympathy : a alternative model of insurance markets

The paper provides an alternative model for insurance market with three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. The paper assumes that providers care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (sympathy assumption). This assumption is satisfied if, for example, they care about their reputation or if there are possible litigation costs in case they do not use the appropriate procedure. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the sympathy assumption 1eads to a 10ss of welfare for the households due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment.

Life Cycle Models, Heterogeneity of Initial Assets,and Wealth Inequality

Life cycle general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents have a very hard time reproducing the American wealth distribution. A common assumption made in this literature is that all young adults enter the economy with no initial assets. In this article, we relax this assumption – not supported by the data - and evaluate the ability of an otherwise standard life cycle model to account for the U.S. wealth inequality. The new feature of the model is that agents enter the economy with assets drawn from an initial distribution of assets, which is estimated using a non-parametric method applied to data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. We found that heterogeneity with respect to initial wealth is key for this class of models to replicate the data. According to our results, American inequality can be explained almost entirely by the fact that some individuals are lucky enough to be born into wealth, while others are born with few or no assets.

Optimal unemployment insurance for couples

This work analyzes the optimal design of an unemployment insurance program for couples, whose joint search problem in the labor market differ significantly from the problem faced by single agents. We use a version of the sequential search model of the labor market adapted to married agents to compare optimal constant policies for single and married agents, as well as characterize the optimal constant policy when the agency faces single and married agents simultaneously. Our main result is that an agency that gives equal weights to single and married agents will want to give equal utility promises to both types of agents and spend more on the single agent.

Essays on health care reform, wealth inequality, and demography

This thesis contains three chapters. The first chapter uses a general equilibrium framework to simulate and compare the long run effects of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and of health care costs reduction policies on macroeconomic variables, government budget, and welfare of individuals. We found that all policies were able to reduce uninsured population, with the PPACA being more effective than cost reductions. The PPACA increased public deficit mainly due to the Medicaid expansion, forcing tax hikes. On the other hand, cost reductions alleviated the fiscal burden of public insurance, reducing public deficit and taxes. Regarding welfare effects, the PPACA as a whole and cost reductions are welfare improving. High welfare gains would be achieved if the U.S. medical costs followed the same trend of OECD countries. Besides, feasible cost reductions are more welfare improving than most of the PPACA components, proving to be a good alternative. The second chapter documents that life cycle general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents have a very hard time reproducing the American wealth distribution. A common assumption made in this literature is that all young adults enter the economy with no initial assets. In this chapter, we relax this assumption – not supported by the data – and evaluate the ability of an otherwise standard life cycle model to account for the U.S. wealth inequality. The new feature of the model is that agents enter the economy with assets drawn from an initial distribution of assets. We found that heterogeneity with respect to initial wealth is key for this class of models to replicate the data. According to our results, American inequality can be explained almost entirely by the fact that some individuals are lucky enough to be born into wealth, while others are born with few or no assets. The third chapter documents that a common assumption adopted in life cycle general equilibrium models is that the population is stable at steady state, that is, its relative age distribution becomes constant over time. An open question is whether the demographic assumptions commonly adopted in these models in fact imply that the population becomes stable. In this chapter we prove the existence of a stable population in a demographic environment where both the age-specific mortality rates and the population growth rate are constant over time, the setup commonly adopted in life cycle general equilibrium models. Hence, the stability of the population do not need to be taken as assumption in these models.

Health Care Reform or More Affordable Health Care?

This article investigates the impact on the U.S. economy of making health care more affordable. We compare health care cost reductions with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) using a rich life cycle general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. We found that all policies were able to reduce uninsured population, but the PPACA was the most effective: in the long run, less than 5% of Americans would remain uninsured. Cost reductions alleviated the government budget, while tax hikes were needed to finance the reform. Feasible cost reductions are less welfare improving than the PPACA.