Assalto ao estado e ao mercado, neoliberalismo e teoria econômica

O Estado e o mercado são instituições complementares. O Estado é a instituição principal que coordena as sociedades modernas; é o sistema constitucional e a organização que o garante; é o principal instrumento através do qual as sociedades democráticas estão moldando o capitalismo de modo a alcançar seus próprios objetivos políticos. Os mercados são instituições baseadas na competição, regulada pelo Estado para que contribuam com a coordenação da economia. Enquanto o liberalismo emergiu no século 18 para combater o estado autocrático, desde os anos 1980 o neoliberalismo (uma distorção maior do liberalismo econômico) tornou-se dominante e montou um assalto ao estado em nome do mercado, mas eventualmente também atacou o mercado. A macroeconomia neoclássica e a teoria da escolha pública foram as meta-ideologias que deram a esse assalto um apelo ‘científico’ e matemático.

O saber impotente: estudo da noção de ciência na obra infantil de Monteiro Lobato

A obra infantil de Monteiro Lobato apresenta a ciência de forma diferenciada em três fases. Na primeira, a ciência é inútil e representa um empecilho no desenrolar das aventuras. Na segunda,ela é o próprio motor das histórias. Na terceira, é vista como ferramenta mal utilizada pela civilização. Monteiro Lobato se vinculou a um grupo ontelectual de São Paulo cuja ação está na base da formação do Partido Democritico na década de vinte. A estrutura das fases identificadas na obra infantil corresponde à trajetória política do grupo. Num primeiro momento, ele luta por afirmar-se, por se estabelecer na política regional contra o conservadorismo do PRP. Num segundo momento ele se faz vitorioso, dirigindo o estado; finalmente ele é derrotado pelo golpe de 1937, se desagrega. Seus membros são cooptados ou perseguidos. Assim, a obra infantil de Lobato retrata a saga do liberalismo oligárquico em São Paulo durante a Primeira República.

O trabalhador do terciário: sua representação do cotidiano, do trabalho e da sociedade

o tema pesquisado: "O trabalhador do Setor Terciário - sua representação do cotidiano, do trabalho e da sociedade" - é uma forma de explicitação de minha prática concreta. Compreender o terciário, a partir da ótica das relações de produção, para desvendar, ao nível da representação, como funciona o fetiche, ao nível através das explicações produzidas e do próprio discurso do trabalhador ligado a esta área de produção não material. Inicia-se por discutir as conjunturas brasileiras de trinta (1930) a oitenta (1980), para entender a oscilação entre o nacionalismo e o liberalismo econômico, entre o desenvolvimento nacional e o desenvolvimento associado ao capital estrangeiro. Estudam-se, neste contexto, diferentes explicações para a expansão do terciário, passando pela estrutura de ocupações, pelos seus efeitos marginais e pela divisão social do trabalho, onde o desenvolvimento e o subdesenvolvimento encontram sua funcionalidade no capitalismo em escala mundial. O estudo nos leva a compreender que todos estes acontecimentos de natureza sócio-econômica se refletem, não como relação mecânica, mas enquanto íntima articulação entre o sócio-político e o econômico. E esta indissociabilidade está viva na representação que o trabalhador faz do seu cotidiano, do trabalho e da sociedade, ainda que não se dê conta e que não possa desvendar o fetiche, o qual, no seu discurso e na sua consciência, revela e encobre a realidade ao mesmo tempo.

Developmental class coalitions: historical experiences and prospects

Este artigo discute o conceito de coalizões de classe como uma alternativa parcial à luta de classes na compreensão das sociedades capitalistas; define duas coalizões de classes básicas - a desenvolvimentista e a liberal; apresenta brevemente três coalizões de classe desenvolvimentistas paradigmáticas - a mercantilista, a bismarckiana, e a social-democrata (ou dos anos dourados do capitalismo); e usa esse arcabouço teórico para entender o capitalismo contemporâneo nos anos pós neoliberais - os anos que se seguem a crise financeira global de 2008

Estado, estado-nação e formas de intermediação social

This paper, first, situates the nation-state historically, as a product of the capitalist revolution. Second, it distinguishes the state (the law system and the organization that guarantees it) from the nation-state or country (the territorial political unit formed by a nation, a state and a territory). Third, it defines nation, civil society and class coalitions, understanding that they are forms of society politically organized, which role is to act as intermediary between society and the state. Fourth, it uses these concepts plus the ones of relative autonomy and of anteriority to understand the ever changing relation between the state and society, where in early moments the state or its elites assumed the lead, and later, as democratization takes place, the protagonist role changed gradually to the people. The paper emphasizes the class coalitions, and argues that behind the two basic forms or economic and political organization of capitalism – developmentalism and economic liberalism – there are the correspondent class coalitions

Homogeneous middles vs. heterogeneous tails, and the end of the ‘Inverted-U’: the share of the rich is what it’s all about

This paper examines the current global scene of distributional disparities within-nations. There are six main conclusions. First, about 80 per cent of the world’s population now live in regions whose median country has a Gini not far from 40. Second, as outliers are now only located among middle-income and rich countries, the ‘upwards’ side of the ‘Inverted-U’ between inequality and income per capita has evaporated (and with it the statistical support there was for the hypothesis that posits that, for whatever reason, ‘things have to get worse before they can get better’). Third, among middle-income countries Latin America and mineral-rich Southern Africa are uniquely unequal, while Eastern Europe follows a distributional path similar to the Nordic countries. Fourth, among rich countries there is a large (and growing) distributional diversity. Fifth, within a global trend of rising inequality, there are two opposite forces at work. One is ‘centrifugal’, and leads to an increased diversity in the shares appropriated by the top 10 and bottom 40 per cent. The other is ‘centripetal’, and leads to a growing uniformity in the income-share appropriated by deciles 5 to 9. Therefore, half of the world’s population (the middle and upper-middle classes) have acquired strong ‘property rights’ over half of their respective national incomes; the other half, however, is increasingly up for grabs between the very rich and the poor. And sixth, Globalisation is thus creating a distributional scenario in which what really matters is the income-share of the rich — because the rest ‘follows’ (middle classes able to defend their shares, and workers with ever more precarious jobs in ever more ‘flexible’ labour markets). Therefore, anybody attempting to understand the within-nations disparity of inequality should always be reminded of this basic distributional fact following the example of Clinton’s campaign strategist: by sticking a note on their notice-boards saying “It’s the share of the rich, stupid”.

The revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of intelligent regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.

Why has productivity growth stagnated in most Latin American countries since the neo-liberal reforms?

Latin America’s economic performance since the beginning of neo-liberal reforms has been poor; this not only contrasts with its own performance pre-1980, but also with what has happened in Asia since 1980. I shall argue that the weakness of the region’s new paradigm is rooted as much in its intrinsic flaws as in the particular way it has been implemented. Latin America’s economic reforms were undertaken primarily as a result of the perceived economic weaknesses of the region — i.e., there was an attitude of ‘throwing in the towel’ vis-à-vis the previous state-led import substituting industrialisation strategy, because most politicians and economists interpreted the 1982 debt crisis as conclusive evidence that it had led the region into a cul-de-sac. As Hirschman has argued, policymaking has a strong component of ‘path-dependency’; as a result, people often stick with policies after they have achieved their aims, and those policies have become counterproductive. This leads to such frustration and disappointment with existing policies and institutions that is not uncommon to experience a ‘rebound effect’. An extreme example of this phenomenon is post-1982 Latin America, where the core of the discourse of the economic reforms that followed ended up simply emphasising the need to reverse as many aspects of the previous development (and political) strategies as possible. This helps to explain the peculiar set of priorities, the rigidity and the messianic attitude with which the reforms were implemented in Latin America, as well as their poor outcome. Something very different happened in Asia, where economic reforms were often intended (rightly or wrongly) as a more targeted and pragmatic mechanism to overcome specific economic and financial constraints. Instead of implementing reforms as a mechanism to reverse existing industrialisation strategies, in Asia they were put into practice in order to continue and strengthen ambitious processes of industrialisation.