The revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of intelligent regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.

"Os bárbaros estão chegando": o processo de democratização do governo Richa no Paraná

O presente trabalho de pesquisa acadêmica abrange a análise da conjuntura política do processo de transição democrática no Brasil e no Paraná, ocorrida no final da década de 1970 e inícios dos anos 80. No capítulo introdutório examino os elementos teórico-metodológicos, que são as categorias de análise que utilizo no estudo da situação concreta brasileira, como contexto amplo, e da conjuntura das eleiçôes de 1982 e do governo de José Richa no Paraná. Era necessário examinar a concepçâo "ampliada" de Estado, o conceito de estrutura e de superestrutura do bloco histórico e a concepção da vertente da democracia liberal e da vertente da democracia popular, no enfoque da literatura do materialismo histórico-dialético, de autores clássicos e modernos. No segundo capítulo examino o projeto de transição democrática dos generais presidentes Geisel e Figueiredo: um plano dos militares e das elites brasileiras para salvar as elites no poder, na travessia pelo alto. O projeto não ia além da legitimação do regime e do modelo econômico pela passagem do governo militar aos civis, por um processo eleitoral duvidoso. No Paraná, objetivo principal da pesquisa, examino o projeto liberal do governo do PMDB de Richa, desde a organizaçâo partidária, a elaboraçâo das diretrizes de governo, a campanha eleitoral, a participaçâo de intelectuais de ponta na campanha, as alianças do PMDB com os setores populares da sociedade até a composição e a "direitização" do governo. "OS BÁRBAROS ESTÃO CHEGANDO", título principal da dissertação, era a denominação que a aristocracia (elite) curitibana atribuiu a José Richa, quando o mesmo ganhou as eleições ao governo do Paraná, pelo fato de ser do interior do Estado e não fazer parte do mundo civilizado da Curitiba cosmopolita. No terceiro capítulo examino a questão da democratização da escola pública do Estado pela instituição das eleições para diretor e vice-diretor da escola, pelos professores, servidores, alunos e pais de alunos. Digo que a democracia vai além do decreto governamental que estabelece as eleições. Digo ainda que o discurso na prática é outro, no caso do governo Richa e da educação. A questão básica da pesquisa é trabalhar a idéia de que a educação é um campo de disputas e confrontos de classes pela hegemonia do poder, em que a classe dominante luta para manter-se no poder como classe dirigente e as classes subalternas ora se mantém aliadas e como classes auxiliares à classe dominante, ora consentem e raras vezes rebelam-se contra a dominaçâo da classe dirigente.

Quasi-experimental estimates of fiscal spillovers and spatial interactions among Brazilian cities

Nós usamos a metodologia de Regressões em Descontinuidade (RDD) para estimar o efeito causal do Fundo de Participação dos Municípios (FPM) recebido por um município sobre características dos municípios vizinhos, considerando uma variedade de temas: finanças públicas, educação, saúde e resultados eleitorais. Nós exploramos a regra que gera uma variação exógena da transferência em munícipios próximos às descontinuidades no repasse do fundo de acordo com faixas de população. Nossa principal contribuição é estimar separadamente e em conjunto o efeito spillover e o efeito direto do FPM, considerando ambos municípios vizinhos ou apenas um deles próximos às mudanças de faixa. Dessa forma, conseguimos entender melhor a interação entre municípios vizinhos quando há uma correlação na probabilidade de receber uma transferência federal. Nós mostramos que a estimativa do efeito direto do FPM sobre os gastos locais diminui em cerca de 20% quando controlamos pelo spillover do vizinho, que em geral é positivo, com exceção dos gastos em saúde e saneamento. Nós estimamos um efeito positivo da transferência sobre notas na prova Brasil e taxas de aprovação escolares em municípios vizinhos e na rede estadual do ensino fundamental. Por outro lado, o recebimento de FPM por municípios vizinhos de pequena população reduz o provimento de bens e serviços de saúde em cidades próximas e maiores, o que pode ocorrer devido à redução da demanda por serviços de saúde. A piora de alguns indicadores globais de saúde é um indício, no entanto, de que podem existir problemas de coordenação para os prefeitos reterem seus gastos em saúde. De fato, quando controlamos pela margem de vitória nas eleições municipais e consideramos apenas cidades vizinhas com prefeitos de partido diferentes, o efeito spillover é maior em magnitude, o que indica que incentivos políticos são importantes para explicar a subprovisão de serviços em saúde, por um lado, e o aumento da provisão de bens em educação, por outro. Nós também constatamos um efeito positivo do FPM sobre votos para o partido do governo federal nas eleições municipais e nacionais, e grande parte desse efeito é explicado pelo spillover do FPM de cidades vizinhas, mostrando que cidades com dependência econômica do governo federal se tornam a base de sustentação e apoio político desse governo. Por fim, nós encontramos um efeito ambíguo do aumento de receita devido ao FPM sobre a competição eleitoral nas eleições municipais, com uma queda da margem de vitória do primeiro colocado e uma redução do número de candidatos, o que pode ser explicado pelo aumento do custo fixo das campanhas locais.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.