Brazil: the pressure points in labor legislation

Brazil’s experience shows that the economic and political history of a country is a critical determinant of which labor laws influence wages and employment, and which are not binding. Long periods of high inflation, illiteracy of the workforce, and biases in the design and enforcement of labor legislation bred by the country’s socioeconomic history are all important in determining the reach of labor laws. Defying conventional wisdom, these factors are shown to affect labor market outcomes even in the sector of employment regarded as unregulated. Following accepted practice in Brazil, we distinguish regulated from unregulated employment by determining whether or not the contract has been ratified by the Ministry of Labor, viz., groups of workers with and without signed work booklet. We then examine the degree of adherence to labor laws in the formal and informal sectors, and finds “pressure points” – viz., evidence of the law on minimum wage, work-hours, and payment timing being binding on outcomes – in both the formal and informal sectors of the Brazilian labor market. The findings of the paper imply that in terms of the design of legislation, informality in Brazil is mainly a fiscal, and not a legal phenomenon. But the manner in which these laws have been enforced is also critical determinant of informality in Brazil: poor record-keeping has strengthened the incentives to stay informal that are already built into the design of the main social security programs, and ambiguities in the design of labor legislation combined with slanted enforcement by labor courts have led to workers effectively being accorded the same labor rights whether or not they have ratified contracts. The incentives to stay informal are naturally higher for workers who are assured of protection under labor legislation regardless of the nature of their contract, which only alters their financial relationship with the government. The paper concludes that informality in Brazil will remain high as long as labor laws remain ambiguous and enforced with a clear pro-labor bias, and social security programs lack tight benefitcontribution linkages and strong enforcement mechanisms.

Impacto da emissão dual-class na estrutura de capital

A tese propõe que empresas que emitem apenas ações com direitos de voto utilizam mais capitais de terceiros do que empresas que emitem tanto ações votantes quanto não votantes. No desenvolvimento do trabalho, foi demonstrada a relevância de relacionar endividamento ao fato de uma empresa emitir ou não ações sem direito a voto, considerando as principais teorias de estrutura de capital e a realidade brasileira. Como os modelos teóricos que explicam o nível de endividamento das empresas ainda carecem de capacidade explicativa, a busca por novos determinantes está presente na literatura de estrutura de capital. A ocorrência da emissão de ações em classes diferenciadas (dual-class) como fator impactante no nível de endividamento foi analisada sob três prismas: de mercado, dos setores e das empresas que unificaram suas ações. Pelas três investigações ficou evidenciada a perspectiva de que o endividamento seja menor nos casos de emissão de ações preferenciais, considerando o ambiente de negociação e regulamentação do Brasil. A aceitação da tese tem reflexos teóricos na identificação de um fator que deve ser levado em consideração nos modelos de estrutura de capital, bem como suscita a importância de gestores, investidores e credores reconhecerem que o fato de uma empresa ser dual-class impacta não apenas na sua estrutura de controle, mas principalmente em sua estrutura de capital. Entre as considerações da aceitação da tese, estaria o reconhecimento de que empresas que ingressam no Novo Mercado na prática estão, no longo prazo, trocando o uso de ações preferenciais como forma de financiamento pela emissão de dívida.

Managerial turnover and leverage under a takeover threat

How do shareholders perceive managers who lever up under a takeover threat? Increasing leverage conveys good news if it reflects management's ability to enhance value. It conveys bad news, though, if inefficient managers are more pressured to lever up. This paper demonstrates that negative (positive) updating prevails when takeover costs are small (large). Managers who leve r up to end a takeover threat thus may commit to an increase in the firm's value and yet increase their chances of being replaced by their shareholders. The model predicts that intraindustry leverage is less dispersed when takeover costs are low.