As políticas públicas de urbanização e regularização fundiária no processo de inclusão social: o PROAP Rio de Janeiro

This work objectives to investigate how the public policies of urbanization and land regularization of the Program of Urbanization of Informal Settlements - PROAP, in Rio de Janeiro allow the social inclusion and the rescue of the citizenship of the poor populations. To reach this objective the two programs of PROAP were analyzed into two communities both beneficed by each one of these programs. First, the social exclusion and how it reflects itself in the form of appropriation of the territory and in the type of housing was deeply analyzed. It leads the analysis of the public policies. As a next step, a brief historical analysis was made to include the PROAP in the historical context, and this was analyzed in each one of its stages. Finally, through a qualitative approaching, the slum of Vigário Geral and the irregular settlement of Ana Gonzaga have been researched, both were chose by their singular characteristics and, according to speech of the inhabitants, it was evaluated how the Program contributes in the social inclusion in these communities.

Land taxes in a Latin American context

Since Henry George (1839-1897) economists have been arguing that a tax on unimproved land is an ideal tax on efficiency grounds. Output taxes, on the other hand, have distortionary effects on the economy. This paper shows that under asymmetric information output taxes might be used along with land tax in order to implement an optimal taxation scheme in a Latin American context, i.e., where land rental markets are relatively thin, land property provides non-agricultural payoffs and there is nonrevenue objectives of land taxation. Also, the model has two implications that can be tested empirically: (i) there is evasion when schemes based only on land taxes are implemented; (ii) this evasion is more severe for large landholders.

The land assembly problem revisited

As in the standard land assembly problem, a developer wants to buy two adjacent blocks of land belonging to two di¤erent owners. The value of the two blocks of land to the developer is greater than the sum of the individual values of the blocks for each owner. Unlike the land assembly literature, however, our focus is on the incentive that each lot owner has to delay the start of negotiations, rather than on the public goods nature of the problem. An incentive for delay exists, for example, when owners perceive that being last to sell will allow them to capture a larger share of the joint surplus from the development. We show that competition at point of sale can cause equilibrium delay, and that cooperation at point of sale will eliminate delay.

Predicting Amazon Deforestation through the deterninants of demand for agricultural land

This paper develops a model of deforestation pressure in the Amazon. It is based on the determinants of demand for agricultural land, i.e. the interactions between population dynamics, urbanization and the growth of local markets, land prices, and government spending and policies. The mo deI is estimated using data from the period 1970 - 1985, and predictions for the period 1985 - 2010 are made under explicit assumptions about the underlying factors of deforestation. The predictions indicate that economic growth in the Amazon is likely to continue at high rates even if the federal government abandons its aggressive development policy. Deforestation will be much smaller if they do, though, since the active development policies tend to promote wasteful use of land.

A model of rural conflict : violence and land reform policy in Brazil

In the past ten years the struggle for land in Brazil has taken the shape of invasions of private land by welI organized groups of land less squatters. It is argued in this paper that these invasions and the resulting contlicts are a direct response to the land reform program which has been adopted by the govemment since 1985. which is based on the expropriation of farms and the creation of settlement projects. The set of formal and informal institutions which compromise the land reform program are used as the background for a game-theory model of rural contlicts. T estable implications are derived trom this model with particular emphasis on the etfect of policy variables on violence. These are then tested with panel data at state levei from 1988 to 1995. - It is shown that govemment policy which has the intent of reducing the amount of violence has the opposite etfect of leading to more incentives for contlicts.