10 resultados para Labour unions

em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV


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This paper presents a theoretical model which discusses the role played by the entrepreneurial risk on the distribution of the national income. In a two-period general equilibrium framework with competitive risk-averse entrepreneurs it is shown that the highest the risk borne by firms, the lower will be real wages, employment and the labour's share in output. The model helps explain the fall of the labour's share in the Brazilian output during the 1980s.

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From a methodological point of view, this paper makes two contributions to the literature. One contribution is the proposal of a new measure of pro-poor growth. This new measure provides the linkage between growth rates in mean income and in income inequality. In this context, growth is defined as pro-poor (or anti-poor) if there is a gain (or loss) in the growth rate due to a decrease (or increase) in inequality. The other contribution is a decomposition methodology that explores linkages growth patterns, and labour market performances. Through the decomposition analysis, growth in per capita income is explained in terms of four labour market components: the employment rate, hours of work, the labour force participation rate, and productivity. The proposed methodology are then applied to the Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD) covering the period 1995-2004. The paper analyzes the evolution of Brazilian social indicators based on per capita income exploring links with adverse labour market performance.

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The paper provides a close lecture of the arguments and methods of legal construction, employed in the extensive individual opinions written by the Justices of the Brazilian Supreme Court in the case which authorized the same sex civil union. After tracing an outline of the legal problem and his possible solutions, we analyze the individual opinions, showing their methodological syncretism, the use of legal methods and arguments in a contradictory way as well the deficiencies in the reasoning. The Justices use legal arguments, but do not meet the requirements of rationality in the decision-making. We have a rhetorical attempt that aims to satisfy the public opinion than to offer a comprehensive and coherent solution according the normative elements of the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988.

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The estimation of labor supply elasticities has been an important issue m the economic literature. Yet all works have estimated conditional mean labor supply functions only. The objective of this paper is to obtain more information on labor supply, by estimating the conditional quantile labor supply function. vI/e use a sample of prime age urban males employees in Brazil. Two stage estimators are used as the net wage and virtual income are found to be endogenous to the model. Contrary to previous works using conditional mean estimators, it is found that labor supply elasticities vary significantly and asymmetrically across hours of work. vVhile the income and wage elasticities at the standard work week are zero, for those working longer hours the elasticities are negative.

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From a methodological point of view, this paper makes two contlibutions to the literature. One contribution is the proposal of a new measure of pro-poor growth. This new measure provides the linkage between growth rates in mean income and in income inequality. In this context, growth is defined as pro-poor (or anti-poor) if there is a gain (or loss) in the growth rate due to a decrease (or increase) in inequality. The other contribution is a decomposition methodology that explores linkages between three dimensions: growth pattems, labour market performances. and social policies. Through the decomposition analysis, growth in per capita income is explained in terms of four labour market components: the employment rate. hours of work, the labour force participation rate. and productivity. We also assess the contribution of different nonlabour income sources to growth patterns. The proposed methodologies are then applied to the Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD) covering the period 1995-2004. The paper analyzes the evolution of Brazilian social indicators based on per capita income exploring links with adverse labour market performance and social policy change, with particular emphasis on the expansion of targeted cash transfers and devising more propoor social security benefits.

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The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

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Esse trabalho tenta analisar a atuação do Ministério do Trabalho através da articulação de seus ministros com outras áreas da burocracia estatal, durante o governo Castelo Branco, para, por um lado, reprimir e expurgar opiniões contrárias ao regime ditatorial e, por outro, promover uma nova política para os trabalhadores, o “novo trabalhismo”. O termo condensava a ideia da área econômica de ‘democratizar’ as oportunidades, ampliando as atribuições dos sindicatos, deslocando o seu foco das reivindicações salariais para o desenvolvimento, em associação com o governo, de projetos e programas de investimentos nos setores sociais de produtividade indireta. Para implementar a proposta, cada ministro teve que lidar com as pressões advindas do processo de alteração da política trabalhista e articular os seus interesses pessoais com as atribuições da pasta. Arnaldo Sussekind resistiu às demandas para o fim da estabilidade, alterou a Lei de Greve, permitiu o fracionamento do 13º salário e abriu espaço para a implantação da política salarial. Ao mesmo tempo promoveu uma massiva intervenção nos sindicatos, cujos processos permitem conhecer melhor o interior da burocracia estatal, perceber os argumentos utilizados para afastar as diretorias das entidades e questionar a tomada de decisões dentro do ministério sob o novo contexto social pós-golpe. Walter Peracchi Barcelos utilizou a pasta como trampolim político, propondo e executando ações repressivas que lhe garantiam vantagens políticas e negligenciando projetos da área econômica, como o Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço, que ameaçavam importantes conquistas dos trabalhadores. Por fim, Luiz Gonzaga do Nascimento e Silva reformulou o Banco Nacional da Habitação e unificou a previdência, ações que permitiram a transferência de atribuições e recursos do Estado para a iniciativa privada. A pesquisa, portanto, sustenta que o Ministério do Trabalho, após o golpe, perdeu poder político dentro do governo por permitir a transferência de suas atribuições para camadas da elite empresarial e para os militares, forçando os sindicatos a modificarem seus canais de diálogo e suas reivindicações para se adaptarem ao novo contexto.

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In this paper we study the e ects of conditional cash transfers in school enrolment and tackling child labour. We develop a dynamic heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model, where households face a set of tradeo s while allocating their children's time in leisure activities, schooling and working. We calibrate the model using data from the Brazilian survey PNAD, before the policy was implemented, in order to quantify the e ects of a conditional transfer. We then evaluate the results of a policy experiment that implements a conditional cash transfer scheme similar to the Brazilian Bolsa Fam lia. Our results suggest that the program, in the long term, is able to substantially increase school registration and reduce child labour and poverty. In addition, we nd out that a progressive conditional cash transfer results is even more e ective in tackling child labour and increasing school enrolment.

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Neste trabalho, estudamos os impactos de transfer^encias condicionais de renda sobre o trabalho e a educa c~ao infantis. Para tanto, desenvolvemos modelo din^amico de equil brio geral com agentes heterog^eneos, onde as fam lias enfrentam tradeo s com rela c~ao a aloca c~ao de tempo das crian cas em atividades de lazer, em escolaridade e em trabalhar. O modelo e calibrado usando dados da Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra em Domic lios, de modo que podemos quanti car os efeitos de uma pol tica de transfer^encia de renda. Finalmente, avaliamos o impacto de um pol tica semelhante ao atual Bolsa Fam lia. Nossos resultados sugerem que o programa, no longo prazo, e capaz de induzir um aumento substancial na escolaridade, al em de ser efetivo na redu c~ao do trabalho infantil e da pobreza. Al em disso, mostramos que um programa progressivo de transfer^encia condicional de renda resulta em benef cios ainda maiores.

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A proposta dessa pesquisa é pensar as ações trabalhistas impetradas pelos sindicatos patronais e dos trabalhadores na cidade do Rio de Janeiro que compreendia parte da jurisprudência do Tribunal Regional do Trabalho da Primeira Região, observando os acórdãos coletivos produzidos na segunda instância da Justiça do Trabalho. Foram observadas matérias e diálogos jurídicos encontrados nos acórdãos coletivos do Tribunal Regional do Trabalho ressaltando as principais questões trabalhistas durante os anos de 1964 e 1979 referentes ao direito do trabalho no Brasil. Com o recorte cronológico dos anos de 1964, quando ocorreu o golpe que depôs do presidente João Goulart, até 1979 quando no processo de distensão política, percebe-se uma mudança na atuação da classe trabalhadora no contexto do novo sindicalismo, a pesquisa também pretende analisar a atuação dos agentes do judiciário trabalhista durante o regime civil-militar observando a prática da magistratura trabalhista diante do projeto político e econômico adotado no regime civil-militar que atingia, especificamente, os interesses dos trabalhadores.