Informality in labor market and welfare

The neoclassical growth model with two sectors in production is employed in this paper in order to investigate how a change in the tax structure affects informality and welfare. We calibrate and simulate the model and find that welfare always increases when we reduce the tax rate on the demand for labor and adjust the tax rate on the value added so that the government revenue remains constant.

A search-theoretic explanation for the negative correlation between labor income and impatience

Lawrance (1991) has shown, through the estimation of consumption Euler equations, that subjective rates of impatience (time preference) in the U.S. are three to Öve percentage points higher for households with lower average labor incomes than for those with higher labor income. From a theoretical perspective, the sign of this correlation in a job-search model seems at Örst to be undetermined, since more impatient workers tend to accept wage o§ers that less impatient workers would not, thereby remaining less time unemployed. The main result of this paper is showing that, regardless of the existence of e§ects of opposite sign, and independently of the particular speciÖcations of the givens of the model, less impatient workers always end up, in the long run, with a higher average income. The result is based on the (unique) invariant Markov distribution of wages associated with the dynamic optimization problem solved by the consumers. An example is provided to illustrate the method.

Brazil: the pressure points in labor legislation

Brazil’s experience shows that the economic and political history of a country is a critical determinant of which labor laws influence wages and employment, and which are not binding. Long periods of high inflation, illiteracy of the workforce, and biases in the design and enforcement of labor legislation bred by the country’s socioeconomic history are all important in determining the reach of labor laws. Defying conventional wisdom, these factors are shown to affect labor market outcomes even in the sector of employment regarded as unregulated. Following accepted practice in Brazil, we distinguish regulated from unregulated employment by determining whether or not the contract has been ratified by the Ministry of Labor, viz., groups of workers with and without signed work booklet. We then examine the degree of adherence to labor laws in the formal and informal sectors, and finds “pressure points” – viz., evidence of the law on minimum wage, work-hours, and payment timing being binding on outcomes – in both the formal and informal sectors of the Brazilian labor market. The findings of the paper imply that in terms of the design of legislation, informality in Brazil is mainly a fiscal, and not a legal phenomenon. But the manner in which these laws have been enforced is also critical determinant of informality in Brazil: poor record-keeping has strengthened the incentives to stay informal that are already built into the design of the main social security programs, and ambiguities in the design of labor legislation combined with slanted enforcement by labor courts have led to workers effectively being accorded the same labor rights whether or not they have ratified contracts. The incentives to stay informal are naturally higher for workers who are assured of protection under labor legislation regardless of the nature of their contract, which only alters their financial relationship with the government. The paper concludes that informality in Brazil will remain high as long as labor laws remain ambiguous and enforced with a clear pro-labor bias, and social security programs lack tight benefitcontribution linkages and strong enforcement mechanisms.

Labor rights, formality and spillovers: evidence from Brazil

Nós analisamos o efeito da emenda constitucional 72/13 no Brasil, que igualou direitos trabalhistas de empregadas domésticas a aqueles de outros empregados. Mostramos que, após a legislação, uma considerável cobertura midiática e um interesse público intensificado aumentou o conhecimento geral de direitos trabalhistas de empregadas domésticas. Como consequência, o não-seguimento de legislações trabalhistas no setor de serviços domésticos ficou mais difícil. Ao mesmo tempo, a necessidade de regulamentar adicionalmente a emenda fez com que custos trabalhistas ficassem praticamente inalterados. Usando uma abordagem de diferença-em-diferenças que compara ocupações selecionadas ao longo do tempo, mostramos que a emenda -- e a discussão que ela causou -- levou a um aumento na formalização e nos salários de empregados domésticos. Então, usando a heterogeneidade do impacto da emenda em grupos demográficos, nossos resultados mostram que emprego doméstico foi reduzido e que mulheres pouco qualificadas saíram força de trabalho e foram para empregos de menor qualidade. Testes de placebo e análises de robustez indicam que nossos resultados não são explicados por diversas interpretações alternativas.