Does liquidity constraints matter for Ricardian equivalence?

The paper analysis a general equilibrium model with two periods, several households and a government that has to finance some expenditures in the first period. Households may have some private information either about their type (adverse selection) or about some action levei chosen in the first period that affects the probability of certain states of nature in the second period (moral hazard). Trade of financiai assets are intermediated by a finite collection of banks. Banks objective functions are determined in equilibrium by shareholders. Due to private information it may be optimal for the banks to introduce constraints in the set of available portfolios for each household as wellas household specific asset prices. In particular, households may face distinct interest rates for holding the risk-free asset. The government finances its expenditures either by taxing households in the first period or by issuing bonds in the first period and taxing households in the second period. Taxes may be state-dependent. Suppose government policies are neutml: i) government policies do not affect the distribution of wealth across households; and ii) if the government decides to tax a household in the second period there is a portfolio available for the banks that generates the Mme payoff in each state of nature as the household taxes. Tben, Ricardian equivalence holds if and only if an appropriate boundary condition is satisfied. Moreover, at every free-entry equilibrium the boundary condition is satisfied and thus Ricardian equivalence holds. These results do not require any particular assumption on the banks' objective function. In particular, we do not assume banks to be risk neutral.

Aftermarket short covering in ipos and long-term stock liquidity

This study investigates the effect of the aftermarket short covering (ASC) carried out by the underwriter during the price stabilization period on stock long-term liquidity. Because the ASC increases liquidity during the stabilization period and liquidity is a persistent characteristic of stocks, the ASC can increase long-term liquidity. In fact, we show that the ASC has a positive effect on liquidity over the 6 months subsequent to the stabilization period. This positive relation holds true even after controlling for many variables found important to explain liquidity by previous authors and the instrumentalization of the ASC.

The inequality curse: constraints and political discretion

We live in an unjust world characterized by economic inequality. No liberal theory of justice is able to justify it. Inequality is not “solved” with equality of opportunity or meritocracy. Nor by the socialist and republican critique. The poor will have to count with them and with democracy to make social progress reality. In their political struggle, they will face one economic constraint: the expected profit rate must remain attractive to business investors. Yet, giving that technological progress in increasingly capital-saving, this economic constraint does not obstruct that wages grow above the productivity rate and inequality is reduced. What really is an obstacle to social justice in the rich countries is, on one hand, the power that capitalist rentiers retain and financists acquired, and, on the other, the competition originated in low wage countries.

The Aiyagari model with liquidity shoch

Neste trabalho é desenvolvida uma versão do modelo de Aiyagari (1994) com choque de liquidez. Este modelo tem Huggett (1993) e Aiyagari (1994) como casos particulares, mas esta generalização permite dois ativos distintos na economia, um líquido e outro ilíquido. Usar dois ativos diferentes implica em dois retornos afetando o "market clearing", logo, a estratégia computacional usada por Aiyagari e Hugget não funciona. Consequentemente, a triangulação de Scarf substitui o algoritmo. Este experimento computacional mostra que o retorno em equilíbrio do ativo líquido é menor do que o retorno do ilíquido. Além disso, pessoas pobres carregam relativamente mais o ativo líquido, e essa desigualdade não aparece no modelo de Aiyagari.

Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.

Crise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiro

A reação da autoridade bancária frente a uma crise é de fundamental importância para a sua contenção. No Brasil, durante a crise do subprime, em 2008, observou-se a ocorrência de uma crise de liquidez em alguns bancos que levou o Banco Central a autorizar uma linha especial de captação de depósitos com limite muito superior ao habitual, denominado Depósito a Prazo com Garantia Especial (DPGE). Estes fatos propiciaram uma oportunidade de observar a reação dos depositantes frente a um choque exógeno ao sistema financeiro nacional para, em seguida, explorar a captação exógena de recursos devido à ampliação nos limites dos depósitos assegurados, com cobertura do Fundo Garantidor de Crédito (FGC). Além disso, analisou-se o efeito do DPGE sobre o crédito, considerando que depósitos assegurados e não-assegurados não são substitutos perfeitos e um aumento na oferta de depósitos assegurados deveria aumentar a oferta de crédito do mercado, como um todo. A estratégia empírica utilizada permitiu reconhecer os bancos emissores de DPGE, separando-os por outros fatores relacionados aos fundamentos bancários (tamanho, liquidez, qualidade dos ativos e retorno) e analisar os efeitos do DPGE nas taxas de juros praticadas na captação de depósitos a prazo, em geral. A base de dados utilizada também permitiu observar o comportamento desses bancos e a estratégia por eles utilizada na origem e destinação de tais recursos. Tomados em conjunto, os resultados encontrados são consistentes com a ideia de que depositantes migram seus recursos para a segurança durante a crise, na chamada “fuga para a qualidade” e retornam quando lhes dão a garantia necessária. Também é coerente com a teoria que diz que a substituição imperfeita entre depósitos assegurados e depósitos não-assegurados afeta a restrição de financiamentos dos bancos. O resultado deste estudo revela a importância da atuação da autoridade reguladora frente a situações críticas, bem como os efeitos no mercado causados pela permanência de um produto desenhado para uma situação específica.

Central bank balance sheet concerns and credible optimal escape from the Liquidity trap

I show that when a central bank is financially independent from the treasury and has balance sheet concerns, an increase in the size or a change in the composition of the central bank's balance sheet (quantitative easing) can serve as a commitment device in a liquidity trap scenario. In particular, when the short-term interest rate is up against the zero lower bound, an open market operation by the central bank that involves purchases of long-term bonds can help mitigate the deation and a large negative output gap under a discretionary equilibrium. This is because such an open market operation provides an incentive to the central bank to keep interest rates low in future in order to avoid losses in its balance sheet.

Credit borrowing constraints in a DSGE framework: income vs. housing

Credit market in Brazil distinguishes from advanced economies in many aspects. One of them is related to collaterals for households borrowing. This work proposes a DSGE framework, based on Gerali et al.(2010), to analyse one pecularity of Brazillian credit market: payroll-deducted personal loans. To original model, we added the possibility to households contract long term debt and compare to differents types of credit constrains: one based on housing and other based on future income. We callibrate and estimate the model to Brazil, using Bayesian technique. Results show that, in a economy where credit constraints are based on income, responses to shocks appear to be stronger, at first, but dissipate faster. This occurs because income responds quickly to shock than housing prices, so does amount available to loans. In order to smooth consumption, agents compensate lower income and borrowing by increasing working hours, restoring loans and debt in a shorter time.

Financial constraints and house prices: an international perspective

In this paper, we show substantial empirical evidence that house prices are more sensitive to shocks to percapita income, in countries where housing finance is more developed. This result is consistent with the theoretical framework developed in the paper, where we study the impact ofprogressive relaxation of financiai constraints on housing demand and equilibrium house prices. Our results are consistent with recent literature on financiai constraints and business investment, which argues that the investment of less constrained firms can be more sensitive to changes in cash flow. More broadly, our results challenge the traditional view that financiai development leads to smaller fluctuations in key economic variables. The policy implications are c1ear and important. Even iffinancial development is desirable for other reasons, the potential associated increase in volatility should be an explicit policy concern.

Construction of facilities under asymmetric information: do constitutional constraints matter?

This paper studies construction of facilities in a federal state under asymmetric information. A country consists of two regions, each ruled by a local authority. The federal government plans to construct a facility in one of the regions. The facility generates a local value in the host region and has spillover effects in the other region. The federal government does not observe the local value because it is the local authority's private information. 80 the federal governrnent designs an incentive-compatible mechanism, specifying if the facility should be constructed and a balanced scheme of interregional transfers to finance its cost. The federal governrnent is constitutionally constrained to respect a given leveI of each region's welfare. We show that depending upon the facility's local value and the spillover effect, the governrnent faces different incentive problems. Moreover, their existence depends crucially on how stringent constitutional constraints are. Therefore, the optimal mechanism will also depend upon these three features of the model.

Insider trading, investment, and liquidity: a welfare analysis

We compare competitive equilibrium outcomes with and without trading by a privately infonned "monopolistic" insider, in a model with real investment portfolio choices ex ante, and noise trading generated by aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare implications of insider trading for the ex ante expected utilities of outsiders are analyzed. The role of interim infonnation revelation due to insider trading, in improving the risk-sharing among outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, is examined in detaiL

Balance of payment crises and capital flows : the role of liquidity

A model of externaI CrISIS is deveIoped focusing on the interaction between Iiquidity creation by financiaI intermediaries and foreign exchange collapses. The intermediaries' role of transforming maturities is shown to result in larger movements of capital and a higher probability of crisis. This resembles the observed cycle in capital fiows: large infiows, crisis and abrupt outfiows. The mo deI highlights how adverse productivity and international interest rate shocks can be magnified by the behavior of individual foreign investors linked together through their deposits in the intermediaries. An eventual collapse of the exchange rate can link investors' behavior even further. The basic model is then extended, quite naturally, to study the effects of capital fiow contagion between countries.

Trend following performance with size and liquidity: evidence from US, Brazil and Portugal

Neste trabalho, eu analiso a eficiência de se aplicar estratégias que identificam tendências em mercados de capitais, em três países diferentes, usando um conjunto de variáveis macroeconómicas. Em cada país, a estratégia é testada contra os índices de grande capitalização, pequena capitalização e o índice principal. Eu concluo que, ao combinar os sinais diários obtidos pela estratégia, é possível alcançar retornos ajustados ao risco superiores e reduzir as perdas possíveis do portfólio. No geral, enfatizo os benefícios de usar estratégias que exploram tendências para investidores avessos ao risco, obtendo retornos característicos de capitais próprios com a volatilidade característica de obrigações.

Do borrowing constraints decrease intergenerational mobility? evidence from Brazil

In this paper, we find evidence that suggests that borrowing constraints may be an important determinant of intergenerational mobility in Brazil. This result contrasts sharply with studies for developed countries, such as Canada and the US, where credit constraints do not seem to play an important role in generating persistence of inequality. Moreover, we find that the social mobility is lower in Brazil in comparison with developed countries. We follow the methodology proposed by Grawe (2001), which uses quantile regression, and obtain two results. First, the degree of intergenerational persistence is greater for the upper quantiles. Second, the degree of intergenerational persistence declines with income at least for the upper quantiles. Both findings are compatible with the presence of borrowing constraints affecting the degree of intergenerational persistence, as predicted by the theory.