Democracy and capitalist revolution

Democracy became the preferred and consolidated form of government only in the twentieth century. It is not sufficient to explain this change solely by reference to rational motives, nor by detecting processes and leadership. A historical approach is required. The new historical fact that led to the change of preference from aristocratic rule to democracy is the capitalist revolution, which changed the manner of appropriating the economic surplus from violence to the market. This is the first necessary condition for democracy. The disappearance of the fear of expropriation, the rise of middle classes and the pressures of the poor or of the workers are the second, third and fourth new historical facts that opened the way for the transition from the liberal to the liberal-democratic regime. After these four conditions were fulfilled, the elites ceased to fear that they would be expropriated if universal suffrage was granted. Eventually, after the transition, the democratic regime became the rational choice for all classes. The theory presented here does not predict transitions, since countries often turn democratic without fully realized historical conditions, but it predicts democratic consolidation, since no country that has completed its capitalist revolution falls back into authoritarianism.

Inglorious revolution : sovereign debt, tropical credibility, and financial underdevelopment in imperial Brazil

In 1824 the creation of institutions that constrained the monarch’s ability to unilaterally tax, spend, and debase the currency put Brazil on a path toward a revolution in public finance, roughly analogous to the financial consequences of England’s Glorious Revolution. This credible commitment to honor sovereign debt resulted in successful long-term funded borrowing at home and abroad from the 1820s through the 1880s that was unrivalled in Latin America. Some domestic bonds, denominated in the home currency and bearing exchange clauses, eventually circulated in European financial markets. The share of total debt accounted for by long-term funded issues grew, and domestic debt came to dominate foreign debt. Sovereign debt yields fell over time in London and Rio de Janeiro, and the cost of new borrowing declined on average. The market’s assessment of the probability of default tended to decrease. Imperial Brazil enjoyed favorable conditions for borrowing, and escaped the strong form of “original sin” stressed by recent work on sovereign debt. The development of vibrant private financial markets did not, however, follow from the enhanced credibility of government debt. Private finance in Imperial Brazil suffered from politicized market interventions that undermined the development of domestic capital markets. Private interest rates remained high, entry into commercial banking was heavily restricted, and limited-liability joint-stock companies were tightly controlled. The Brazilian case provides a powerful counterexample to the general proposition of North and Weingast that institutional changes that credibly commit the government to honor its obligations necessarily promote the development of private finance. The very institutions that enhanced the credibility of sovereign debt permitted the systematic repression of private financial development. In terms of its consequences for domestic capital markets, the liberal Constitution of 1824 represented an “inglorious” revolution.

A green revolution in Mozambique: a study about the government possibilities to launch a sustainable green revolution

The present study is focused on the analysis of the political, economical and social factors that may interfere with the possibility of a Green Revolution as a solution for Mozambique to reach self-sufficiency and to reduce poverty. In order to perform such analysis, the study analyzes the consequences of the decolonization process in Mozambique focusing that the independence process in Mozambique did not create non-colonial models for the Agriculture Sector. Later on, the study tries to understand the impact of HIV/AIDS and Malaria on the labor force. By then, it explores the concepts of the Green Revolution and its successful history in India. At the end, it tries to evaluate if a Green Revolution is possible in Africa, especially in Mozambique, first identifying the factors, which characterized the Green Revolution in India, and trying to link those factors with the reality of Mozambique. The report is structured as followed; Chapter 2, ¿The decolonization process and its impacts on the agriculture sector¿. It gives information about the decolonization process, and explores its consequences. Chapter 3, ¿The Impacts of HIV/AIDS and Malaria on the Labor Force¿. It analyzes the impact of those diseases in the labor force. Chapter 4 ¿The Green Revolution and the Agriculture Sector¿, explores the concepts of Green Revolution, its success in India and its history in Mozambique. Chapter 5, finally, centers on conclusions, findings and recommendations.

Globalization and the Industrial Revolution

This paper argues that trade specialization played an indispensable role in supporting the Industrial Revolution, allowing the economy to shift resources to the manufacture without facing food and raw materials shortage. In our arti cial economy, there are two sectors agriculture and manufacture and the economy is initially closed and under a Malthusian trap. In this economy the industrial revolution entails a transition towards a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin economy. The model reproduces the main stylized facts of the transition to modern growth and globalization. We show that two-sectors closed-economy models cannot explain the fall in the value of land relative to wages observed in the 19th century and that the transition in this case is much longer than that observed allowing for trade.

Estado, Estado-nação e revolução capitalista

This paper distinguishes the state (the law system and the organization that guarantees it) from the nation-state or country – the territorial political unit formed by a nation, a state and a territory. Second, it defines nation and civil society, understanding them that the nation and the civil society are the two forms of politically organized society that work as intermediary between society and the state. The formation of the nation-states and the industrial revolution are part of the capitalist revolution. Since that crucial historical transformation takes place in each giving society progress or development follows: the absolute state changes into the liberal one, and the liberal state into the democratic state, whereas the nation and civil society also get less unequal or more “democratized”. In this historical process the state is the basic instrument of collective action of the nation or of civil society.e

Globalization and the Industrial Revolution (revised)

This paper argues that trade specialization played an indispensable role in supporting the Industrial Revolution. We calibrate a two-good and two-sector overlapping generations model to Englandís historical development and investigate how much different Englandís development path would have been if it had not globalized in 1840. The open-economy model is able to closely match the data, but the closed-economy model cannot explain the fall in the value of land relative to wages observed in the 19th century. Without globalization, the transition period in the British economy would be considerably longer than that observed in the data and key variables, such as the share of labor force in agriculture, would have converged to Ögures very distant from the actual ones.

Estado capaz (desenvolvimentista) e democracia em países pré-industriais

This paper distinguishes three types of countries (rich, middle-income, and pre-industrial) and discusses the problems of state capability and the quality of democracy in the later, which include the poor countries. A consolidate democracy supposes that the country has realized its capitalist revolution and counts with a relatively capable state. The challenge of pre-industrial countries is to build their nation and a reasonably capable state, and to make their national and industrial revolution. The democratic state will be its main instrument to achieve the five political objectives that modern societies defined historically: security, individual liberty, economic well-being, social justice, and protection of the environment. Given the demand of the people and the pressure of rich countries since the 1980s, this state will have to be democratic, but, historically, all industrial revolutions were the outcome of a developmental strategy, and none of them were accomplished in the realm of democracy. This is the main contradiction and the main challenge faced by populist leaders who try to develop their countries, having as adversaries the local liberal oligarchy and the rich countries or the West. They must build a capable state, but their poorly organized societies do not help. They must give priority to economic growth, but the people ask for more social services. Thus, to govern these countries is extremely difficult.

The revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of intelligent regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.

Why has productivity growth stagnated in most Latin American countries since the neo-liberal reforms?

Latin America’s economic performance since the beginning of neo-liberal reforms has been poor; this not only contrasts with its own performance pre-1980, but also with what has happened in Asia since 1980. I shall argue that the weakness of the region’s new paradigm is rooted as much in its intrinsic flaws as in the particular way it has been implemented. Latin America’s economic reforms were undertaken primarily as a result of the perceived economic weaknesses of the region — i.e., there was an attitude of ‘throwing in the towel’ vis-à-vis the previous state-led import substituting industrialisation strategy, because most politicians and economists interpreted the 1982 debt crisis as conclusive evidence that it had led the region into a cul-de-sac. As Hirschman has argued, policymaking has a strong component of ‘path-dependency’; as a result, people often stick with policies after they have achieved their aims, and those policies have become counterproductive. This leads to such frustration and disappointment with existing policies and institutions that is not uncommon to experience a ‘rebound effect’. An extreme example of this phenomenon is post-1982 Latin America, where the core of the discourse of the economic reforms that followed ended up simply emphasising the need to reverse as many aspects of the previous development (and political) strategies as possible. This helps to explain the peculiar set of priorities, the rigidity and the messianic attitude with which the reforms were implemented in Latin America, as well as their poor outcome. Something very different happened in Asia, where economic reforms were often intended (rightly or wrongly) as a more targeted and pragmatic mechanism to overcome specific economic and financial constraints. Instead of implementing reforms as a mechanism to reverse existing industrialisation strategies, in Asia they were put into practice in order to continue and strengthen ambitious processes of industrialisation.