O sindicalismo e a administração publica

A dissertação aqui apresentada versa sobre uma temática nova, quer vista sob a ótica do nascimento do fato sociológico analisado - O Sindicalismo e a Administração Pública quer se considere a quase inexistência de fontes nas quais se possa abeberar, para que fosse possível estabelecer o fio condutor no desenvolvimento do tema. A temática foi analisada em dois planos: primeiro, fêz-se uma apreciação crítica da história do associativismo no Brasil, em sua simbiose com o aspecto social, com o lado econômico e com o lastro jurídico, ao ser analisado o caminho percorrido desde o primeiro clarão do Brasil até os dias presentes. Em segundo estágio, perquiriu-se a questão sindical, no que diz respeito à sua etiologia, o seu despertar mais consciente na década de 80 do nosso século, perpassando pela criação das Centrais Sindicais, ao serem detectados os desvios ideológicos, as contradições, a sua fisiologia em função de sua organização, ideário e ação na direção do que se propõem em nome de seus afiliados. Com efeito, o núcleo do trabalho se cinge à arregimentação do corpo de funcionários públicos com vistas a um eficaz - hoje, ainda muito incipiente - congraçamento, ao se deparar com uma forte resistência institucional, de vez que só a partir da Constituição de 1988, é que se abriu caminho para o direito de associação sindical a esse estamento dos agentes públicos. As disfunções são, aí, analisadas em relação ao despreparo dos Recursos Humanos no exercício de liderança e em confronto com a estrutura institucional anacrônica e de feitio autoritário, para fazer valer, de forma eficaz e efetiva, um bom desempenho da ação sindical, que se deseja genuína, autônoma e autógena, em função dos interesses de classe e a ter em vista a excelência dos serviços públicos; o fenômeno estudado, inversamente, mostra o processamento de uma luta sindical radicada em estrutura antidemocrática, em que o Estado financia os sindicatos e todo o aparelhamento sindical vertical, via contribuição sindical e a considerar que esse lastro sustentador da luta sindical é decalque de uma época de predominância de valores chauvinistas, exaltados no Brasil - e em outros países -, nas décadas de 30 e 40. Ainda foi feito um estudo comparativo com três modelos de sindicalismo, quais sejam: o francês, o alemão e o português. Os dois primeiros por razões de se constituirem em paradigmas de países centrais, tendo em vista que: (1) a França é modelo inspirador das instituições ocidentais, em sede político-jurídico-social, haja vista a sua História prenhe de fatos solapadores do statu quo ante; e (2) a Alemanha, por ter uma classe eficazmente institucionalizada de agentes públicos, tendo tradição araigada desde a burocracia prussiana, o que dá o toque de elevado profissionalismo a esses agentes públicos, os quais contam com uma agremiação sindical que guarda independência com relação ao movimento sindical do trabalhador privado, este, também consolidado em poderosa organização sindical naquele país. Portugal aparece no trabalho como o ascendente cultural do Brasil, o que implica em ser mostrado o nascedouro sindical desse país, dentro do clima cultural em que viveu e vive a península lusitana, e com isso se tenta elucidar o estágio de seu sindicalismo, as suas disfunções e auto funções , as suas semelhanças com o modelo brasileiro, as suas inclinações e natureza. As conclusões aferidas registram alguns aspectos relevantes: 1º) o Brasil nasceu de uma Administração centralizadora, marcada por uma máquina administrativa ineficaz, ineficiente, com a marca do Estato-império e sem a presença da construção concomitante de uma nação que é retardatária no assentar a viga da cidadania, o que levou a delongar a formação dos anseios e do espírito genuinamente autóctones. A repressão ao desenvolvimento das letras foi um entrave à criação de um espírito de povo, com a variante de ser uma maioria inculta, massacrantemente iletrada, em meio a uma pirâmide social em que se registrava apenas uma base desmesurada e um vértice acanhado, sem ter de permeio outras classes sociais que pudessem ser ou vir a ser estratificadas. Na esteira desses elementos, concluiu-se que: 2º) o movimento associativo é uma realidade incipiente e adormecido durante séculos, o que desbordou em uma apatia que só hoje começa a ser sacudida, através dos movimentos associativistas e sindical, este último nascido no meio das fábricas e estendido a algumas capitais de maior relevância política ou de maior peso econômico. o aspecto de maior magnitude para o trabalho foi a sinalização aberta aos servidores públicos para que se sindicalizassem, do que decorreu a conclusão de que essa ação precisa ser tangenciada e carreada a ser um movimento mais autenticamente ligado aos interesses da classe, pois por desvirtuamento contingencial em face da iniciante pouca expressão e inexperiência desse estamento, a ação sindical desses servidores sempre esteve à ilharga do movimento sindical do trabalhador privado, o qual tem outra linha de ação direcionada a interesses mais ligados ao conflito trabalho vs. capital, interesses esses que não se coadunam e nem se identificam com as aspirações e necessidades do funcionalismo público, mesmo que, muitas vezes, a questão do conflito desses agentes tenha uma interface no conjunto da pauta de reivindicação dos trabalhadores privados, ou seja, a questão salarial. O imperativo maior - e esta é a base da recomendação mais substancial - é conduzir a ação dos agentes públicos de forma heterodoxa na direção de se independentizar o movimento sindical desses agentes, a ser impulsionado pelas suas peculiaridades e por sua essencialidade ditada pela sua ontologia de servidores da coisa pública e tendo o público como sua clientela. Este é, em síntese, o caminho aqui trilhado.

Export-led recoveries in small open industrialized economies

This paper studies the role of Vertical Specialization-based trade and foreign damand push as elements capable of explaining export-led recoveries in small open industrialized economies. The empirical evidence on export-led recoveries is reviewed. Data supporting the growing importance of vertical specialization for international trade are presented. I compare the performance of two versions of a small open economy model, calibrated to mimic Canadian Business Cycles. The …rst one is based upon Schmitt-Grohe(1998). The second incorporates Vertical- Specialization-based trade. I show that an arti…cial economy featuring Vertical-Specializationbased trade in conjunction with an exogenous AR(2) process for foreign output displays improved impulse responses to a foreign output shock and is able to mimic the contribution of Canadian exports to output growth during economic recoveries.

Lighting and violent crimes: evaluating the effect of an electrification policy in rural Brazil on violent crime reduction

This paper estimates the effect of lighting on violent crime reduction. We explore an electrification program (LUZ PARA TODOS or Light for All - LPT) adopted by the federal government to expand electrification to rural areas in all Brazilian municipalities in the 2000s as an exogenous source of variation in electrification expansion. Our instrumental variable results show a reduction in homicide rates (approximately five homicides per 100,000 inhabitants) on rural roads/urban streets when a municipality moved from no access to full coverage of electricity between 2000 and 2010. These findings are even more significant in the northern and northeastern regions of Brazil, where rates of electrification are lower than those of the rest of the country and, thus, where the program is concentrated. In the north (northeast), the number of violent deaths on the streets per 100,000 inhabitants decreased by 48.12 (13.43). This moved a municipality at the 99th percentile (75th) to the median (zero) of the crime distribution of municipalities. Finally, we do not find effects on violent deaths in households and at other locations. Because we use an IV strategy by exploring the LPT program eligibility criteria, we can interpret the results as the estimated impact of the program on those experiencing an increase in electricity coverage due to their program eligibility. Thus, the results represent local average treatment effects of lighting on homicides.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

The economics of wage-led recovery: analysis and policy recommendations

The financial crisis and Great Recession have been followed by a jobs shortage crisis that most forecasts predict will persist for years given current policies. This paper argues for a wage-led recovery and growth program which is the only way to remedy the deep causes of the crisis and escape the jobs crisis. Such a program is the polar opposite of the current policy orthodoxy, showing how much is at stake. Winning the argument for wage-led recovery will require winning the war of ideas about economics that has its roots going back to Keynes’ challenge of classical macroeconomics in the 1920s and 1930s. That will involve showing how the financial crisis and Great Recession were the ultimate result of three decades of neoliberal policy, which produced wage stagnation by severing the wage productivity growth link and made asset price inflation and debt the engine of demand growth in place of wages; showing how wage-led policy resolves the current problem of global demand shortage without pricing out labor; and developing a detailed set of policy proposals that flow from these understandings. The essence of a wage-led policy approach is to rebuild the link between wages and productivity growth, combined with expansionary macroeconomic policy that fills the current demand shortfall so as to push the economy on to a recovery path. Both sets of measures are necessary. Expansionary macro policy (i.e. fiscal stimulus and easy monetary policy) without rebuilding the wage mechanism will not produce sustainable recovery and may end in fiscal crisis. Rebuilding the wage mechanism without expansionary macro policy is likely to leave the economy stuck in the orbit of stagnation.