Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.

Green logistics: key elements for a well-functioning sustainable logistics system

A growing awareness of the modern society about the direct relationship between a growing global community with increasing total industrial activities on one hand and various environmental problems and a natural limitation of natural resources on the other hand set the base for sustainable or “green” approaches within the supply chain. This paper therefore will look at the issue of “Green Logistics” which seeks to reduce the environmental impact of logistics activities by taking into account functions such as recycling, waste and carbon emission reduction and the use of alternative sources of energy. In order to analyze how these approaches and ideas are being perceived by the system as a whole two models from the area of prospective and scenario planning are being used and described to identify the main drivers and tendencies within the system in order to create feasible hypothesis. Using the URCA/CHIVAS model allows us to identify the driver variables out of a high number of variables that best describe the system “Green Logistics”. Followed by the analysis of the actor’s strategies in the system with the Mactor model it is possible to reduce the complexity of a completely holistic system to a few key drivers that can be analyzed further on. Here the implications of URCA/CHIVAS and Mactor are being used to formulate hypotheses about the perception of Green Logistics and its successful implementation among logistics decision makers by an online survey. This research seeks to demonstrate the usefulness of scenario planning to a highly complex system observing it from all angles and extracting information about the relevant factors of it. The results of this demonstration indicate that there are drivers much beyond the factory walls that need to be considered when implementing successfully a system such as Green Logistics.