Adaptation of the international investment contract: the hardship clause

Este trabalho acadêmico explora, em linhas gerais, a questão da adaptação do contrato de investimento internacional, e o tema ‘cláusula de hardship’ em específico. Objetiva-se efetuar uma análise detalhada da cláusula de hardship, como meio de adaptação e flexibilização de contratos internacionais de investimento sob a ótica da prática jurídica e mercantil contemporânea. A discussão se centra no contraste entre a possibilidade de adaptação do contrato por circunstâncias imprevisíveis e o imperativo de previsibilidade no investimento. Nesse sentido, o estudo busca oferecer soluções práticas para o dilema existente entre a necessidade de segurança na relação econômica (cumprimento do contato) e a prevenção da possibilidade de ruína financeira para quaisquer das partes no caso de uma mudança brusca no contexto dos negócios. O trabalho está centrado em uma investigação teórica acerca dos temas de readaptação contratual; diferenças entre sistemas jurídicos de estados-nações, e suas consequências no comércio internacional; e a cláusula de hardship em si. Como forma de contribuir para uma compreensão prática na questão da adaptação do contrato de investimento internacional devido a fatores imprevistos, este trabalho analisa casos reais e tendências atuais observadas na arbitragem internacional.

Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessment

Managed caIe capitation contracts provide monetary incentives for doctoIs to save medical costs while standard health insurance contracts do noto The papeI proposes an alternative model for insurance markets which is used to analyze managed caIe contracts. In our model, households would like to buy insurance for the possible need of a service. The distinctive aspect of our model is that providers of service have privileged information on the most appropriate procedure to be followed. In the managed care application of the model, doctors are the providers of the service and through a diagnosis have better information of the patient's health condition. Equilibrium in our model is always constrained eflicient. A partial capitation contract arises when both the cost and net benefits of treatment are high enough. We show that a capitation contract provides incentives for doctors: i) to care about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (altruistic behamor); and ii) to save medical costs (managed care behamor). Doctors, in this case, choose less medically eflicient treatments as they would choose under a standard health insurance contract. Besides this, household' welfare is increased in comparison to the standard contract. This increased welfare translates into a revealed preference for the capitation contract.

The insurance function of contracts

One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.

Do insurance defrauders want to be punished?

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit confirms a false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We characterize the efRcient contracts when this punishment is bounded from above by a legal restriction. Then, we do some comparative statics on the efRcient contracts and on the agent's utility. The most important result of this paper concerns the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment. We prove that there exists a uni que value of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high risk type. Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment, the insurer will effectively audit a low risk reporto We also show that this particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk policyholder. Therefore, when this probability is sufRciently high, the nullity of the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder, the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA and in some European countries.

Monopolistic insurance and competitive financial markets

This dissertation studies the interaction between insurance and financial markets. Individuals who differ only in risk can save through a competitive market. They also have access to insurance contracts offered by a monopolist firm. We show that an equilibrium exists in that economy. Fundamentally, we identify an externality imposed on the insurer's decision by the endogeneity of prices in the financial market.We argue that, because of such externality and in contrast to the pure contract theory case, equilibrium may exhibit pooling.