The influence of the tag-along rights in the value of companies: an event study of the effects on the market and service companies

The aim of this work is to check the effect of granting tag-along rights to stockholders by analyzing the behavior of the return of the stock. To do so we carried out event studies for a group of 21 company stocks, divided into service provider companies and others, who granted this right to their stockholders after Law 10,303 was passed in October, 2001. In the test we used two models for estimating abnormal returns: adjusted to the market and adjusted to the risk and market. The results of the tests we carried out based on these models did not capture abnormal returns (surpluses), telling us that the tag-along rights did not affect the pattern of daily returns of the stocks of companies traded on BOVESPA (The Sao Paulo Stock Exchange). We did not expect this result because of the new corporate governance practices adopted by companies in Brazil.

On the economic and fiscal effects of infrastructure investment in Brazil

This article studies the productive impact of infrastructure investment in Brazil. Public-capital expenditures in the country have decreased continuously over the last two decades, and this paper shows the significant impact this has had on infrastructure stocks. Cointegration analysis is used to investigate the long-run association between output and infrastructure, the results being then used to study the short-run dynamic of these variables. Whether in the short or long run, the productive impact of infrastructure was found to be relevant. Other group of simulations studies the impact of expanding capital expenditures through debt finance on debt to GDP ratio as well as on public cash áow and net worth.

Bank relationships: effect on the availability and marginal cost of credit for firms in Argentina

The paper provides evidence on what affects at the margin the cost and availability of bank credit for firms in Argentina. We study in particular how banks use different pieces of private and public information to screen firms and overcome informational asymmetries in the credit market. Some private information is transferable, like balance sheet data. Private information generated in relationships is not. To capture the closeness of bank relationships, we resort to the concentration of bank credit and the number of credit lines in a bank. We also consider public information available in the Central de Deudores. The cost of credit is measured using overdrafts, the most expensive line of credit, at the bank that charges the highest rate for overdrafts. We find that the cost of credit is smaller for a firm with a close relationship to the marginal bank. Firms with large assets, a high sales/assets ratio, and a low debt/assets ratio pay a lower interest rate at the margin. A good credit history (no debt arrears and no bounced checks) and collateral also reduce the marginal interest rate. The availability of credit is measured by unused credit lines as a proportion of total liabilities with the main bank. The availability of credit depends positively on a close relationship with the main bank. Large assets, a high return over assets, a high sales/assets ratio, a low debt/assets ratio, a good credit history, and collateral lead to higher credit availability. Our measure of unused credit lines is less ambiguous than traditional measures like leverage, which may indicate financial distress rather than availability of credit.