Financial integration and public financial institutions

This article highlights the problems associated with the existence of financiai institutions owned by a State which is a member of a federation. We show that these financiai institutions allow the States to transfer deficits to the federal government. This possibility creates incentives to higher deficits at State and federal leveis, implying an inefficiently high inflation rate. The main policy implication is that stabilization policies are more difficult to be implemented in countries such as Brazil, and Argentina which allow the members of the federation to own financiai institutions. A second policy implication is that Economic Blocks such as the European Community or Mercosur should not allow regional central banks if they create a monetary authority to help the members in financiai difficulty.

International integration and long- run persistence of the GNP distribution

We use the Ramsey model of g,Towth elaborated by Bliss [1995] and Ventlira [1997] to show how international integration results in long-nm persistellce Df GNPs distribution, while allowing, under certain conditions on parameters, for convergellce during the transition. First, we pi·ovide relationships which explicitly relate, in the neighborhood of the steady-state, the magnitude of conditional convergence or divergence to the fundamentaIs of the economies. Second, we present ali analysis of the Cobb Douglas case with a broad dass of utility functions and show that there is always transitional convergenee with this technology. Third, directions for testing the Illodel against the traditional dosed-ecollomy setting are proposed. These lead to adding specific and world-wide regTessors to traditional growth regressions.