Financial integration and public financial institutions

This article highlights the problems associated with the existence of financiai institutions owned by a State which is a member of a federation. We show that these financiai institutions allow the States to transfer deficits to the federal government. This possibility creates incentives to higher deficits at State and federal leveis, implying an inefficiently high inflation rate. The main policy implication is that stabilization policies are more difficult to be implemented in countries such as Brazil, and Argentina which allow the members of the federation to own financiai institutions. A second policy implication is that Economic Blocks such as the European Community or Mercosur should not allow regional central banks if they create a monetary authority to help the members in financiai difficulty.

Inflationary bias and state owned financial institutions

This article explains why the existence of state owned financial institutions makes it more difficult for a country to balance its budget. We show that states can use their financiaI institutions to transfer their deficits to the federal govemment. As a result, there is a bias towards Iarge deficits and high inflation rates. Our model also predicts that state owned financiaI institutions should underperform the market, mainly because they concentrate their portfolios on non-performing loans to their own shareholders, that is, the states. Brazil and Argentina are two countries with a history of high inflation that confirm our predictions .

An empirical approach toward understanding the linkage between legal and financial institutions

Researchers have made different attempts to investigate the interaction between the quality and efficiency of a country’s institutions and a country’s economic performance. Within this framework, emphasis has been put on the relationship between the legal institutions and the financial system as essential factors in creating and enhancing overall economic growth. The link between legal institutions and the financial systems, however, is still somewhat controversial. This paper reports on a survey administered to 1,362 participants regarding preferences for investment under different legal and financial institutions. Results suggest that the performance of a country‘s legal institutions affects the willingness to invest money in that country and that people of different gender, age, political traditions, and professional experience react differently to these institutions.

Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth

This manuscript empirically assesses the effects of political institutions on economic growth. It analyzes how political institutions affect economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic development by means of dynamic panel estimation with interaction terms. The new empirical results obtained show that political institutions work as a substitute for democracy promoting economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important for increasing economic growth, mainly when democracy is not consolidated. Moreover, political institutions are extremely relevant to economic outcomes in periods of transition to democracy and in poor countries with high ethnical fractionalization.

Sale of credit portfolio and risk : the case of financial institutions in Brazil

Este estudo analisa se as vendas de carteiras de crédito são utilizadas por instituições financeiras para gestão de risco, de acordo com Stanton(1998) e Murray(2001) ou para captação recursos, como apontado em Cebenoyan e Strahan(2001) e Dionne e Harchaoui(2003). Duas hipóteses foram testadas quanto às vendas de carteira de crédito: 1) implicam em melhor rating na carteira remanescente; ou 2) promovem alavancagem financeira - com piora na carteira remanescente -, controlando para a existência de coobrigação e para quem esses ativos foram transferidos. A amostra inclui informações trimestrais de 145 instituições financeiras do primeiro trimestre de 2001 ao segundo trimestre de 2008. Os resultados oferecem evidências empíricas de que as instituições financeiras utilizam estas vendas para melhora do rating da carteira de crédito remanescente, ou seja, elas transferem, em sua maioria, ativos de baixa qualidade, garantindo bons ratings e melhorando a liquidez. Adicionalmente, seguindo a proposta Dionne e Harchaoui(2003) - que além de testar, evidenciam que exigências regulatórias promovem alavancagem em ativos de alto risco - foi observada a relação entre o Índice de Basiléia e rating da carteira de crédito. As conclusões foram semelhantes às encontradas por Dionne e Harchaoui(2003): quanto mais adequada – maior Índice de Basiléia - uma instituição financeira for, maiores as chances de ela possuir uma carteira de crédito com qualidade ruim.

Hybrid political institutions and governability: the budgetary process in Brazil

In this paper we take a close look at some of the particular pathways by which majoritarian and consensual institutions affect governability. We demonstrate that the mix of majoritarian and consensual institutions found within a country can influence these pathways quite dramatically, such that they produce rather different consequences for governability, even when these pathways are relatively similar in nature. Particularly, we focus on the rules governing the relationship between the President and the Legislature, especially the appropriation of amendments proposed by legislators. In some presidential countries, the president possesses a partial veto (or a line-item veto) which allows him/her to approve or strike appropriations, which legislators introduce in amendments. Concentrating on the case of Brazil, we argue and demonstrate that whether or not the president can use this tool to sustain governing majorities (i.e., to increase governability) depends on the kind of amendment introduced by legislators. One kind, individual amendment, is linked to the majoritarian institution of a powerful presidency and therefore helps to increase governability. A second kind, collective amendment, is linked to consensual institutions and actually does not enhance legislative support for the Executive.

Rising Brazil: implications for world order and international institutions

Palestra promovida pelo Centro de Relações Internacionais da FGV.

Pompidou & Pompeia: a parallel between the management strategies of two cultural institutions in the French and Brazilian contexts

A presente pesquisa foi conduzida na forma de um estudo de caso de duas instituições culturais no contexto francês e brasileiro. O Centro Pompidou é um projeto presidencial de museu financiado pelo Estado, com a missão de tornar a arte moderna em todas as suas expressões acessíveis ao público em geral. O Sesc Pompeia é um centro multidisciplinar de cultura e esporte - financiado pelo dinheiro dos impostos e administrado pela Federação do Comércio . O Sesc Pompéia é dedicado à oferta de educação informal através do cultivo da mente e do corpo. O estudo examina se as teorias de dependência de recursos e de poder podem ser utilizadas para conceituar a relação que o Centro Pompidou e do Sesc Pompéia tem com seus stakeholders financeiros. Mais especificamente, será discutido em que medida o grau de dependência influencia a estratégia de gestão das instituições. O objetivo é de responder a pergunta seguinte: quais são as estratégias que as instituições adotam para reduzir sua dependência com relação a seus principais stakeholders financeiros? Finalmente algumas implicações práticas de gestão serão elaboradas a partir do paralelo entre as estratégias das duas instituições.

Theorizing Latin America : transactions, resources and institutions

Nos anos 80, a América Latina, uma das regiões menos desenvolvidas do mundo, enfrentou um período de mudanças econômicas e políticas significativas que levaram essa região a um lugar de destaque no mercado mundial. Por conseguinte, a América Latina foi objeto de diversos estudos, que, por sua vez, foram compilados nesta revisão de literatura, a fim de que se possam identificar quais os avanços foram feitos no âmbito da Gestão e Negócios Internacionais. Como base, tomou-se a metodologia aplicada por Meyer e Peng (2005), fazendo um paralelo entre três importantes teorias da área (Teoria de Baseada em Recursos, Teoria Baseada no Custo das Transações e Teoria Institucional) e alguns assuntos-chave de extrema relevância ao entendimento do tema (Construindo Vantagens Competitivas, Liberalização Econômica versus Regulação Governamental e Internacionalização) Ao final, delimitamos as contribuições da América Latina ao estudo da Gestão e Negócios Internacionais, fazendo algumas sugestões para futuros pesquisas nesse âmbito.

Electoral institutions,cleavage structures,and the number of parties

Theory: A classic question in political science concems ",hat deteImines the number of parties that compete in a given polity. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to answering this question, one that emphasizes the role of electorallaws in structuring coalitional incentives, another that emphasizes the importance of pre-existing social cleavages. In tbis paper, we view the number of parties as a product of the interaction between these two forces, following Powell (1982) and Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994). Hypotheses: The effective number of parties in a polity should be a multiplicative rather than an additive function ofthe peImissiveness ofthe electoral system and the heterogeneity ofthe society. Methods: Multiple regression on cross-sectional aggregate electoral statistics. Unlike previous studies, we (1) do not confine attention to developed democracies; (2) explicitly control for the influence of presidential elections, taking account of whether they are concurrent or nonconcurrent, and ofthe effective number ofpresidential candidates; and (3) also control for the presence and operation of upper tiers in legislative elections. Results: The hypothesis is confiImed, both as regards the number of legislative and the number of presidential parties .

Economic recovery from the Argentine great depression : institutions, expectations, and the change of macroeconomic regime

This work explores how Argentina overcame the Great Depression and asks whether active macroeconomic interventions made any contribution to the recovery. In particular, we study Argentine macroeconomic policy as it deviated from gold-standard orthodoxy after the final suspension of convertibility in 1929. As elsewhere, fiscal policy in Argentina was conservative, and had little power to smooth output. Monetary policy became heterodox after 1929. The first and most important stage of institutional change took place with the switch from a metallic monetary regime to a fiduciary regime in 1931; the Caja de Conversión (Conversion Office, a currency board) began rediscounting as a means to sterilize gold outflows and avoid deflationary pressures, thus breaking from orthodox "mIes of the game." However, the actual injections of liquidity were small' and were not enough to fully offset the incipient monetary contractions: the "Keynes" effect was weak or negative. Rather, recovery derived from changes in beliefs and expectations surrounding the shift in the monetary and exchange-rate regime,and the delinking of gold flows and the money base. Agents perceivod a new regime, as shown by the path of consumption, investment, and estimated ex ante real interest rates: the "Mundell" effect was dominant. Notably, this change of regime predated a later, and supposedly more significant, stage of institutional reform, namely the creation of the central bank in 1935. Still, the extent of intervention was weak, and insufficient to fully offset externaI shocks to prices and money. Argentine macropolicy was heterodox in terms of the change of regime, but still conservative in terms of the tentative scope of the measures taken .

Public debt management, monetary policy and financial institutions

Despite the large size of the Brazilian debt market, as well the large diversity of its bonds, the picture that emerges is of a market that has not yet completed its transition from the role it performed during the megainflation years, namely that of providing a liquid asset that provided positive real returns. This unfinished transition is currently placing the market under severe stress, as fears of a possible default from the next administration grow larger. This paper analyzes several aspects pertaining to the management of the domestic public debt. The causes for the extremely large and fast growth ofthe domestic public debt during the seven-year period that President Cardoso are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 computes Value at Risk and Cash Flow at Risk measures for the domestic public debt. The rollover risk is introduced in a mean-variance framework in Section 4. Section 5 discusses a few issues pertaining to the overlap between debt management and monetary policy. Finally, Section 6 wraps up with policy discussion and policy recommendations.