Essays on industrial organization

Esta tese compõe-se de três ensaios que versam sobre o formato, em termos de estrutura de governança, das indústrias e como a estrutura interna das mesmas in fluenciam esses formatos e seus produtos. O primeiro capítulo apresenta um modelo de como a qualidade institucional, confiança e incompleteza contratual afetam as decisiões das firmas sobre a melhor forma de se organizarem internacionalmente. O segundo capítulo vai na mesma direcão de explicar a organização das indústrias, mas com foco no efeito da transmissão de informação entre as unidades constituintes das organizações sobre o formato ótimo das mesmas. Ambos trabalhos usam modelos dinâmicos. O terceiro capítulo se utiliza da modelagem de organização industrial para mostrar como a estrutura interna de uma indústria in fluencia no risco de crédito consignado.

Trust-based trade

There is substantially more trade within national borders than across borders. An important explanation for this fact is the weak enforcement of international contracts. We develop a model in which agents build reputations to overcome this institutional failure. The model describes the interplay between institutional quality, reputations and the dynamics of international trade. It also rationalizes several empirical regularities. We find that history matters for trade volumes, but that its effects vary with the institutional setting of the country. The same is true for the efticacy of trade liberalization programs. Moreover, while stricter enforcement of contracts enhances trade in the short run, it makes it harder for individual traders to develop good reputations. We show that this indirect negative effect may produce an "institutional trap": for sufliciently low initial levels of contract enforcement, a small tightening in enforcement reduces future trade fiows. We find also that search frictions aggravate the problems created by weak enforceability of contracts, even if they impose no direct cost on agents. The model allows extensions in several directions. We outline two of them, indicating how one could study transnational networks and the effects of firm heterogeneity within our structure.

A maturidade das instituições e a tributação do capital

Pesquisa em foco: Institutional quality and capital taxation in developing economies - 2011. Pesquisadores: Luis Araujo e Prof. Paulo Arvate

The brazilian education quality index (Ideb): measurement and incentives upgrades

The increasing availability of social statistics in Latin America opens new possibilities in terms of accountability and incentive mechanisms for policy makers. This paper addresses these issues within the institutional context of the Brazilian educational system. We build a theoretical model based on the theory of incentives to analyze the role of the recently launched Basic Education Development Index (Ideb) in the provision of incentives at the sub-national level. The first result is to demonstrate that an education target system has the potential to improve the allocation of resources to education through conditional transfers to municipalities and schools. Second, we analyze the local government’s decision about how to allocate its education budget when seeking to accomplish the different objectives contemplated by the index, which involves the interaction between its two components, average proficiency and the passing rate. We discuss as well policy issues concerning the implementation of the synthetic education index in the light of this model arguing that there is room for improving the Ideb’s methodology itself. In addition, we analyze the desirable properties of an ideal education index and we argue in favor of an ex-post relative learning evaluation system for different municipalities (schools) based on the value added across different grades