Infrastructure and productivity in Latin America: is there a relationship in the long run?

This article analyses the relationship between infrastructure and total factor productivity (TFP) in the four major Latin American economies: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. We hypothesise that an increase in infrastructure has an indirect effect on long-term economic growth by raising productivity. To assess this theory, we use the traditional Johansen methodology for testing the cointegration between TFP and physical measures of infrastructure stock, such as energy, roads, and telephones. We then apply the Lütkepohl, Saikkonen and Trenkler Test, which considers a possible level shift in the series and has better small sample properties, to the same data set and compare the two tests. The results do not support a robust long-term relationship between the series; we do not find strong evidence that cuts in infrastructure investment in some Latin American countries were the main reason for the fall in TFP during the 1970s and 1980s.

Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy : macroeconomic impact and welfare computation

In this paper a competitive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive externality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent government can improve upon decentralized allocation internalizing the externality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuals' welfare, no• operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters .

Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy: macroeconomic impact and welfare computation

In this paper a competi tive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive extemality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent governrnent can improve upon decentralized allocation intemalizing the extemality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuais' welfare, no operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters.